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Education

Ph.D. New York University, Political Science, 1977
M.A. New York University, Political Science, 1972
B.A. Fordham University, Political Science, 1969

Academic Positions

2007 – UB Distinguished Professor of Political Science, University at Buffalo
1991 – 2007 Professor of Political Science, University at Buffalo
1987 – 1991 Associate Professor of Political Science, University at Buffalo
1984 – 1987 Associate, Center for International Relations, Boston University
1978 – 1987 Assistant Professor of Political Science, Boston University
1977 – 1978 Adjunct Assistant Professor of Political Science, New York Institute of Technology
1977 Research Associate, Department of Economics, New York University (Supported by Office of Naval Research grant to Oskar Morgenstern)
1977 Adjunct Assistant Professor of Economics, New York University
1976 – 1978 Adjunct Assistant Professor of Political Science, The Cooper Union

Books and Monographs

Game Theory, Diplomatic History and Security Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, pp. vii + 185.

The Games of July: Explaining the Great War. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011, pp. x + 214.

Perfect Deterrence. [with D. Marc Kilgour]. Cambridge Studies in International Relations: 72. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. xxii + 414.

Modeling International Conflict. [Edited]. London: Gordon & Breach, 1990, pp. 1 – 167.

The Dynamics of Deterrence. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987, pp. xiv + 194.

Exploring the Stability of Deterrence. [Edited with Jacek Kugler]. University of Denver Graduate School of International Studies Monograph Series in World Affairs. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987, pp. viii + 168.

Game Theory: Concepts and Applications. Sage University Paper Series on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1984, pp. 1 – 96.

- (Korean edition, trans. Sooyoun Hwang. Pusan, Korea: Kyungshung University Press, 2004, pp. 1 – 159.)
- (Hungarian edition, trans. John Hidi. Budapest: Helicon, 2006, pp. 1 – 136.)

Articles

“Two Against One: Deterrence in the Triad,” *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy*, (2024), <https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2023-0050>, 1 – 25.

“Modeling Threats and Promises,” [with D. Marc Kilgour], *Journal of Peace Research*, 60, number 4 (2023), 661 – 71.

“The Carrot and Stick Approach to Coercive Diplomacy,” *International Journal of Development and Conflict*, 10, number 1, (2020), 105 – 15.

“Explaining the Long-Peace: Why von Neumann (and Schelling) Got it Wrong,” *International Studies Review*, (2018), 20, pp. 422 – 37.

“A General Explanation of the Cuban Missile Crisis,” *International Journal of Peace Economics and Peace Science*, 1, number 1, (2016), pp. 91 – 118.

“Reflections on the Great War,” *Review of History and Political Science*, 3, number 2, (2015), pp. 1 – 5.

“The Moroccan Crisis of 1905 – 1906: An Analytic Narrative,” *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy*, 21, number 3, (July 2015), pp. 1 – 24.

“A Game-Theoretic History of the Cuban Missile Crisis,” *Economies*, 2, number 1 (2014), pp. 20 – 44.

“Deterrence Theory, Then and Now: There Is No Going Back,” *St Antony’s International Review*, 9, number 1, (May 2013), pp. 157 – 67.

“After Sarajevo: Explaining the Blank Check,” *International Interactions*, 35, (January – March 2009), pp. 106 – 27.

“Explaining the 1914 War in Europe,” *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 21, number 1 (January 2009), pp. 63 – 95.

“Toward a Unified Theory of Interstate Conflict,” *International Interactions*, 33, number 3 (July – September 2007), pp. 305 – 27.

“Explaining Limited Conflicts” [with D. Marc Kilgour], *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 24, number 1 (Spring 2007), pp 65 – 82.

“The Deterrence-vs.-Restraint Dilemma in Extended Deterrence: Explaining British Policy in 1914” [with D. Marc Kilgour], *International Studies Review*, 8, number 4 (December 2006), pp. 623 – 41.

“Deterrence is Dead. Long Live Deterrence,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 23, number 2 (Summer 2006), pp. 115 – 20.

“Reconciling Rationality with Deterrence: A Re-examination of the Logical Foundations of Deterrence Theory,” *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 16, number 2 (April 2004), pp. 107 – 41.

