

América: The Big Picture

A Collection of Research Papers by the Students in History

403

Spring 2017



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Introduction

The most aggressively visible position on United States-Latin American relations today is that which has been propagated by United States (US) President Donald Trump. When commenting on the growing number of illegal immigrants coming into the US he declared, “But you have people coming in and I’m not just saying Mexicans, I’m talking about people that are from all over that are killers and rapists and they’re coming into this country.”ⁱ The word “Mexicans” in this case acts as a blanket term that encompasses all native Spanish speakers south of the US border. Despite the criticisms that Trump received for his bluntness, his declaration was just the latest in a long line of “Latin Americans are dangerous” comments that have come out in the last few decades. From these, it is clear that there is a US stigma about Latin Americans: one that characterizes them as enemies to US security. This characterization has been elucidated by many US politicians who have uttered statements along the lines of, “Mexicans are immigrating into the US, causing crime, and taking jobs that should be reserved for legal residents of the US.” To alleviate the fears caused by this characterization, Trump has made it his duty to step up the US government’s push to remove illegal immigrants from the US and to make it nigh impossible for future illegals to come in by building a wall on the US’s southern border. Whether or not one agrees with these drastic actions, they showcase that the idea of illegal immigration and increased criminality is at the forefront of the US constructed characterization of Latin America. The goal of this book’s collection of essays is to identify the progression, or degradation, of US-Latin American relations over the last two centuries, and reveal how this progression has led to the creation of the “Latin Americans are threats” stigma present within the US today.

While President Trump’s method of labeling Latin America negatively has been a consistent part of the US’s political rhetoric for the past few decades, the original relations between the US and Latin America was drastically different. In fact, while the transition into the 21st century has been plagued with passive-aggressive interactions like Trump’s comment, the late 18th and early 19th centuries featured a comparatively friendlier atmosphere. Both the US and Latin America worked hard to break free from their European ties and obtain a sense of freedom and personal autonomy, and many US citizens looked upon their southern neighbors as friends and allies in the quest for freedom. It was not until the mid-1820s that these attitudes began to shift, and the friendly relations that the US and Latin America shared began to dissolve.ⁱⁱ

The disappearance of the US and Latin America’s positive relationship began with the ideas of race, slavery and freedom. For the US, the freedom that was fought for in its Revolutionary War, 1775-1783, was reserved for white men: a prospect encompassed within the US Declaration of Independence. This was emphasized throughout the 19th century when US southerners transitioned from believing that slavery was a necessary evil to believing that it was a positive good. This alteration of beliefs caused tension within the US that eventually culminated into one of the many factors that began the US Civil War, 1861-1865. What is often overlooked by US citizens, however, is how these events also began to separate the US from Latin America. Contrary to the US, most Latin American revolutions under the leadership of Simón Bolívar promoted the abolition of slavery. For US citizens, this difference was easy to ignore while the Latin American revolutions raged because these wars for autonomy made it seem as though Latin America was following in the US’s revolutionary footsteps.ⁱⁱⁱ After the grandeur of these revolutions slowed down in the 1820s and the nations of Latin America began

to promote their more laissez-faire opinion regarding how much power African descendants could obtain, the difference was no longer clouded and the US began to view Latin America as a land of inferiors: one that the US did not want to be affiliated with.

This separation continued through the 19th century with the increase of US imperialism. Beginning with the passage of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 which declared that the US would intervene in any Western Hemispheric nation if Europe attempted to recolonize the area, the US began to use any excuse it could muster to sink its claws into Latin America and promote manifest destiny, or the US belief that it was destined to stretch its territory from “sea to shining sea.”^{iv} Through this, the US began to forget about its previous relations with Latin America – the relations that identified it with a friendly land of republics and revolutionaries – and the US invaded Mexico in 1846. This two year conflict ended in a US victory, its acquisition of more than 55% of Mexico’s territory, and the birth of the US’s belief that it was the dominant power in the Western Hemisphere.^v This was then exacerbated when the US reached its imperialistic claws into Nicaragua and Panama in the latter half of the 19th century with the desire to construct a canal between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. By involving itself in both nations with greedy intent, the US decimated them both politically and economically.^{vi} In the end, the US ignored its involvement with Nicaragua’s and Panama’s respective declines, the US’s belief that it was the dominator of the West became solidified, and the belief that Latin America was a backward, lowly, and weak land became a common evaluation by uninformed US citizens.

This separation proceeded to come to a high complete severance with the turn of the 20th century. Following in Monroe’s footsteps, US President Theodore Roosevelt implemented his 1904 Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine declaring that it was the US’s duty to interfere in Latin America as a hemispheric police.^{vii} Consequently, the US’s increasing desire to interfere with Latin American affairs continued to chafe the connection between them. While this separation was slightly alleviated through US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s declaration that the US would stop its interference through the Good Neighbor Policy of 1933, it did not last long.^{viii} Coinciding with the rise of Nazism in Europe during the later 1930s, the US felt that the Nazis were a threat to US dominance in the Western Hemisphere. Acting on this belief, the US began to intervene in Latin America once more under the pretense that it was a land of childlike people who would be easily susceptible to Nazi influence.^{ix} This style of obstruction then persisted into the Cold War era, 1947-1991, with the fear of Nazis and Germany being replaced by a fear of communists and Russia. In the end, the US continued down its steady path away from friendly Latin American relations.

Through the progression of these events, it becomes quite clear how US-Latin American relations dipped. Over two centuries, Latin America, in US eyes, transitioned from a land of likeminded individuals who were reflections of US ideals to a land full of undesirables like Africans, bandits, Nazis, and communists. Correspondingly, the US perception of Latin America has transitioned from one of friends to one of peoples who are, when compared to the US, disheveled, lowly, and threatening. Understanding this allows for a more nuanced perspective of both Latin America and the way that the US has come to view the nations and people that encompass it. This book is, consequently, segmented into three distinct sections that each tap into this nuanced perspective to present an informed analysis of this two century long US-Latin American decline of relations.

The first section, “Shifting Borders, Fabricated Autonomy, and Foreign Intervention,” details the “era of revolutions,” circa 1774 to 1848, and how these revolutions impacted the lives of Western Hemispheric people on personal and national levels. The lines separating countries

started to fluctuate and, amidst this, borders began to overlap. The result of this was the shift of allegiances, both personally and nationally, in order to discover what would yield the most luscious benefits. The first essay of this section, Jakubowski's "The Persuasion of a Privateer's Flag: An Analysis of Caribbean Privateers' Personal Motivations during the Spanish American Wars for Independence, 1800-1820," follows the lives of seven privateers during the Spanish American Wars for Independence. Arguing that these privateers were not motivated by the desire for criminality, Jakubowski declares that they were primarily interested in self-discovery and identification. As the borders between the Western nations shifted uncontrollably, it was not uncommon for merchants and sailors to abandon their failing businesses and relocate to Latin America in an attempt to find stability and prosperity. Whether the privateers opted to remain there for a short period of time, pledge their allegiance to one of the many Latin American nations, create their own government, or remain unaffiliated and merely capitalize off the chaotic era as a smuggler, Jakubowski concludes that these privateers were simply citizens looking for their place within the ever-changing world. Taking place a few decades later, Park's "The Myths of Filibuster William Walker" tells the story and exploits of the controversial US figure William Walker during his time in Nicaragua, 1855-1857. By this point in history, the borders of the Western Hemisphere were more solidified, but this fact did not stop Walker from declaring himself the President of Nicaragua upon his invitation into the country. Stating that this achievement has propagated two myths within Walker's academic analyses – "the myth of exceptional men" and "the myth of the white *conquistador*" – Park has made it his duty to dissolve them both. Consequently, Park aims to place the story of Walker outside the myths to reveal the reality of Walker's time in Nicaragua. Finally, the last essay of this section, Bonelli's "The French Intervention in Mexico," focuses on how US interference in Mexico during the Mexican-American War, 1846-1848, led to the increase in both French and US interventionist acts that steered Mexico into a new cultural landscape. The most prominent of these, Bonelli reveals, is the 1861 French Intervention of Mexico. By defining how US and French foreign intervention infringed on Mexican autonomy, Bonelli showcases how the borders created during the "era of revolutions" were made malleable by outside nations, especially when profit was involved. Bonelli concludes that the result of these foreign interventions altered the future relations that Latin America would have with the rest of the world and, at the same time, began to set the stage for the US's idea of its own exceptionalism. Together, this section's essays serve to present the formation of the Western Hemispheric "land of freedom" and its incipient convulsion by foreign, predominately US, imperialism.

The second section, "The Ever Changing Diaspora," showcases the eventual bastardization of Latin American cultures through the US's rise of imperialism and the increased US belief of its own exceptionalism. These essays show the continued severance of the US from its Latin American neighbors, as well as the beginnings of a US-created concept of Latin America. Through this, the foundation of how Latin America went from being perceived by the US as a land of friends to a land of threats was set. The first essay, Muruthi's "Immigration and Food in the Americas," reveals the appropriation of various Latin American foods by the US. By focusing on cuisines such as the burrito and the taco, Muruthi showcases how Latin American food has been commercialized and mass-produced by the US to the point that it has become a symbol for Latin American culture inside of the US's borders. The unfortunate aspect of this, however, is that the meanings that these foods hold in the US are unreflective of their meanings within Latin America. Consequently, Muruthi concludes, fast food restaurants – such as Taco Bell and Chipotle – have become false symbols of Latin America within the US. The second

essay of this section, Benjamin's "Changing Tides: US-Mexico Relations Through the Concept of Immigration Relations," examines the relationship history between the US and Mexico by focusing on each country's immigration policies. Reminding his reader that the US once stood for the acceptance of all – a fact promoted by the Statue of Liberty – Benjamin reveals how this stance, especially regarding Mexican immigrants, has become full of restrictions. By detailing the history of US-Mexican relations with a particularly monetary focused lens, Benjamin reveals that the US policy on Mexican immigration was not one that quickly fell into stubbornness, but one that has been subjected to a fluctuating and complicated mess. In the end, Benjamin concludes that the US policy on immigration is linked to economic prosperity: the more prosperous the US economy is, the more favorable the US view of Mexico is, and the more favorable the US policies on Mexican immigration are. As a whole, the two essays of this section identify the causes and the effects of the US's severance from Latin America: the less prosperous that it is to keep the US borders open, the more the US pulls itself away from Latin America, the more blind the US becomes to who Latin Americans are.