“Alignment Patterns, Crisis Bargaining, and Extended Deterrence: A Game-Theoretic Analysis” [with D. Marc Kilgour], *International Studies Quarterly*, 47, number 4 (December 2003), pp. 587 – 615.

“The Impact of Conventional Force Reductions on Strategic Deterrence” [with D. Marc Kilgour], *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy*, 7, number 2 (Spring 2001), pp. 59 – 82.

“All Mortis, No Rigor,” *International Security*, 24, number 2 (Fall 1999), pp. 107 – 14.
• Reprinted in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller [eds.], *Rational Choice and Security Studies*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000.

“Deterrence Theory and the Spiral Model Revisited” [with D. Marc Kilgour], *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 10, number 1 (January 1998), pp. 66 – 87.

“Classical Deterrence Theory: A Critical Assessment.” *International Interactions*, 21, number 4, (1996), pp. 365 – 87.

“Assessing Competing Defense Postures: The Strategic Implications of ‘Flexible Response’” [with D. Marc Kilgour], *World Politics*, 47, number 3 (April 1995), pp. 373 – 417.

“Uncertainty and the Role of the Pawn in Extended Deterrence” [with D. Marc Kilgour], *Synthèse*, 100, number 3 (September 1994), pp. 379 – 412.

- “Modeling Massive Retaliation” [with D. Marc Kilgour], *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 13, number 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 61 – 86.
- “Asymmetric Deterrence” [with D. Marc Kilgour], *International Studies Quarterly*, 37, number 1 (March 1993), pp. 1 – 27.
- Translated and reprinted in Motoshi Suzuki, ed., *Theories and Models in the Social Sciences*, Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2000.
- “NATO, Rational Escalation and Flexible Response,” *Journal of Peace Research*, 29, number 4 (November 1992), pp. 435 – 54.
- “Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence,” [with D. Marc Kilgour], *American Journal of Political Science*, 35, number 2 (May 1991), pp. 305 – 334.
- “Rationality and Deterrence,” *World Politics*, 42, number 2 (January 1990), pp. 238 – 260.
- “The Dynamics of Escalation,” *Information and Decision Technologies*, 16, number 3 (1990), pp. 249 – 261.
- “Rational Choice Models and International Relations Research,” *International Interactions*, 15, numbers 3 and 4 (1990), pp. 197 – 201.
- “The Long-Term Stability of Deterrence,” [with Jacek Kugler], *International Interactions*, 15, numbers 3 and 4 (1990), pp. 255 – 278.
- Reprinted in *International Interactions*, “Special Issue on Power Transitions” (January 2012).
- “The Logic of Deterrence,” *Analyse & Kritik*, 9 (October 1987), pp. 47 – 61.
- “Holding Power in Sequential Games,” [with D. Marc Kilgour], *International Interactions*, 13, number 2 (1987), pp. 91 – 114.
- “Toward a Reformulation of the Theory of Mutual Deterrence,” *International Studies Quarterly*, 29, number 2 (June 1985), pp. 155 – 169.
- “Limited-Move Equilibria in 2 x 2 Games,” *Theory and Decision*, 16, number 1 (January 1984), pp. 1 – 19.
- “A Game-Theoretic Evaluation of the Cease-Fire Alert Decision of 1973,” *Journal of Peace Research*, 20, number 1 (April 1983), pp. 73 – 86.
- “Competing Game-Theoretic Explanations: The Geneva Conference of 1954,” *International Studies Quarterly*, 26, number 1 (March 1982), pp. 141 – 146.
- “Nonmyopic Equilibria and the Middle East Crisis of 1967,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 5, number 1 (Spring 1981), pp. 139 – 162.
- “Double Deception: Two Against One in Three-Person Games,” [with Steven J. Brams], *Theory and Decision*, 13, number 1 (March 1981), pp. 81 – 91.

“The Geneva Conference of 1954: A Case of Tacit Deception,” *International Studies Quarterly*, 23, number 3 (September 1979), pp. 390 – 411.

“A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Vietnam Negotiations: Preferences and Strategies, 1968-1973,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 21, number 4 (December 1977), pp. 663 – 84.