The third section, "Latin American Representation in the United States," details the US's almost complete separation from Latin America, and vice versa. While the last section revealed how the US's distance from Latin America resulted in the US's formation of unreflective Latin America symbols, this section reveals both Latin America's response to this appropriation in addition to the US's exacerbation of it via the media. In this section's first essay, "Identity Through Religion in the Borderlands," Crisafulli reveals how US-Mexican relations were oftentimes hampered by the US devotion to Protestantism and the Mexican devotion to Catholicism. Consequently, Crisafulli declares, when Mexican Catholics and incoming European Catholics attempted to practice their religion in the Western World, they were often challenged by the US. In response, Crisafulli reveals how Mexican and European people in the Americas worked together to prevent their religion from being appropriated by the US. In so doing, Crisafulli concludes, Mexican and European Catholics formulated three different religious sects among themselves: Mexican-Americans, European-Catholic-Americans, and Catholic-Americans. The second essay of this section, Colopietro's "Latin Americans in the United States' Film Industry," showcases how the main connection that many US citizens have with Latin American citizens is from their dramatized and fabricated Hollywood stereotypes. By examining a plethora of these stereotypes – "*El Bandito*," "the Harlot," "the Male Buffoon," "the Female Clown," "the Latin Lover," and "the Dark Lady" – within a variety of films that date from the early years of Hollywood into modern day, Colopietro reveals how these characterizations have spread through US popular culture like wildfire. In the end, Colopietro concludes that they have been detrimental to many US citizens' understandings of Latin America. Following this, Kustra's "Latin Type Casting in the United States' Media" details the same stereotypes presented in Colopietro's essay, but in a broader context that includes all media. Arguing that these stereotypes were not crafted out of happenstance, but products of early US-Native American and US-Latin American conflicts, Kustra argues that the stereotypes were always meant to be demeaning and derogatory toward Latin Americans. Declaring that these depictions have since been mindlessly propagated within US culture and have, consequently, created a harmful view of Latin America for US citizens, Kustra concludes by providing a series of options on how to rectify this problem. Side by side, the essays of this section reveal the peak of the US's separation from Latin America, the cause of the US's modern negative outlook on Latin America, and Latin Americans' attempts to retain their autonomy during this.

The fourth and final section, “U.S.-Latin American Relations: The Battle for Hegemony,” reveals how the severance of the US from Latin America impacted the foreign policies between the two. Not only did the severance increase the US’s imperialistic tendencies toward Latin America, it opened the door for the creation of Latin American depictions that labelled them as threats to US security. In other words, this section showcases how the high finality of the US severing itself from Latin America resulted in a clash between them, as well as the creation of the “Latin Americans are threats” stigma that the US uses today. The first essay of this section, Scialabba’s “Panama(s) Canal,” focuses on the US interest and dealings in Panama during the construction of its canal, 1903-1914, and its consecutive historical analyses. Noticing that many historians over the past century succumb to discussing the US’s involvement in Panama to be either imperialistic or non-imperialistic, Scialabba argues that this discrepancy is the product of each historian’s respective era. By declaring that earlier historians lacked a complete understanding of the event and were too stubborn to see it outside of its economic benefit for the US, Scialabba declares that they wrote about the event with a more imperialistic intent. This, Scialabba concludes, is reflective of the early 20th century US’s lack of knowledge about Latin America: a lack that can be contributed to, as earlier essays have showcased, the effect of US media. Following this, Franco’s essay “Nicaragua During the Cold War” details the Cold War struggle between capitalism and communism within a nation that was not the US or Russia. After analyzing the history of the Nicaraguan Civil War, 1979-1990, Franco argues how US-Nicaraguan relations were impacted by the US’s assessment of the war’s prime players. By observing how the US labeled the Nicaraguan government under the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) as a terroristic and communistic threat to US security and labeled the FSLN’s conservative adversaries, the Contras, as the ideal role models of freedom, Franco reveals how the US altered its relations with Nicaragua to best suit US interests; the US made its Nicaraguan enemies, the Contras, into a threat to gain public and political support for interfering in the Nicaraguan Civil War against them. And finally, Ottati’s essay “U.S.-Venezuela: A Tale of Two Freedoms” analyzes what is meant by the term “Bolivarian” and how it affected the relations between Latin America, primarily Venezuela, and the US. By examining the purposes and desires that Simón Bolívar placed within his ideology in the early 19th century and how they clash and correspond with US desires and beliefs, Ottati attempts to understand why there has been such a severance between the acts of the US and the desires of Latin America. Ottati concludes that the main issue comes in the form of how freedom is understood by both sides: the “Bolivarian” method revolves around a more monarchical or dictatorial government promoting freedom while the US’s ideals of freedom are more focused on the ability of the people to govern themselves. In the end, the “Bolivarian” ideals were so distant from US desires that the US ended up labelling them as enemies to the US: an action that has caused tensions between the Venezuela and the US. The essays of this section showcase the point where the US finally came to see threats to US security within the borders of Latin America.

This book, in totality, is designed to display the steady decline of US-Latin American relations from the beginning of the 19th century up until modern day. By detailing how the US and Latin America started off on friendly terms and how the US sacrificed these niceties in favor of imperialism, this collection of essays reveals why this came to fruition and what its impact was: the US characterization of Latin America as a land of threats. Through this, it becomes clear that US President Donald Trump’s vocalizations about how “Mexicans” are “killers” and “rapists” were not randomly formulated connections, but byproducts of two hundred years of US imperialism and US-Latin American separation. In the end, the reader of this book is not asked to

condone or condemn President Trump for his decision to wall off the US-Mexican border, but to understand the intense history between the US and Latin America, and acknowledge that Trump's decision is merely one made after a long history of lackluster and aggressive interactions between the US and its southern neighbors.

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Section 1: Shifting Borders, Fabricated Autonomy and Foreign Intervention.

**The Persuasion of a Privateer's Flag:
An Analysis of Caribbean Privateers' Personal Motivations during the Spanish American
Wars for Independence, 1800-1820**

Christopher Jakubowski

When the average United States (US) citizen thinks of a Caribbean privateer, the image that is likely to manifest is a rum-drinking, bearded, shabbily dressed ruffian who breaks free from the confines of society by sailing lawlessly under a black flag: a pirate. While some privateers of the Caribbean, especially during the Golden Age of Piracy between 1650 and 1730, did adhere to this description, most were far from it. The reason for this falsity is due to the elevation of Caribbean pirates in US popular culture through films like *The Pirates of the Caribbean* and, as historian Matthew McCarthy has observed, the rarity of academic analyses on privateers during the Spanish American Wars for Independence.^x During this early nineteenth century Era of Revolutions, 1774-1848, the United States was finding its footing and Spanish American colonies were finally breaking free from their ties to Europe. Amidst this, young merchants and sailors from the US and Europe who were impacted by the collateral effects of the Spanish American revolutions began to question where they belonged among the shifting borders and newfound allegiances. By analyzing the lives of a variety of privateers from a variety of nationalities, such as the Baltimorean James Chaytor, the British citizen Thomas Taylor, the New Orleans resident Renato Beluche, the Scotsman Gregor MacGregor, and the Frenchmen Louis Michel-Aury, Jean Laffite, and Pierre Laffite, it becomes clear that each of them began their privateering careers in response to a fluctuating, early nineteenth century political and economic environment. While each of these privateers were, most visibly, motivated by some form of personal gain, beneath all these veneers was a more noble aspiration. Consequently, by analyzing the three visibly common motivations of patriotism, respect, and profit, it becomes clear that privateers during the Spanish American Wars for Independence shared an underlying desire to obtain a sense of belonging amidst their messy, ever-changing, nineteenth century world.

A Revolutionary Backdrop

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, revolutions spread across the world. After the United States officially broke free from Britain in 1783 and France flipped its monarchy upside-down with its revolution of 1789, Spanish America began to stir restlessly. This was exacerbated after Napoleon Bonaparte took charge in France and, in 1807, decided to march an army into Portugal to overthrow King Joao IV. These actions proceeded to explode into chaos the following year when Napoleon marched his army into Spain, deposed King Fernando VII, and placed his own brother, Joseph Bonaparte, on the throne. Out of anger, the Spanish citizens in Europe as well as the Western Hemisphere took up arms and fought against the French dictator guerilla style. The Spanish citizens succeeded in their quest to repel Bonaparte's hegemony, but their objective took an unexpected turn in 1814 when King Fernando retook the throne. Angered by the revolutions that his subjects had been a part of, Fernando decided to aggressively subdue the French colonies in the Americas. Responding to Fernando's newfound attitude, the Spanish American colonies stepped up their efforts and decided to formulate their own nationalities by completely severing themselves from Europe. This was achieved by staging

even larger and more widespread revolutions under the leadership of the legendary Venezuelan leader Simón Bolívar and other comparable figures.^{xi}

In tandem to the chaos happening between Spain and its colonies, the US tried to capitalize on the conflict while maintaining the shaky foundation of neutrality. US politicians believed that the US, as a nation, was too weak to safely and effectively support the Spanish Americans militaristically. Consequently, the US government passed a series of neutrality acts to prevent any European or South American nation from invading the US. This act was made difficult to enforce, however, because of, as historian Arthur Preston Whitaker stated, “the embarrassing activity of Napoleonic exiles[,] . . . Spanish American agents[,] and their sympathizers.”^{xii}