- Reprinted in I. William Zartman [ed.], *The Negotiation Process: Theories and Applications*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1978.

“Deception in Simple Voting Games,” [with Steven J. Brams], *Social Science Research*, 6, number 3 (September 1977), pp. 257 – 72.

Chapters

“Multilateral Arms Races,” in Manas Chatterji and Partha Gangopadhyay [eds.], *New Frontiers in Conflict Management and Peace Economics, Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development*. Bingley, UK: Emerald Group, 2021, vol. 29, 15 – 25. <https://doi.org/10.1108/S1572-832320210000029002>

“Perfect Deterrence Theory,” in William R. Thompson [ed.], *Oxford Encyclopedia of Empirical International Relations Theory*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018.

- Published online, January 2017: DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.555.
- Reprinted in Guoli Liu and Joanna Drzewieniecki [eds.], *Russian Studies, Political Science, and the Philosophy of Technology*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2022.

“Modern Deterrence Theory: Research Trends, Policy Debates, and Methodological Controversies,” [with Stephen L. Quackenbush], in Desmond King, [ed.], *Oxford Handbooks Online*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016.
DOI:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935307.013.39

“Deterrence Theory,” in David Armstrong [ed.], *Oxford Bibliographies in International Relations*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
DOI: 10.1093/OBO/9780199743292-0161.

“Game Theory and Other Modeling Approaches,” [with Branislav L. Slantchev], in Robert A. Denemark et al., [eds.], *The International Studies Encyclopedia*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, vol. IV, pp. 2591 – 2610.

- Also published online at: <http://www.isacompendium.com/>.
- Revised version published in Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Paul F. Diehl, and James D. Morrow, [eds.], *Guide to the Scientific Study of International Processes*. West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012, 46 – 86.

“Game Theory and Security Studies,” in Paul D. Williams [ed.], *Security Studies: An Introduction*. London: Routledge, 2008, pp. 44 – 58.

- Revised and updated for the 2nd ed., 2012, pp. 48 – 62.

“Analytic Narratives, Game Theory, and Peace Science,” in Manas Chatterji [ed.] *Frontiers of Peace Economics and Peace Science, Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development*. Bingley, UK: Emerald Group, 2011, vol. 16, pp. 19 – 35.

“A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the War in Kosovo,” [with Stephen L. Quackenbush], in Jennifer Sterling-Folker, [ed.], *Making Sense of IR Theory*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006, pp. 98 – 114.

“The Rites of Passage: Parity, Nuclear Deterrence and Power Transitions,” in Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke, [eds.], *Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of “The War Ledger.”* Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1996, pp. 249 – 68.

“A Stability Analysis of the US-USSR Strategic Relationship,” in Kugler and Zagare, *Exploring the Stability of Deterrence*. University of Denver Graduate School of International Studies Monograph Series in World Affairs. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987, pp. 123 – 150.

“Risk, Deterrence, and War” [with Jacek Kugler], in Kugler and Zagare, *Exploring the Stability of Deterrence*. University of Denver Graduate School of International Studies Monograph Series in World Affairs. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987, pp. 67 – 89.

“Introduction” [with Jacek Kugler], in Kugler and Zagare, *Exploring the Stability of Deterrence*. University of Denver Graduate School of International Studies Monograph Series in World Affairs. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987, pp. 1 – 11.

“Recent Advances in Game Theory and Political Science,” in Samuel Long, [ed.], *Annual Review of Political Science*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1986, pp. 60 – 90.

“The Pathologies of Unilateral Deterrence,” in Urs Luterbacher and Michael D. Ward [eds.], *Dynamic Models of International Conflict*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1985, pp. 52 – 75.

Reviews

Leo J. Blanken, L., *Rational Empires: Institutional Incentives and Imperial Expansion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), in *Global Discourse: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs and Applied Contemporary Thought*, 3:1 (2013), pp. 197 – 201.

- Reprinted in Russell Foster, Mathew Johnson and Mark Edward [eds.], *The Crisis of the Twenty-First Century: Empire in the Age of Austerity*. London: Routledge, 2014.

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, *War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), in *American Political Science Review*, 87 (September 1993).

William H. Riker, *Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice* (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Co., 1982), in *American Political Science Review*, 77 (September 1983).

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, *The War Trap* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), in *American Political Science Review*, 76 (September 1982).

James Mayall and Cornelia Navari [eds.], *The End of the Post-War Era: Documents on Great Power Relations 1968–1975*. (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1980), in *Journal of Politics*, (February 1982).

Other Publications

“Double Deterrence: Two Challengers, One Defender,” Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment, September 27, 2023: <https://nsiteam.com/double-deterrence-two-challengers-one-defender/>

“War is not a Game, but We should Play it Like one,” *iAi News*, April 11, 2023: https://iai.tv/articles/war-is-not-a-game-but-we-should-play-it-like-one-frank-zagare-auid-2448?_auid=2020

“Game Theory and Diplomatic History: The Strategy Behind the Rhineland Crisis,” *Science Uncovered*. Medium: <https://medium.com/science-uncovered/game-theory-thinking-behind-rhineland-crisis-9e7fe2c62ff>. April 5, 2019.

“Game Theory and Diplomatic History: Introduction to the Rhineland Crisis,” *Science Uncovered*. Medium: <https://medium.com/science-uncovered/introduction-rhineland-crisis-429620d55f05>. March 9, 2019

“Game Theory in Diplomatic History,” *Science Uncovered*. Medium: <https://medium.com/science-uncovered/basics-game-theory-diplomatic-history-846de9345cce>. February 9, 2019.

“The Deterrence Project,” *Qualitative Data Repository*. <https://doi.org/10.5064/F6AJE0NP> QDR Main Collection. V1, 2018.

“Assessing the Stability of Interstate Relationships Using Game Theory,” in *Perspectives on Political and Social Regional Stability Impacted by Global Crises - A Social Science Context*. and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Research and Development Directorate, January 2010, pp. 242 – 46.

“Game Theory.” *The World Book Encyclopedia*. Chicago: World Book Publishing, 1996.

The Mathematics of Conflict. Lexington, MA: Consortium for Mathematics and Its Application, 1986, pp. viii + 38.

Abstracts

“All Mortis, No Rigor.” *International Political Science Abstracts*, 51 (2001).

“Deterrence Theory and the Spiral Model Revisited” (with D. Marc Kilgour). *Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy*, 4 (Fall and Winter 1996).

“Crisis, Escalation and Extended Deterrence” (with D. Marc Kilgour). *Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy*, 3 (Winter 1996).

“Modeling ‘Massive Retaliation’” (with D. Marc Kilgour). *Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy*, 1 (Fall 1993).

“Uncertainty and the Role of the Pawn in Extended Deterrence” (with D. Marc Kilgour). *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 12 (Spring 1993).

Journals Edited

Special Issue of *Conflict Management and Peace Science* on “Deterrence,” 2006.

Special Issue of *International Interactions* on “Rational Choice Models in International Relations,” 1990.

Paper Presentations

“Modeling Threats and Promises,” [with D. Marc Kilgour], paper delivered at the conference on The Scientific Study of Interstate Conflict, October 22 – 23, 2021, The University at Buffalo, SUNY.

“Reflections on the Great War,” paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 28 – 31, 2014.

“Explaining the Blank Check: A Game-Theoretic Analysis,” delivered at the annual meeting of the Northeastern Political Science Association, Boston, Massachusetts, November 13 – 19, 2008.

“The July Crisis: A Game-Theoretic Analysis,” delivered at the 48th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Chicago, Illinois, February 28 – March 3, 2007.

“Unambiguous Commitments: When Do They Work?” [with D. Marc Kilgour], delivered at the 46th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Honolulu, Hawaii, March 1 – 5, 2005.

“Toward a Unified Theory of Interstate Conflict,” delivered at the 5th Power Transition Conference, Carmel, CA, August 20 – 21, 2004.

“Squaring the Circle: Resolving the Conflict Between Deterrence Theory and the Rationality Postulate,” delivered at the 45th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, March 17 – 20, 2004.

“The Multipolar Alignment Game” [with D. Marc Kilgour], delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA, August 30 – September 2, 2001, and at the Conference for the Institutionalization of International Negotiation Systems, University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany, July 2003.