The embarrassing activities that Whitaker spoke of began slowly. When the Spanish American revolutions started, most US citizens opted to cheer on their neighbors from the sidelines because of the belief that Spanish America was following in the US’s footsteps. This vocalization was not acted upon until after the War of 1812. This approximately three-year conflict between the US and Britain ended in a US victory and the reinvigoration of US citizens’ confidence in themselves. Any doubt that many had in their ability to defend their interests melted, and the reserved encouragement for Spanish American independence was replaced by a desire for action. Many US citizens felt that the US’s policy of neutrality was not something that they wanted to adhere to. As a result, after receiving commissions – the legal documents that condoned piratical actions by a sailor on the issuing county’s enemies – from various Spanish American countries, many young US citizens began their careers as Spanish American privateers albeit with individual reasons for investing their life in the Spanish American quest for freedom.^{xiii}

A Foundational Middle Ground

The most common motivation that drove merchants and sailors to become privateers was the belief that the US’s policies of the era, such as its neutrality, did not provide for the soon-to-be privateers’ personal needs. The epitome of this was identified by historian David Head as James Chaytor, captain of the ship dubbed the *Mammoth*. Chaytor was from a merchant family in the port city of Baltimore, but as various tariffs were put in place in the Western Hemisphere in tandem with the escalation of violence his merchant business began to fail. In 1816, as a desperate solution to solve this economic problem, the youthful Chaytor decided to set sail from Baltimore for the revolutionary hotspot of Buenos Aires with a cargo of munitions, food, and war time supplies.^{xiv} Chaytor hoped that this excursion would allow him to sell his goods to the revolutionaries in exchange for the profits that his business had lost. This type of transaction was not uncommon among US merchants during the first few years after the War of 1812, circa 1815, and “[t]he trickle of weapons that dripped southward from the United States before 1815 turning into something more of a stream following the peace with Britain.”^{xv} The irony of this, however, was that many of the small Spanish American insurgent groups did not have the funds to pay for the eager US merchants’ supplies.^{xvi} This was precisely the problem that Chaytor ran into upon reaching his destination. While his guns were bought up quickly, all his other goods were untouched because of a lack of the revolutionaries’ ability to pay for them. In the end, Chaytor failed to make the profit he had hoped. But, like most of the other adventurous young merchants, he received an unexpected ultimatum. The revolutionaries stated that they would commission Chaytor as a privateer if he sailed under the flag of Buenos Aires. This, they argued, would help the insurgents’ cause because their revolution lacked a strong navy and would help Chaytor

because he would get the profit that he was looking for. Deciding that being a privateer for Argentina was more beneficial than being a US merchant, Chaytor disregarded the idea of US neutrality, stripped himself of his US citizenship, became a certified Argentinian and, leaving his family behind in Baltimore, became a privateer.^{xvii}

While sailing under the flag of Buenos Aires, Chaytor gained a feeling of strong patriotism for the Spanish American revolutions. While it could be argued that he was always patriotic toward them because of his decision to sell weapons to Spanish American insurgents instead of their much wealthier Spanish adversaries, when Chaytor was a privateer he gained an even more heightened respect for them. During his service, letters that Chaytor wrote to his wife revealed that his “whole soul [was] devoted to the [Spanish American] cause,” that he began to prefer speaking Spanish over English, that he preferred the classic Spanish name Diego to his birth name James, and that he changed the name of his ship from the *Mammoth* to the *Independencia del Sud*, or the *Independence of the South*.^{xviii} His goal had transitioned from one of monetary gain to one of ecstatic and elated patriotism for a country that was not even of his birth. He had come a long way from being a small time Baltimorean merchant. Nonetheless, as the Spanish American revolutions came to a close around 1820, Chaytor’s patriotism dwindled and he returned to Baltimore to live with his family once again. When he made it back to Baltimore, he set up a shop to fit ships for sailing and then, after this shop failed, became a full-time sailor on a steamboat that shuttled between Baltimore and Philadelphia.^{xix} From here, Chaytor proceeded to live the rest of his life in, comparable, quiet tranquility.

Chaytor’s story reveals the core of a privateer during the early 1800s. He was a young and impressionable man relatively unassociated with the revolutions during their conception, but through a coincidental bit of circumstances was dragged into their bosom and found comfort in them. At first, Chaytor’s comfortableness came in the form of saving his failing business, but as time progressed he became infected with the patriotism of the Spanish American insurgents and developed a sense of belonging. This series of events is representative of the Age of Revolutions: borders between nations were blurred, stories of freedom and self-achievement were common, and a high sense of autonomy was felt among young generations around the world. Chaytor had grown up with stories of the US Revolution, heard tales of the Spanish American Revolutions while living at his port city of Baltimore, and was moved by them. While Chaytor’s privateering career did not pan out indefinitely, it was one that he was very proud of while it lasted. Chaytor is the perfect middle ground regarding privateers’ motivations during the Spanish American Wars for Independence, but as to be expected various other privateers’ motivations branched away from this foundation in more radical directions.

The Motivation of Patriotism

Some privateers, like Thomas Taylor, took the patriotism that Chaytor gained to a comparatively grander height. Despite being born a British citizen in Bermuda, he quickly moved with his family to the port city of Wilmington, Delaware where he attended school and obtained a US citizenship. While he was proud of being a US citizen with British roots, Taylor also had a strange feeling that he did not belong. Consequently, when the Spanish American revolutions broke out, Taylor sailed to Argentina in 1810 and became a naturalized citizen there in an attempt to find his true place in the world. While at his new home, he joined the Argentinian navy, earned the rank of captain, was given command of the *Zephyr*, and fought bravely with many Argentine revolutionaries.^{xx} For examples of the latter, he served under Argentine general William Brown at the River Plate – the estuary on the border between

Argentina and Uruguay –and spent time as a privateer. Through these two deeds, Taylor obtained both riches and honor as a Spanish American in the name of patriotism and freedom.^{xxi} Through these acts, Taylor finally felt like he was living where he belonged. This was exemplified when Taylor was given six commissions by the Venezuelan government and tasked with being the first of many loyal freedom fighters to sail to Baltimore as an *armador* – or someone who would fit out ships for privateering and find sailors to sail on them – and he eagerly accepted.^{xxii}

While looking for recruits, Taylor's success varied, but his enthusiasm never dwindled. Taking with him a plethora of stories about riches and glory, he went about his mission with pride and, initially, seemed to be very successful. Upon his arrival in Baltimore in the beginning of 1816, he found a crew, purchased a ship – the *Romp* – fit it out to be a privateer vessel named the *Santefecino*, and set sail. Unfortunately, this success took a turn for the worse when the crew grew agitated at Taylor's leadership, mutinied, and sailed back to Baltimore.^{xxiii} This did not dissuade Taylor, however, because the patriotism he had for his new home was too strong to accept failure. Instead, he viewed the *Santefecino* incident as an incentive to step up his methods. Taylor became more ambitious and found an even better crew: a variety of US citizens including an insurance company director and merchant, a grocery store owner, the son of a Baltimore merchant prince, a former sheriff, a merchant-tailor, and a postmaster, lawyer, and journalist.^{xxiv} Any fear that this new crew had was satiated by Taylor through the distribution of his commissions signed by the Venezuelan government that condoned all the privateers' piratical actions. In the end, Taylor was successful and Baltimore began to grow into one of the biggest privateering havens within the US.^{xxv} This was all made possible because of Taylor's refusal to give up in the face of defeat, and because of his new, unfaltering patriotic loyalty and sense of belonging to Venezuela and Spanish America.

Unadulterated patriotism for the Spanish American revolutions was a trait also held by Renato Beluche Jr. Born on December 15, 1780 in the port city of New Orleans to Renato Beluche Sr. – a wigmaker whose wig-shop was supposedly a smuggler's front – and Rosa Laporte, Beluche Jr. learned to sail at a young age and, through his twenties, put his skills to use as a shipmaster and merchant.^{xxvi} In this trade, he sold goods that ranged from crops – like corn – to commercial goods – like sugar and slaves. Beluche experienced the chaos of the Era of Revolutions firsthand when, because of the Louisiana Purchase of 1803, the US obtained New Orleans from the French and Beluche's citizenship was adjusted. In addition, as the Spanish American revolutions raged, Beluche's business slowed like Chaytor's because of the increase of various local tariffs. This decline was then exacerbated when US President Thomas Jefferson passed an act which forbade merchants from importing slaves from foreign countries. Consequently, Beluche began to feel like he lacked a nation that he was completely at home in. Initially attempting to make ends meet by ferrying Spanish American refugees to safety, he began to become invested in their cause. After marrying the refugee Marie Magdeleine Victoire Milleret in 1809, Beluche joined many of his fellow merchants and sailed south to enlist as a privateer.^{xxvii} After sailing to St. Martin, a small island off Puerto Rico, Beluche adopted the fake name Pierre Brugman and obtained his first commission from Captain General Jean Augustine Ernouf – the commander of one of France's two remaining Caribbean colonies – on February 10, 1810. "I do authorize Pierre Brugman . . . to lead or send into the ports of France or its colonies all ships of enemies of the Empire."^{xxviii} For the next two years, Beluche ended up receiving a variety of commissions and sailed under a variety of flags – a sign of his lack of belonging – including the French flag, the US flag, and Cartagena's Colombian flag.^{xxix}

Beluche's fluctuation of loyalties ended during his time sailing for Cartagena when he finally discovered where he belonged. In 1813, Colombian President Rodríguez Torices devised a plan to take Santa Marta, an important Colombian city, from Spanish loyalists by recruiting Beluche and several other privateers. Torices gathered a thousand troops, boarded them onto privateering ships, and attempted multiple invasions of the city. While none were successful in capturing Santa Marta, Beluche, while captain of the privateer ship *La Popa*, managed to cover the insurgent troops on one of their invasions: a feat which earned him the rank of a lieutenant in Cartagena's navy. After this, Beluche remained loyal to Cartagena and became determined to assist the revolutionaries in any way that he could.^{xxx} He even remarked, "I was born in the new world and acquired a love of glory in the defense of her liberty."^{xxx} Just like Chaytor, while beginning his privateering career hoping to revitalize his failing merchant business, Beluche ended up becoming so invested in helping Spanish America obtain its freedom that he came to call it home. The only difference from Chaytor is that Beluche, like Taylor, remained invested through the end of the revolutions and beyond.