“Alliance Dynamics” [with D. Marc Kilgour], delivered at Joint U.K. ECAAR and Peace Science Conference, Middlesex University, London, U.K., June 13 – 16, 2001.

“Alignment Patterns and Crisis Bargaining in Multipolar Systems: A Game Theoretic Analysis” [with D. Marc Kilgour], delivered at the 42nd Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Chicago, IL, February 20 – 24, 2001.

“The Future of Deterrence Theory” delivered at the 39th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Minneapolis, MN, March 17 – 21, 1998.

“Deterrence Effectiveness When Forces Shrink” [with D. Marc Kilgour], delivered at the 39th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Minneapolis, MN, March 17 – 21, 1998.

“Can Deterrence Be Effective When Forces Are Small” [with D. Marc Kilgour], delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, August 28 – 31, 1997.

“Prolegomena to a Theory of Perfect Deterrence” delivered at the 51st Annual Conference of the New York State Political Science Association, New York, NY, April 18 – 19, 1997.

“Plagued With Platitudes: A Critical Assessment of Classical Deterrence Theory” delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA, August 29 – September 1, 1996.

“Deterrence Theory and the Spiral Model Revisited” [with D. Marc Kilgour], delivered at the 37th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, CA, April 16 • 20, 1996 and at the Fifth World Peace Science Congress, Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, Netherlands, June 3 – 6, 1996.

“Crisis, Escalation, and Extended Deterrence” [with D. Marc Kilgour], delivered at the Twenty-Ninth North American meeting of the Peace Science Society (International), Columbus, Ohio, October 13 – 15, 1995.

“Using Game Theory To Analyse a General Two-level Escalation Model” [with D. Marc Kilgour], delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, NY, September 1 – 4, 1994.

“Can Escalation Be Controlled? A Game-Theoretic Analysis” [with D. Marc Kilgour], delivered at the 35th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, DC, March 28 – April 1, 1994.

“Modeling ‘Flexible Response’” [with D. Marc Kilgour], delivered at the 34th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Acapulco, Mexico, March 23 – 27, 1993.

“Modeling ‘Massive Retaliation’” [with D. Marc Kilgour], delivered at the Twenty-Sixth North American meeting of the Peace Science Society (International), Pittsburgh, PA, November 13 – 15, 1992.

“The Rites of Passage: Parity, Nuclear Deterrence and Power Transitions,” delivered at the Conference on Parity and War: A Critical Assessment of *The War Ledger*, The Claremont Graduate School, Claremont, CA, October 2 – 4, 1992.

“Uncertainty and the Viability of Limited War Options,” [with D. Marc Kilgour], delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, August 29 – September 1, 1991.

“Uncertainty and the Role of the Pawn in Extended Deterrence,” [with D. Marc Kilgour], delivered at the 32nd Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Vancouver, British Columbia, March 20 – 23, 1991, at the British International Studies Conference, Warwick, UK, December 16 – 18, 1991, and at the World Peace Conference, Rotterdam, The Netherlands, May 18 – 20, 1992.

“Escalation in Multi-Stage Games,” delivered at the Twenty-Fourth North American meeting of the Peace Science Society (International), New Brunswick, NJ, November 16 – 18, 1990.

“Hegemonic Deterrence,” [with D. Marc Kilgour], delivered at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, DC, April 10 – 14, 1990, and at the International Conference on Game Theory and Economics, University at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, NY, July 16 – 17, 1990.

“Deterrence and Uncertainty,” [with D. Marc Kilgour], delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA, August 31 – September 3, 1989.
Nominated for the Pi Sigma Alpha Award by the Conflict Processes Section.

“Holding Power in Sequential Games: The Case of the 1948 Berlin Crisis,” [with D. Marc Kilgour], delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, August 28 – 31, 1986.

“The Long-Term Stability of Deterrence,” [with Jacek Kugler and Walter J. Petersen], delivered at the XIII World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Paris, France, July 15 – 20, 1985, and at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, LA, August 28 – September 1, 1985.