After the attempted invasions on Santa Marta, Beluche became a man of his word. In 1815, soon after helping defend Louisiana from British Invasion, he became a devoted follower of Simón Bolívar and the Bolivarian way of thinking. This loyalty was exemplified when Beluche changed the name of his ship from *La Popa* to *General Bolívar* around 1816. Beluche then assisted Bolívar to victory during the naval battle of Los Frailes: a feat which awarded him the high-ranking title of commodore.^{xxxii} Beluche continued his investment in the Spanish American Wars for Independence until their completion and stayed loyal in the aftermath by becoming a naval officer in the official fleet of Colombia. His loyalty was even acknowledged by Bolívar in 1828 when he decided to make Beluche the head of his Pacific fleet: "I prefer Beluche. . . . He is superior to all the others because of his rank, knowledge and ability, enthusiasm, etc."^{xxxiii} Beluche had now, without a doubt, discovered the place where he belonged.

After Beluche was forced to shift his citizenship from French to US and after US policies hurt his mercantile business, he opted to look for better prospects in Spanish America. Upon carving a new life for himself, he gained money, honor, and a devotion to Simón Bolívar that he kept until the end of his days. Through his motivation of patriotism, Beluche discovered a place that he felt he truly belonged to.

The Motivation of Respect

A second motivation that some privateers had was, as exemplified by Gregor MacGregor, the desire to obtain respect. Born in Scotland in 1786, MacGregor joined the British navy as soon as he could. Britain, like the US, took a path of neutrality during the Spanish American Wars for Independence. Also like the US, the British were primarily interested in the profit that they could make from selling troops and weapons to "Spanish America on behalf of [both] the insurgents or Spanish armies in the region."^{xxxiv} Consequently, Britain's neutrality was tested by constant attacks against their merchants by both the insurgents and the Spanish. To resolve this issue, British foreign secretary Robert Stewart Castlereagh devised one carefully constructed plan to deal with each opposing side. As for the insurgents, Britain decided to send convoys – or naval escorts – with their merchants under the pretense that any privateers that approached were to be considered pirate equivalents and destroyed on sight. As for the Spanish, Britain decided that they would only act with diplomatic action if and when their neutrality was compromised by

Spanish acts. All in all, the last thing the British were after was another taxing war like the 1808-1814 Peninsular War against Napoleon.^{xxxv}

During this Napoleonic War, MacGregor had a very promising career in the British navy and eventually achieved a middling rank. One fateful day, however, this career was compromised when MacGregor, now in his mid-twenties, had a barroom argument with another officer that turned violent. As punishment, MacGregor was commanded to reassign himself to a new, much less favorable post.^{xxxvi} Feeling that this command did not respect his career plan, MacGregor decided that he no longer belonged with the British, dropped out of the military, and fled to Caracas, Venezuela in 1811 to search for better career prospects and respect in the local insurgents' navy.

MacGregor's underlying desire to gain militaristic respect was initially hidden under a guise of patriotism for Spanish American freedom. According to his account, the purpose of his move to Caracas was "to settle and aid in the struggle for Spanish American independence from Spain," but because of the nature of his departure – fleeing Britain after a dip in his naval career – this was most likely a half-truth.^{xxxvii} Nevertheless, his claims appeared genuine for a few years; he married a Simón Bolívar's wealthy cousin, Josefa Lovera, became "colonel and adjutant-general to General Miranda[,] . . . commandant-general of the cavalry[,] . . . general of brigade in the Venezuelan army[,] . . . received the special thanks of Bolivar [himself,] and [was rewarded] the insignia of the order of Libertadores [a term that refers to the prime players of the Spanish American Wars for Independence]."^{xxxviii} Eventually, however, Bolívar promoted someone else to a position that MacGregor believed he deserved and he got into another row with a fellow officer. MacGregor felt like he was not appreciated and did not belong, packed his bags, and sailed for a better prospect once more: one that would place him outside the law of any local nation and into the hands of privateers.^{xxxix}

In March 1817, MacGregor received a commission from the Venezuelan government and became a privateer with the overarching goal of procuring Florida and its neighboring defensible island, Amelia Island, from Spain. "[We] request you," MacGregor's commission stated, "in the name of our constituents, to proceed on you own responsibility . . . to adopt such measure as in your judgment may most effectually tend to procure for our brethren of both the Floridas."^{xl} MacGregor saw this commission as the freedom to proceed with his objective however he pleased, and he took this to heart. At first, MacGregor looked for support by proposing his plan to the British minister Sir Charles Bagot – perhaps an attempt by MacGregor to earn the recognition that he believed he had always deserved in the British navy – and tried to encourage Bagot to hinder "an American occupation of Florida by secretly countenancing a venture against the province in the name of the patriots."^{xli} Bagot did not trust MacGregor and respectfully refused him – most likely because of MacGregor's shaky history with the British navy in addition to Britain's goal of maintaining its neutrality. After this rejection, MacGregor turned his attention to the US State Department under Richard Rush and plugged his plan by saying that his ultimate intention was to sell Florida to the US. While not opposed to this outcome, Rush graciously told MacGregor that he could not, because of the US's neutrality, condone such an action.^{xlii} Given that MacGregor flipped his intentions while talking to each nation, it is clear that he was not particularly invested in either of their outcomes and interested only in his own gain. A little perturbed but not dissuaded by his failings, MacGregor fell back on his final choice: to secure Amelia Island with the help of privateers. This proposal proved fruitful for MacGregor's goals since the island itself was useful to the privateering crowd because it could provide a base that could be used to pounce "on Spanish ships en route to Cuba or Puerto Rico."^{xliii} In the end,

MacGregor secured approximately one hundred and fifty privateering followers and proceeded to lead his own invasion of Amelia Island on June 29, 1817. During this invasion, MacGregor was finally discovered a government that he felt that he belonged to and would be respected by: his own.

Despite Florida and Amelia Island being in such demand from the nations surrounding it – as seen through the current Spanish occupation of it, Venezuela’s commission to MacGregor asking for it, and the US’s interest in purchasing it – the Spanish had not kept Amelia Island well defended. The island was rather small, about thirteen miles long and four miles wide, and had only one small town of about forty wooden houses guarded by a neighboring Spanish garrison at Fernandina with a grand total of fifty-four soldiers. To add to this weak composition, the soldiers stationed at Fernandina were “mostly men worn out in the service, as many of them had been in the Spanish armies thirty years.”^{xliv} So when MacGregor landed with his one hundred and fifty men, the Spanish were ill prepared. This was exacerbated by rumors that the Spanish General Francisco Morales received that said MacGregor had a substantially larger force of one thousand men and six warships. Consequently, Morales surrendered the island to the newly self-titled Brigadier General Gregor MacGregor. This title showcases the Scotsman finally achieving, even if it was appointed by himself, the respect and esteemed high naval rank that he had wanted. After his victory, MacGregor proclaimed to the Amelia Islanders that, “Your brethren of Mexico, Buenos Ayres, New Granada and Venezuela, who are so gloriously engaged in fighting for that inestimable gift which nature has bestowed upon her children, . . . have confided to me the command of the land and naval forces.” This made MacGregor so proud that he later proclaimed to his fellows that he and his followers were “brave men, animated by a noble zeal for the happiness of mankind,” and that “[their] names [would] be transmitted to the latest posterity.” MacGregor even commanded his followers to wear “a shield of honor . . . on the left arm” to show off the glory they achieved in conquering the island.^{xlv} MacGregor’s personal and career goals had finally been met and with it he found a sense of pride, respect, and belonging.

MacGregor’s accomplishment was short lived, however, because he soon lost control of Amelia Island. After his conquest, MacGregor began setting up a government and preparing for his attack on Florida. In the meantime, he invited fellow privateers to base themselves at his new home and, in some cases, even gave out personalized commissions. Unfortunately, because of his slow mobilization to push onward to Florida, the Spanish had enough time to reinforce their assets. As the months dragged on, MacGregor never received support, militarily or monetarily, from anyone and his force slowly dwindled. Finally, in early September 1817, he cut his losses and decided to abandon Amelia effectively ending his achieved goal of being a Brigadier General and a self-proclaimed hero. Amelia was then taken over by two US citizens who had sailed under MacGregor, an ex-New York city sheriff Ruggles Hubbard and an ex-Pennsylvania Congressman Jared Irwin, until French privateer Louis Michel-Aury arrived on September 17, 1817.^{xlvi}

MacGregor had capitalized on the chaos of the Era of Revolutions in order to secure the respectful position that he believed he deserved. Unlike Chaytor, Taylor, and Beluche, MacGregor never seemed to feel patriotic for the revolutions’ causes except when they could be exploited for his own career oriented gain. In the end, after not being able to feel a sense of belonging or respect within any of the nations that he interacted with, he decided to formulate his own.

MacGregor was not alone in his quest to achieve respect from the Spanish American revolutions because Amelia Island’s latest inhabitant, Louis-Michel Aury, had the same

intention. Apart from being born in the commerce heavy city of Paris, France in 1788, little is known about what Aury was like in his younger years besides his desire to make a name and profit for himself.^{xlvii} This was showcased when he sailed to the New World to become a privateer for the French around 1802 when he was only fourteen.^{xlviii} The French, at the time, did not have the strongest foothold in the Western Hemisphere, and they ended up losing the most substantial part of their position around 1804 after the British took the city of Saint-Domingue in what is today known as Haiti by supporting the revolutionary movement of Toussaint Louverture.^{xlix} During the stand of for this city, Aury ended up losing his ship and fleeing to Guadalupe, a French outpost near Mexico, where he continued to identify as a Frenchman and vowed to himself that he would continue to fight for the French crown against the British and the Spanish as a privateer.¹ Aury was not the only French sailor who made this vow because “[o]nce the insurgents drove out the French [from Saint-Domingue], Napoleon’s agents commissioned virtually all who applied out of the French colonies.”^{li} This fact was so noticeable that even Aury commented in 1808 that, “Corsairs [privateers and pirates] are the only French boats, war or merchant, in this country. . . . They wage war as loyally as the ships of his imperial majesty.”^{lii} As the years progressed and the Spanish American revolutions escalated, however, Aury became the master of his own ship, lost his sense of respect from and loyalty for the nigh-absent French, and ended up becoming less invested in what he could do for France and – possibly because he became associated with MacGregor during the time – more invested with what he could do for himself.

Aury’s path toward finding a sense of belonging and respect began in 1815 when he came upon the Spanish siege of Cartagena and opted to help the rebels. For three months, Aury acted as a smuggler by bringing foodstuffs into the city: a deed which kept the rebellion alive longer than expected. Because of this assistance, Aury was recognized by Simón Bolívar and rewarded the rank of commodore in the navy. Despite his admirable actions, however, the city ended up falling and refugees clambered onto Aury’s ships in search of salvation. In response, Aury sailed them all to Haiti. At this point, Aury had a “disagreement with [Bolívar which]” made Aury feel disregarded by Cartagena, shrunk his sense of belonging with them, and “led him to seek a new employer.”^{liii} This desire for new employment came to fruition in the form of a Mexican insurgent. Inspired by his deeds at Cartagena, the Mexican requested Aury’s aid in the comparable struggle that the Mexican people were having against Spanish royalists. Because of his need for a new position, Aury accepted this request, recruited two hundred Haitians on top of his already present crew, and sailed for Mexico in 1816. During this voyage, Aury happened upon an island that peaked his hunger for power and respect: the strategically located sliver of land in the Gulf of Mexico known as Galveston Island.^{liv} Here, Aury finally concluded that no already existing nation would respect him the way he wanted. Consequently, he decided that he should devote himself to a government of his own design.

Upon founding Galveston, Aury implemented his privateer lifestyle and set up a government with himself at the top which, much like MacGregor’s Amelia Island, was designed to benefit himself and other privateers. This design model attracted a “gang of desperate vagabonds, including Frenchmen . . . freebooters . . . smugglers . . . [and,] in short[,] outcasts of every country.”^{lv} Because of its strategically militaristic naval location and Mexico’s acceptance of privateers for their cause, Mexican politician and diplomat Manuel de Herrera soon recognized Galveston’s legitimacy.^{lvi} Through this recognition, Aury was given the ability to distribute privateering commissions in the name of the Mexican rebels. This ability allowed

privateers to take their captured ships to Galveston in order to smuggle their goods into and sell them within the nearby US.

Despite the legitimacy that Galveston provided, though, many of the privateers' actions were still considered illegal to many other nations, and the privateers at Galveston knew that. As one of Aury's prisoners, Juan Domingo Lozano, commented, "the marks on the packages were 'always removed from all the goods from prizes before leaving Galveston in order to prevent their being recognized and claimed by their real owners.'"^{lvii} Despite the confidence that Aury and his workers seemed to have, the reality was still that they were stealing from other nations and breaking many codes of neutrality. This conduct emphasizes what eventually led to Galveston's downfall: Aury governed the island per his own personal desires, but many of the other outcasts on the island had their own. Consequently, Aury's actions were not received well by some of his men, particularly the newly recruited two hundred Haitians.^{lviii} After being forced to work in ways they did not want to by Aury, and then upon hearing a rumor that Aury intended to sell them into slavery – an action which Aury was well known for – the Haitians revolted. During the chaos, the revolutionaries raided Aury's cabin where he "had only a knife for defense. He drew the weapon, but a pistol spat flame upon his breast [and h]e fell to earth" alive but dazed.^{lix} The mutineers then proceeded to take a bunch of salvage and flee. After this, Aury's rule was met with constant opposition, especially by the later elucidated Laffite brothers, and he ended up fleeing the island on April 5, 1817.^{lx}

After his failed governorship at Galveston, Aury refused to sit idly by and, instead, sailed to Amelia island in July 1817 to take over what MacGregor had started and recreate the government that Aury felt he belonged to. Clashing almost immediately with Hubbard and Irwin, the two MacGregor had left in charge, the three soon had to come to an understanding. Aury became "commander of the island's military forces, Hubbard civil governor, and Irwin the military's second in command."^{lxi} At this point, Aury claimed Amelia to be a part of the Mexican Republic, like Galveston was, and began to rebuild the privateering government that he believed had been unfairly taken away from him. But, like his attempt at Galveston, it was short lived. The US privateers under Irwin and Hubbard and the black Haitian privateers under Aury factionalized. The color of Aury's allies skin was too much for the US citizens, on and off the island, to take and "Commodore AURY, with his ***** troops" became a common phrase to many.^{lxii} The aggression between the factions quickly escalated and bordered on a full blown civil war. Hubbard died quickly from, as determined by its description, yellow fever, but tensions did not die down. Like MacGregor had done a few years earlier, "one hundred British ex-officers sailed from England for South America to enlist in the cause of Spanish American Independence" in August 1817.^{lxiii} These British sailors found themselves on Amelia island and separated themselves into the two factions. After failing to fully implement martial law, Aury called for a democratic election. In the end, his followers won five out of the nine seats.^{lxiv}

Aury believed he was in the clear after the election, but was quickly proven wrong by the US. According to an act passed by Congress in 1811, the President had the authority to forcefully expel any foreign occupation in Spanish Florida. During this time, since President Monroe did not recognize MacGregor's or Aury's authority, he ordered the US navy to remove Aury from power: since "persons . . . have lately taken possession of Amelia Island . . . without the sanction of any of the Spanish colonies . . . and for purposes unfriendly to the and incompatible with the interests of the United States, [President Monroe] has decided to break up that establishment and take temporary possession of Amelia Island."^{lxv} This action was made even more pertinent for US politicians when Monroe reminded Congress that all of the negotiations between Spain and

the US for the acquisition of Florida would have been for naught if Florida was lost to a third party.^{lxvi} This point convinced most of Congress, the US navy was ordered to take Amelia Island, and in late December 1817, Aury gave up without a fight. In a letter to the US naval officer J.D. Henley, Aury declared, “I am ready to surrender this place to the forces under your command, whenever you may judge proper to come and take possession thereof.”^{lxvii} Aury then sailed away to found new location at Old Providence near modern Nicaragua to set up the government he felt like he belonged to. This new location went a lot more smoothly than Aury’s previous two attempts, but came to a sudden end with his ungraceful death in 1821 from falling off his horse.^{lxviii} A quiet and awkward way to go out for such a colorful and ambitious man.

Aury, like MacGregor, tried to play the revolutionary field for his own gain and to find a place where he felt he belonged. Aury sailed to the New World with the hope of earning respect and making a profit, switched his loyalties from the France to Colombia to Mexico, and ended up becoming loyal and devoted to himself as a privateer by founding his own government and making himself the highest authority in it.

The Motivation of Profit

A third motivation that some privateers had regarding the Spanish American revolutions was, as in the Laffite brothers’ case, excessive fiscal profit. Pierre Laffite was born in France in 1770 to Jean Laffite Sr. and his wife Marie Lagrange. Marie passed away soon after, probably from childbirth, and in 1775 Jean remarried to Marguerite Desteil who proceeded to birth six children in the port village of Bages near Pauillac, France. The last of these children, born sometime between 1782 and 1786, was Jean Laffite Jr. Both brothers grew up within their middle-class merchant family, but by 1800 Pierre and Jean had decided that economic success was not a possible option in France because of the chaos of the French Revolution, 1789-1799, and its aftermath. Therefore, the two sailed across the sea to the New World.^{lxix} While the two did not travel together, they both eventually ended up uniting in the same place: New Orleans, Louisiana. The brothers had no intention of becoming privateers or smugglers initially, but the global circumstances of the time created a series of opportunities that the two could hardly refuse.

A full understanding of the Laffites requires an understanding of the politics and economy of Louisiana. Before President Thomas Jefferson purchased it as part of his Louisiana Purchase of 1803, it belonged to the French. Paralleling the chaos of the French Revolution, many French citizens had fled to Louisiana for a new start, despite developing a feeling of agitation for their US neighbors from the primarily naval based Quasi-War between France and the US from 1789-1800. Understandably when the French citizens of Louisiana suddenly became US citizens in 1803, not all of them – such as Renato Beluche and the Laffites – were completely comfortable and some wanted to show their displeasure any way that they could. Luckily for them, Louisiana was the perfect place to do that. “[Its] geography . . . made smuggling easy. Sandwiched between Spanish territory to the east and west . . . [and] Lower Louisiana [being] a vast network of marshes, swamps, little lakes, tiny bays, and bayous that flowed between the Mississippi River and the Gulf of Mexico” made it the perfect place to bring material into the area discreetly and then send it off to willing buyers.^{lxx} Additionally, many French privateers saw Louisiana as a convenient market because of the local ex-French population and the comparably safe route to it from the Caribbean.^{lxxi} Equally important, Louisiana was packed full of various trades, like sugar and cotton industries, most of which needed slaves and a lot of materials to maintain. So, when the US made it a law that foreign

slaves could not be imported into the country and the various tariffs were set up by surrounding countries because of the Spanish American revolutions, the Louisiana markets began to become starved for goods. Unlike Renato Beluche and other comparable merchants who turned on the declining Louisiana market and fled to find better prospects in Spanish America, the Laffites decided that they would take this political and geographic atmosphere and turn it for their own gain by becoming smugglers within Louisiana itself.^{lxxii} The Laffites, like most other Frenchmen in the Western Hemisphere, did not feel like they belonged in their place of residence, so they decided to forge their own, unique path around it.