“The Pathologies of Unilateral Deterrence: The Falkland/Malvinas Crisis of 1982,” delivered at the Second World Peace Science Congress, Rotterdam, Netherlands, June 4 – 15, 1984, and at the National Science Foundation Conference on Dynamic Models of International Conflict, Boulder, CO, October 31 – November 3, 1984.

“Exploring the Stability of Deterrence,” [with Jacek Kugler], delivered at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, GA, March 27 – 31, 1984.

“Limited-Move Equilibria in 2 x 2 Games,” delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1 – 4, 1983.

“Toward a Reconciliation of Game Theory and the Theory of Mutual Deterrence,” delivered at the Fourth Annual Meeting of the Summer Institute for the Study of Conflict Theory and International Security, Los Angeles, CA, June 23 – 25, 1983, and at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Mexico City, April 5 – 9, 1983.

“A Game-Theoretic Evaluation of the Cease-Fire Alert Decision of 1973,” delivered at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Cincinnati, OH, March 24 – 27, 1982.

“Nonmyopic Equilibria and the Middle East Crisis of 1967,” delivered at the North American Conference of the Peace Science Society (International), Philadelphia, PA, November 9 • 11, 1981 and at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Denver, CO, September 2 – 5, 1982.

“Double Deception: Two Against One in Three Person Games,” [with Steven J. Brams], delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Public Choice Society, Charleston, SC, March 17 – 19, 1979.

Related Professional Activity

Pod Cast Guest, “Nuclear Deterrence as a Game Theoretic Concept,” *Game Changer*, <https://www.tws-partners.com/podcast/>

Panelist, National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine pilot project *Exploring the Development of Analytic Frameworks*, 2017 – 2018. The project is sponsored by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).

Invited Participant, First World War Workshop, sponsored by the National Science Foundation, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, April 27 – 29, 2012.

“The Onset of War in 1914,” lecture sponsored by the Department of Political Science, Northeastern University, January 27, 2012.

Chair, panel on “Structural Challenges in World Politics” at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, New York, NY, February 15 – 18, 2009.

Chair, panel on “Bargaining, War Costs, and Power” at the Annual Convention of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, April 3, 2008.

“Logical Consistency, Empirical Accuracy and Perfect Deterrence Theory,” lecture sponsored by the Department of Political Science, Vanderbilt University, March 29, 2005.

“Perfect Deterrence Theory,” lecture sponsored by School of International Relations, University of Southern California, April 1, 2004.

Chair, panel on “Dynamics of Conflict” at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Chicago, IL, February 24, 2001.

“Explaining Crises and Limited Wars,” lecture sponsored by the Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, February 23, 1996.

“When Do Limited Conflicts Occur?” lecture sponsored by the Department of Political Science, The Pennsylvania State University, January 11, 1996.

Chair, panel on “Modeling Conflict” at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Acapulco, Mexico, March 23 – 27, 1993.

Chair, panel on “Modeling Interstate Conflict” at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA, August 31 – September 3, 1989.

“Deterrence Theory: A Critical Assessment,” lecture sponsored by the Centre for International and Strategic Studies, York University, Toronto, Canada, May 4, 1989.

Chair, panel on “Cooperation and Conflict in International Politics” at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, September 1 – 4, 1988.

Chair, panel on “Cooperation and Conflict in International Politics” at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, September 2 – 5, 1987.

Chair, panel on “Modeling International Conflict” at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, August 29, 1986.

“The Dynamics of Deterrence,” lecture given at the faculty workshop on “Game Theory, National Security, and International Conflict,” Wellesley College, Wellesley, MA, August 11, 1986.

Chair, panel on “Dynamics of Conflict Processes: Deterrence and Instability,” at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, August 30, 1984.

“The Logic of Deterrence: Some Nonintuitive Results,” lecture sponsored by the Departments of Philosophy and Systems Design Engineering, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Canada, November 17, 1983.