Between 1809 and 1813, the Laffite brothers built and expanded a Louisiana smuggling trade much to the joy of privateers and the chagrin of US officials. While smugglers, like the Laffites, “were not usually cutthroats or pirates . . . [and] were [merely] ordinary merchants, farmers, and sailors seeking to augment their incomes or support their families,” the Laffites’ trade, and the political environment that they promoted it in attracted the company of more violent ruffians.^{lxxiii} This attraction was increased tenfold when the Laffites founded a sanctuary to outfit privateering ships in the Gulf of Mexico known as Barataria. This location provided both an easy access point for privateers to drop off their prizes and the ability to plan future smuggling transactions. This latter use was of particular importance to the Laffites because they relished quick and efficient business. After gathering predetermined buyers and sellers on a preselected patch of land, such as the Chenier that the Laffites called The Temple, they conducted business, and then shipped the goods up the various local channels of Louisiana.^{lxxiv}

While the core of the Laffites’ business was not in opposition to the US’s interests because it weakened the power of the Spanish and strengthened the power of local US producers, since the smuggled goods avoided customs duties and the methods of obtaining them broke US neutrality laws, the US government was forced to act. In 1811, the US sent their navy to attack Barataria in an attempt to stop the Laffites’ business, but the effort was cut short by the beginning of the War of 1812. This war drained the US’s resources and forced its navy to sail north in defense against the British.^{lxxv} For the Laffites, however, the War of 1812 meant two things: an increase in business for privateers and the placement of the smuggling trade near the bottom of the US’s priority list. Consequently, the Laffites stepped up their game by formulating their own fleet of privateers.^{lxxvi} This series of actions was made even easier from the leniency that many of the privateers and smugglers received in the Louisiana court system. Since many of the juries were composed of ex-French citizens, many gladly let smugglers off the hook because they were helping the locals and angering the US: two prospects that many of the previous French citizens were glad to achieve.^{lxxvii} This expansion of the Laffites’ power and decline in the US’s ability to do anything about it finally led to Jean Laffite receiving his first bounty of \$500 in 1814.^{lxxviii} The Laffites were bending the environment of the western world to create the life that they felt proud belonging to, much to the annoyance of the US government.

The Laffites’ exploitation of the War of 1812 and the Spanish American revolutions came to a crude conclusion at the end of 1814. Under naval officer Daniel Todd Patterson, the US navy sailed to Barataria, successfully landed, and proceeded to hang a handful of pirates and privateers. Fortunately for the Laffites, they heard about the impending attack well before the navy closed in and were both able to escape before the conflict began. But with their home and base of operations down for the count, the brothers were back to square one.^{lxxix} On December 22, 1814, however, the tides turned. The War of 1812 was coming to a close, but due to some communication errors some British naval officers were en route to invade New Orleans. Colonel Andrew Jackson, the future President of the United States, offered the Laffites, and many of their

contemporaries, clemency for their crimes if they helped him to stage a defense. Because of their trade, the Laffite brothers were the most well versed people in the backwaters of Louisiana, and Jackson wanted to use them as consultants.^{lxxx} In the end, the defense was successful and Jackson was true to his word: “The brothers Laffite have exhibited . . . courage and fidelity; and the general promises that the government shall be duly apprized of their conduct.”^{lxxxii} For the following few years, the Laffites decided to keep their heads down and tried to become ordinary US citizens. While this was difficult for them, as seen through Pierre becoming a spy for the Spanish, the two did not make much noise until they heard the news that Louis-Michel Aury was aiming to set up a base of operations in Galveston Island near the end of 1816. This event made the Laffites see another opportunity to make a profit and recreate the haven that they had come to call home. Thus, they began their antics once more.^{lxxxii}

When Aury’s grasp over Galveston started to show its cracks, the Laffites made their move. Because of their ties to the Spanish through Pierre, the Laffites were able to oust Aury with the support of Spain without ever intending to return the favor of shutting down privateering at the island.^{lxxxiii} In fact, the Spanish actually trusted the Laffites so much that one of their Spanish contacts, Fatio, declared, “He [Pierre Laffite] has always transacted with us in the greatest sincerity and shows us now that he desires to cooperate in the destruction of that gang of adventurers.”^{lxxxiv} This whole process was done through lies and trickery. The Laffites observed and studied the turmoil on Galveston for a while before reporting their intentions to the Spanish in Havana. Upon the Spanish showing interest, the Laffites moved on Galveston. Using some of their own ships and an assortment of flags, they managed to stage what looked like a fleet of Spanish ships escorting the prizes of a few Mexican ships. With this guise, it seemed as though the Laffites succeeded in their promise to the Spanish of conquering Galveston for them, but in reality, the Laffites just set up a base of operations like they had at Barataria.^{lxxxv}

The Laffites’ leadership of Galveston was a lot better than Aury’s, but it was not something that could last forever. Between 1819 and 1820, the revolutions of Spanish America began to slow down and the political atmosphere that the Laffites had been playing off began to fade. The US no longer needed to walk the shaky path of neutrality and Spain and Latin America no longer had a use for privateers. Consequently, the US turned its gaze to Galveston and sent its navy. As the ships closed in, the Laffites knew that their lifestyle had come to an end and they decided to abandon the island and flee south before they got hanged. For the following few years, the brothers tried to continue their lifestyle as privateers for various Spanish American countries, but nothing could recapture the sensation of belonging that they had when they were smugglers. In the end, Pierre died in 1821 from a terrible illness and Jean followed suit on February 5, 1823 after being mortally wounded from grapeshot during a naval battle.^{lxxxvi} After their deaths, piracy and privateering remained in the Western Hemisphere for only a few more years before dying out as a career around 1825.

The Laffites had capitalized on the political and economic environments around them by constantly playing one side against another to make a profit. They used the Spanish American revolutions as a backdrop to formulate a smuggling business to gain wealth and a location to call home. As that environment dwindled, however, so did the Laffites and all their fellow privateers and smugglers; as the political and economic fluctuations ended, so too did the need for self-discovery and the need for belonging amidst them.^{lxxxvii}

Conclusion

The early nineteenth century marked the adolescence of the Era of Revolutions. As nations around the world exploded into revolutionary chaos, borders and nationalities were in constant flux and with it came a general sense of unhinged belonging: many people were unsure of where they wanted call home. While the US achieved its independence in 1783, its Spanish American neighbors to the south had only just begun their quest for freedom. Consequently, port cities all around the Atlantic heard tales of devoted Spanish American freedom fighters and their exploits. As to be expected, many impressionable young folk who questioned their place in this new environment flocked to Spanish America to find what they were missing in life.

While on the surface the motivations for these movements deviated between different privateers – the three most common being patriotism, respect, and profit – there was one underlying motivation that influenced all of them: the desire to find a sense of belonging within a shifting, nineteenth century world. For instance, the Baltimorean merchant James Chaytor sailed to Buenos Aires with the intention of saving his failing mercantile business, but he ended up receiving a feeling of belonging and personal investment in the Spanish American reach for freedom. Additionally, Thomas Taylor sailed to Argentina in 1810 as an individual seemingly devoid of a sense of belonging after being subjected to fluctuating nationalities: he was born a British citizen in Bermuda and then quickly become a US citizen in Willmington, Delaware. However, after obtaining his Argentine citizenship, joining its navy, and gaining a reputation for his achievements, Taylor began to feel like he finally found a place that he could call home and a cause that he could call his own. Renato Beluche, a New Orleans merchant, underwent a similar transformation to Taylor. After shifting from a French to a US citizenship with the Louisiana Purchase of 1803 and after US policies hampered his merchant business, Beluche was conflicted as to where he should align himself. But, after sailing to Colombia and assisting the insurgents, Beluche found prestige, money, and respect and decided that Spanish America was where he belonged. Gregor MacGregor ran into a similar sense of dislodgement when the British navy that he was aligned to commanded him into an unfavorable position. After fleeing to Venezuela to find a government that he felt respected him, he was eventually met with another dip in his career plans and he ended up founding his own government at Amelia Island: one that he felt he could devote himself to and call home. In the same vein, Louis Michel-Aury traversed to the Caribbean as an early teen, but after the French lost their footing in the Western Hemisphere Aury started to lose his connection to them. Consequently, Aury founded his own government at Galveston Island and took over MacGregor's Amelia Island. These two actions gave Aury a government to connect with: his own. And finally, Jean and Pierre Laffite fled France around 1800 when they decided that the direction the post-revolutionary country was headed was not for them. After sailing to New Orleans, the two set up a very profitable smuggling business between Louisiana and their base in the Gulf and Mexico known as Barataria and the Laffites garnered a sense of pride in their career.

In the end, each of these seven privateers were pushed into their lifestyle because of changes occurring around the world. While some were searching for ways to save their failing businesses, others were searching for ways to forward their careers, and even more were searching for methods to gain fiscal wealth. But underneath all of these motivations was the desire to find a sense of belonging. Luckily for them, the Era of Revolutions was the perfect backdrop to achieve this endeavor. The national malleability of the era gave determined individuals the chance to put on a new face, walk – or in this case sail – a new path, and redefine themselves. Just like the freedom that the widespread revolutions in Spanish America were

propagating, the people influenced by them broke away from the mold of their predecessors and decided to find their own goals and loyalties in their new, flexible, and chaotic nineteenth century world.

ⁱ Donald Trump, “Candidate Donald Trump talks immigration, gay marriage, and ISIS,” *CNN Politics*, June 28,

ⁱⁱ See Caitlin Fitz, *Our Sister Republics: The United States in an Age of American Revolutions*, (New York, New York: Liverlight Publishing Corporation, 2016).

ⁱⁱⁱ *Ibid.*, 17-45.

^{iv} Peter H. Smith, *Talons of the Eagle: Latin America, the United States, and the World*, (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 19. See Katharine Lee Bates, “America, the Beautiful,” 1895.

^v Smith, *Talons of the Eagle*, 21-23.

^{vi} See Michel Gobat, *Confronting the American Dream: Nicaragua Under U.S. Imperial Rule*, (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2005); Aims McGuiness, *Path of Empire: Panama and the California Gold Rush*, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2008).

^{vii} Smith, *Talons of the Eagle*, 39.

^{viii} *Ibid.*, 41.

^{ix} Max Paul Friedman, *Nazis and Good Neighbors: The United States Campaign Against the Germans of Latin America in World War II*, (New York, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

- ^x Matthew McCarthy, *Privateering, Piracy and British Policy in Spanish America, 1810-1830*, (Rochester, New York: The Boydell Press, 2013), 4.
- ^{xi} David Head, "New Nations, New Connections: Spanish American Privateering from the United States and the Development of Atlantic Relations," *Early American Studies* 11, no. 1 (2013): 161-165.
- ^{xii} Arthur Preston Whitaker, *The United States and the Independence of Latin America, 1800-1830*, (Baltimore Maryland: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1941), 236-237.
- ^{xiii} See Caitlin Fitz, *Our Sister Republics: The United States in an Age of American Revolutions*, (New York, New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2016).
- ^{xiv} David Head, *Privateers of the Americas: Spanish American Privateering from the United States in the Early Republic*, (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 2015), 1. For information on Chaytor's age, according to Ancestry.com there was a James Chaytor born in Baltimore in 1798 to a James and Sarah Chaytor. If this is the same Chaytor, it would make him about eighteen when he sailed for Buenos Aires in 1816.
- ^{xv} Fitz, *Our Sister Republics*, 163.
- ^{xvi} *Ibid.*, 166-167.
- ^{xvii} Head, *Privateers of the Americas*, 1-2.
- ^{xviii} Qtd. in *Ibid.*, 122.
- ^{xix} *Ibid.*, 2, 122-123 and 149.
- ^{xx} Fred Hopkins, "For Freedom and Profit: Baltimore Privateers in the Wars of South American Independence," *The Northern Mariner* 18, no. 3-4 (2008), 94.
- ^{xxi} Charles C. Griffin, "Privateering from Baltimore During the Spanish American Wars of Independence," *Maryland Historical Magazine* 35, no. 1 (1940): 4.
- ^{xxii} Samuel Flagg Bemis, *Early Diplomatic Missions from Buenos Aires to the United States, 1811-1824*, (The Society, 1940), 37.
- ^{xxiii} Head, *Privateers of the Americas*, 63; and Bemis, *Early Diplomatic Missions*, 37.
- ^{xxiv} Head, "New Nations, New Connections," 166.
- ^{xxv} *Ibid.*; and Head, *Privateers of the Americas*, 64.
- ^{xxvi} Jane Lucas De Grummond, *Renato Beluche: Smuggler, Privateer, and Patriot*, (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1983) 12-16.
- ^{xxvii} *Ibid.*, 38-52.
- ^{xxviii} Qtd. in *Ibid.*, *Renato Beluche*, 54.
- ^{xxix} *Ibid.*, *Renato Beluche*, 53-66.
- ^{xxx} *Ibid.*, 67-74.
- ^{xxxi} Qtd. Head, *Privateers of the Americas*, 127.
- ^{xxxii} De Grummond, *Renato Beluche*, 138-150.
- ^{xxxiii} Qtd. Head, *Privateers of the Americas*, 127.
- ^{xxxiv} McCarthy, *Privateering, Piracy and British Policy*, 14.
- ^{xxxv} *Ibid.*, 70-72 and 91-92.
- ^{xxxvi} Head, *Privateers of the Americas*, 102.
- ^{xxxvii} T. Frederick Davis, "MacGregor's Invasion of Florida, 1817," *The Florida Historical Quarterly* 7, no. 1 (1928): 3.
- ^{xxxviii} *Ibid.*, 3-4.
- ^{xxxix} Charles Carroll Griffin, *The United States and the Disruption of the Spanish Empire, 1810-1822*, (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 1937), 110; Head, *Privateers of the Americas*, 102.
- ^{xl} Qtd. in Davis, "MacGregor's Invasion of Florida," 4.
- ^{xli} Griffin, *The United States and the Disruption*, 111.
- ^{xlii} *Ibid.*, 110.
- ^{xliiii} Fitz, *Our Sister Republics*, 110.
- ^{xliv} Davis, "MacGregor's Invasion of Florida," 12.
- ^{xlv} Qtd. in *Ibid.*, 13-17.
- ^{xlvi} *Ibid.*, 15-26; and Head, *Privateers of the Americas*, 104-105.
- ^{xlvii} Davis, "MacGregor's Invasion of Florida," 31.
- ^{xlviii} "A Guide to the Louis-Michel Aury Papers, 1808-1821," *Briscoe Center for American History: The University of Texas at Austin*, accessed April 26, 2017, <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/taro/utcah/00809/cah-00809.html>.

- ^{xlix} William C. Davis, *The Pirates Laffite: The Treacherous World of the Corsairs of the Gulf*, (Orlando, Florida: Harcourt, Inc., 2005), 41.
- ^l De Grummond, *Renato Beluche*, 84-85.
- ^{li} Davis, *The Pirates Laffite* 30.
- ^{lii} Qtd. in Davis, *The Pirates Laffite*, 41.
- ^{liii} Head, *Privateers of the Americas*, 94.
- ^{liv} Stanley Faye, "Trouble on the Coast," *Southern Methodist University* 16, no. 4 (1931): 470-471.
- ^{lv} Davis, "MacGregor's Invasion of Florida," 31.
- ^{lvi} *Ibid.*
- ^{lvii} Qtd. in Head, *Privateers of the Americas*, 97.
- ^{lviii} *Ibid.*, 94-97.
- ^{lix} Faye, "Trouble on the Coast," 474.
- ^{lx} Head, *Privateers of the Americas*, 99.
- ^{lxi} *Ibid.*, 106.
- ^{lxii} Qtd. in Fitz, *Our Sister Republics*, 112.
- ^{lxiii} Davis, "MacGregor's Invasion of Florida," 36.
- ^{lxiv} Head, *Privateers of the Americas*, 108.
- ^{lxv} Qtd. in Davis, "MacGregor's Invasion of Florida," 40.
- ^{lxvi} Richard G. Lowe, "American Seizure of Amelia Island," *Florida Historical Society* 45, no. 1 (1966): 25.
- ^{lxvii} Qtd. in Davis, "MacGregor's Invasion of Florida," 53.
- ^{lxviii} Head, *Privateers of the Americas*, 182.
- ^{lxix} Davis, *The Pirates Laffite*, 2-4.
- ^{lxx} Head, *Privateers of the Americas*, 43.
- ^{lxxi} *Ibid.*
- ^{lxxii} Davis, *The Pirates Laffite*, 38-43.
- ^{lxxiii} Smith, *Borderland Smuggling*, 12.
- ^{lxxiv} Head, *Privateers of the Americas*, 44-46.
- ^{lxxv} Davis, *The Pirates Laffite*, 69-77.
- ^{lxxvi} Head, *Privateers of the Americas*, 56-61; and Davis, 123.
- ^{lxxvii} Head, *Privateers of the Americas*, 56.
- ^{lxxviii} Davis, *The Pirates Laffite*, 131.
- ^{lxxix} *Ibid.*, 181-210.
- ^{lxxx} *Ibid.*, 211-213.
- ^{lxxxi} Robert C. Vogel, "Jean Laffite, the Baratarians, and the Battle of New Orleans: A Reappraisal," *Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association* 41, no. 3 (2000): 270,
- ^{lxxxii} Davis, *The Pirates Laffite*, 258 and 302.
- ^{lxxxiii} *Ibid.*, 326-348; and Head, *Privateers of the Americas*, 102-105.
- ^{lxxxiv} Qtd. Davis, *The Pirates Laffite*, 366.
- ^{lxxxv} Head, *Privateers of the Americas*, 105.
- ^{lxxxvi} Davis, *The Pirates Laffite*, 435-463.
- ^{lxxxvii} *Ibid.*, 466.

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The Myths of Filibuster William Walker

John Park

William Walker's rise to power in Nicaragua as a filibuster and president unquestionably shows his impressive tact and daringness. His final position in life may be strange and offsetting for an American, but his adventurous story and rise to power is what raises the eyebrows of the masses. Nicaraguan President William Walker may have been one of the most controversial figures in the United States history. In his book *The War in Nicaragua*, the reasons that he presents for his actions can be situated under "*The Myth of Exceptional Men*" as well as "*The Myth of the White Conquistador*" (conqueror) that was originally coined by Mathew Restall's famous book, *Seven Myths of the Spanish Conquest*. These myths will be used in this paper to correct the same myths that were applied to the Spanish Conquistadors. Typically, William Walker's presence in school lectures only tells us that he became the President of Nicaragua and that the U.S. sanctioned him to do so. With the lack of in depth information about Walker, people will assume and later create their own answer, and those common answers were the same myths that people tend to create. The 7 myths by Restall were originally appointed to the Spanish Conquistadors during the Age of Exploration, because these white men's achievements were 'hyped up' to a point where a band of Spanish individuals were seen solely as the ultimate conquerors of Latin America. Due to the fact that people tend to create these myths, Walker's status in modern day society as a successful filibuster is no different than the conquistadors. What this paper will provide, is a summary of his fantastic adventures, but at the same time, diffusing some of the myths that people created and, the tendency to believe in the idea of U.S. exceptionalism.

First, to define the myths people create. Matthew Restall and his book "*Seven Myths of the Spanish Conquest*" has mapped out the myths in his seven chapters. Some myths are true to an extent, but due to the tendency of exaggeration, William Walker must be put back into the realistic lighting. The first myth deals with "*The Myth of exceptional men*" that was used to say that "how a handful of Spaniards won two empires" and "leading small bands of volunteers" (Restall, 3). In the case of Walker, only the latter is almost true, because Walker was invited and he also had Native Americans in his force at Nicaragua. The second myth would not be applied to William Walker because there was no King he was loyal to, but for organizational sake, it was "*the Myth of the King's Army*". The third chapter is very relevant to William Walker as it was called "*The Myth of the White Conquistador*". Although the myth was originally directed towards the Spaniards, Walker's "conquest" left out his allies previously mentioned before, the Natives and Nicaraguans. Chapter four and myth four is "*The Myth of Completion*" that the Spanish conquered the Americas in just a few years, but in Walker's case, he did go to Nicaragua to "conquer" them originally, but he did become their leader in a few years due to an opportunity provided by his opportunistic investors. The fifth, "*The Myth of (Mis)Communication*" is also not applied to Walker because most of the time, he did not have troubles communicating with his Nicaraguan employers. Chapter six is dedicated to the Natives that are silenced in the world today hence the name "*The Myth of Native Desolation*". It was the belief that the Natives ceased to exist after the Spaniards "quickly" conquered them, but in Walker's case, people do not focus

on the fact that his army did encompass the Natives and that the Natives did exist within the political and military realm. The final myth that is crucial to this paper is "*The Myth of Superiority*". The Myth's name speaks for itself as it was that the Spanish was superior militaristically and culturally. In Walker's case, it is much relevant to see why people apply this myth onto him, because he was seen as the "conquering" force. This myth is both racist and false, because Walker was simply invited to Nicaragua.