Administrative Positions

- Chair, Department of Political Science, University at Buffalo, 1991–1994; 1996–2005
- Director of Undergraduate Studies, University at Buffalo, 2001–2006
- Director of Graduate Studies, Department of Political Science, University at Buffalo, 1989–1991
- Graduate Placement Director, Department of Political Science, University at Buffalo, 1987–1991
- Director, Undergraduate Studies, Department of Political Science, Boston University, 1982–1985
- Honors Coordinator, Department of Political Science, Boston University, 1982–1987

Professional Associations

American Political Science Association

- Council Member, Conflict Processes Section, 1986–1989, 1993–1996
- Selection Committee, “Lifetime Achievement Award,” Conflict Processes Section, 1990–1991

International Studies Association

- Vice President, 2006–2007
- Professional Rights and Responsibilities Committee, 2004–2006
- Presidential Nominating Committee, 2000–2004
- Nominating Committee, Scientific Study of International Politics Section, 1996

Peace Science Society (International)

- Councilor, 1992–1996
- The Walter Isard Dissertation Award Committee, 1993–1994
- Presidential Nominating Committee, 1993–1994

Honors and Activities

- Lisa Hertel Teaching Award, University at Buffalo, 2007
- The American Political Science Association/Pi Sigma Alpha award for “Outstanding Teaching in Political Science,” 2007
- Susan Strange Award, International Studies Association, 2005
- Sustained Achievement Award, University at Buffalo, 2002
- Nominated (with D. Marc Kilgour) by the Conflict Process Section for the Pi Sigma Alpha Award (best paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1989)
- Consultant: Booz Allen & Hamilton, 1985
- Participant: Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, 1972
- Member: Pi Sigma Alpha, 1969
- Dean’s List: Fordham University, 1967–1968
- Listed: Who’s Who in the East, 1993–
- Who’s Who in American Education, 1996–
- Who’s Who in America, 1996–

Boards and Panels

- Editorial Board: *International Journal of Peace Economics and Peace Science*, 2014 –
- Editorial Board: *Oxford Bibliographies Online in International Relations*, 2012 – 2016
- Editorial Board: *Game Theory and Strategy*, 2008
- Editorial Board: *International Studies Quarterly*, 1999 – 2003
- Editorial Board: *International Interactions*, 1984 – 1992; 1999 – 2014
- National Science Foundation Political Science Advisory Panel, 1990 – 1991
- Academic Advisory Board, United Arab Emirates University, Al Ain, UAE, 1998

Grants and Fellowships

- Faculty Development Grant, University at Buffalo, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017
- National Science Foundation Research Grant, 1996–1999
- International Studies Association Travel Grant, 1996
- National Science Foundation Research Grant, 1992–1995
- United States Institute of Peace Research Grant, 1989–1990
- Fellow: MIT/Harvard Summer Program on Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control, 1984
- Boston University Graduate School Research Grant, 1979–1980
- Boston University Special Summer Term Research Support Grant, 1979
- The Penfeld Fellowship for Studies in Diplomacy, International Affairs, and Belles Lettres, 1976–1977
- New York University Fellowships, 1975–1977
- New York State Regent’s Scholarship, 1965–1969
- Veteran’s Administration Scholarship, 1965–1969

University Committees

- UB Award Committee, 2022–
- IGERT Chairs Council, 2001
- ETC (Education Technology) Advisory Board, 2001
- Chair, International Relations Search Committee, University at Buffalo, 1995–1996
- Graduate Admissions Committee, University at Buffalo, 1994–1996
- Faculty of Social Sciences Budget Committee, University at Buffalo, 1990–1991
- Political Science Department Chair Search Committee, University at Buffalo, 1990, 1994
- History Department Chair Search Committee, University at Buffalo, 1989–1990
- Departmental Advisory Committee, University at Buffalo, 1987–1991, 2005 -
- Fulbright-Hays Campus Screening Committee, Boston University, 1985
- American Government Recruitment Committee, Boston University, 1983–1985
- Merit and Equity Allocation Committee, Boston University, 1982–1984
- Social Science Curriculum Committee, Boston University, 1980–1984
- International Relations Recruitment Committee for the Overseas Program, Boston University, 1980–1981
- Department International Relations Recruitment Committee, Boston University, Chair, 1981–1982; 1985–1987
- Graduate Advising and Evaluation Committee, Boston University, 1978–1983
- Graduate Admissions Committee, Boston University, 1979–1983
- Graduate Curriculum Committee, New York University, 1975–1976

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