Secondly, the definition of "U.S. exceptionalism" must be defined in the context of Nicaragua during the 19th century. U.S. exceptionalism is sometimes a myth when regarding some aspects of William Walker, because he and his filibusters personified America in Nicaragua. U.S. exceptionalism undoubtedly evident because all nations are different, but the argument is that Walker was not superior compared to the Nicaraguans and their natives. He was only successful because the ideology of U.S. exceptionalism in Nicaragua was very evident, and the major believer was Castellon, the director of the Nicaraguan Provisional Democratic Party. He sought that Walker would bring democracy and freedom to Nicaragua, but that was a myth due to the racist nature of Walker. This ideology is also propagandized through the Statue of Liberty as the German professor Sieglinde Lemke argues that it, "Signifies this proselytizing mission as the natural extension of the U.S.' sense of itself as an exceptional nation", and it depicts that the U.S. is the bulwark of democracy (Fluck, Winfried, Pease, 207). By monopolizing democracy, the U.S. becomes arrogant and desires to protect their hegemony over the western hemisphere. This exceptional ideology also creates the idea of racial supremacy due to the fact that Americans were white and they held the power of democracy, and Walker depicts just that. Therefore U.S. exceptionalism is an double edged sword, and sometimes it does not exist in some cases.

The backdrop and relevance of his journey began on his trek to Mexico began in the summer of 1853 to create a military colony in modern day Texas and north western Mexico, or to be precise, Sonora. His presence in Sonora was a part of the arrogant racist doctrine called the Manifest Destiny. This Manifest is the creation to legitimize the U.S.'s expansion to bring civilization to the already civilized west. It was already civilized because the Mexicans inhabited vast amounts of land in modern day California, New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona. This colony was established to 'protect the interests' of the Unites States and to create a buffer zone to fend off not the Mexicans, but the savage Native Apaches (Walker, 19). In June 1853, he tried to visit the Mexican governor of Sonora to request funds to aid the frontier towns, but when he arrived in Guayma the prefect denied him from going into the interior of Mexico. Around the same time, Walker overheard the news of the troubles that the Guayma and the nearby settlement were facing. The news was that the Apaches were sacking, pillaging, murdering, and kidnapping men, women, and child. At this time, the Mexican Sonora area was subject to the laws not under the sovereign, but more under the laws of the bandit Apaches, therefore the fearful townsfolk sought protection from the Apaches and William was not exempted from this plea (Walker, 21). The Apaches were agitated primarily from the United States' hostile west ward expansion originating from the Manifest Destiny. With the incompetence of the Mexicans in the Sonora region and the plea for help at Guayma, U.S. Colonel William Walker found himself in a unique position that would allow his to seize Sonora for himself.

Walker saw his seizure of Sonora as a mission for survival and justice. He regarded his tightly knit subordinates with highest expectations. In one case of his men conducting illegal cattle raiding, he imposed martial law and decimated his soldiers whom he had committed the deed to uphold justice, however the truth is that Walker authorized many other raids on neighboring ranches (May, 41). He also stated that the composition of a soldier's mind should be one of the conservative mind and the motivation to create and not destroy. This philosophy is ironic, because the men wanted to build and create their reputation by killing Native Americans and destroying their land. Their task was to create and build a stable foundation for a society, but they ultimately failed (Walker 24). On a national scale, the United States believed that their efforts were serving some noble purpose rather than material interest (Smith, 44). This summarized excerpt from Smith's book *"Talons of the Eagle: Latin America, the United States, and the World"* enlightens us on the nature of the Americans under Walker, because if the Americans were to proclaim themselves as "selfless" and "noble", we should expect those traits from their motivations, actions, and the outcomes of their actions. Walker's decimation of his regiment may be just, but this characteristic inevitably did not hold up when he and his mercenaries sought out for Nicaragua after their failure in Sonora. "The Myth of Exceptional Men" can be applied here because Walker's ideal was not the reality of his situation. He did have a band of American mercenaries, but their actions were not exceptional due to the fact that they did the most common thing a marching soldier would do, harass the nearby inhabitants.

In May 1854, Colonel Walker did not waver after his failure at Sonora, and instead set his eyes on Nicaragua. On August 15th, 1854, he sent his comrade Mr. Cole to inspect the revolution in Nicaragua. He then received news from the Nicaraguan Provisional government which proposed an offer that would employ three hundred American mercenaries from Colonel Walker, however it was only to be denied by Walker under the pretense of the 1818 Neutrality Law. Walker's use of this loophole in the Neutrality Law was seen through the previously failed colonization effort in Sonora. It was under the cession of land and the creation of a colony to Walker that he can get into Nicaragua, because he would own his property in Nicaragua. The Nicaraguan provisional government under Castellon gave away the colonization grant out of fear and desperation. The same desperation that was seen in the eyes of the people of Guaymas, Walker capitalized on it. Castellon and his liberal provisional government at Leon did not expect Walker to seize power, but instead wanted to invite Walker and his mercenaries from all walks of life to colonize agriculturally. Who wanted to "civilize" and guide Nicaragua towards political and economic modernity (Gobat, 1). This neocolonial mindset of white supremacy notes the *"The Myth of the White Conquistador"* and *"The Myth of Superiority"*. *"The Myth of the White Conquistador"* is evident due to Walker being invited over to Nicaragua, therefore he was not conquering anything at all under his name initially. *"The Myth of Superiority"* is actually believed by the Nicaraguan Democratic as they did invite them over to be a civilizing entity as well as William Walker himself. Walker and his Americans were also well equipped and experienced in warfare, therefore they were superior in tactics, but obviously not racially.

Walker and Mr. Cole had made a pact with the provisional Nicaraguan government entirely on their own accord. This showed that they had a great amount of autonomy to engage in their own expeditions, however this vast amount of free will must be legitimized under a higher power. William Walker found legitimacy approval through U.S. General Wool. The General listened, shook the Colonel's hand, and wished for the expedition's absolute success

(Walker, 29). This non-official agreement symbolically depicts Walker's standing with the United States' upper echelon. This colonization agreement enabled the "U.S. colonists" to go to Nicaragua and at the same time, making the enterprise legal. U.S. sanctions on the actions of Walker was limited to a simple handshake, and nothing more. Walker had to find his own way to access capital to transport him and the necessary provisions to Nicaragua, therefore, he took a loan in his own name. Walker's position of power had little strength because when he was to depart on his brig called *Vesta*, a Deputy Marshal seized the ship because the departure of the ship was illegal. The U.S. Colonel William Walker was then fined for a costly three hundred dollars because of the incident which is approx. 8000 dollars in 2017 (CPI). This almost made William Walker abort the entire enterprise. In the end, Walker had to cast off in secrecy in a last ditch effort to begin his quest. After detaining the marshal's keeper who was supposed to hold the brig at bay, they all sailed off on May 4th, 1855. It is shocking that a man with a powerful position in the United States military lacked any influential strength and had fiscal wealth to ward off the sheriff. Walker and his men can be seen as rouge pirates that are setting out for an adventure, and actually falling within with "*The Myth of exceptional men*", because the Americans were a handful of men, on the other hand, they were assisted later by the Nicaraguans so, they were not the only few that were fighting.

The question then arises: why didn't the United States government supply Walker and his group of American mercenaries? This was due in the pretense that the sociological perspective at the time was of race, religion and the climate of the weather. U.S. authorities like Carl Schurz presented that "the tropics were unfit for democracy; instead they were conducive to laziness, licentiousness, and irresponsibility" (Smith, 51). Another perspective and ideology dominant at this time was Herbert Spencer's idea of Social Darwinism. It was the idea that categorized entire races with the backing of science, however even Darwin himself disapproved of this ideology before it was even introduced. When he observed Argentina in one of his letters, he witnessed the merciless slaughter of the Native American people that inhabited the eastern portion of Argentina and expressed concern (Nouzeilles). The U.S. authorities instead subscribed to Social Darwinism instead to display their supremacy, and concluding that the people of the tropics are lazy and have no notion of competence when operating a republic (Smith, 51). In the case of Nicaraguans, the U.S. hierarchy put them in the category of Indians and some argued even lower because of their mixed blood (Smith, 52). Colonel Walker's subordinates in the phalanx displayed their own point of view of this ideology, and the difference between the mercenaries and the U.S. authorities were little to none. "Williams followers by contrast, Nicaraguans encountered a highly exclusionary and bellicose strand of U.S. Manifest Destiny that claimed Latin Americans could not be Americanized through the "civilizing" force of U.S. culture and trade but had to be violently subordinated if not physically exterminated" (Gobat, 22). This ideology was also resulted in the decimation Colonel Walker's soldiers in the earlier years when he was rallying his mercenaries near Mexico.

This situation displays the duality of the U.S.'s perception of William Walker. Due to the lack of both power and U.S. support that Walker depicts, he faced problems at first, but he later exercised his complete autonomy of his actions with no limitations bound to his position in life as he was going rogue as a professional pirate. This characteristic was not only limited to Walker, because his mercenaries were also acting on their own to gain glory as Walker stated: "They (Walker's soldiers) were most of them men of strong character, tired of the humdrum of

common life, and ready for a career which might bring them the sweets of adventure or the rewards of fame". Many of them were military veterans, but rarely, in the case of Dr. Alex Jones he was a treasure hunter thus giving a diverse range of capable characters in Walker's force. Walker seemed to be leading professionals that were loosely tied to any formal military doctrine, and displays that he was not the only one that was capable to lead. Therefore, proves that he was not the only exceptional figure present.

When William Walker, also known as the "butcher" of Central America, arrives in Nicaragua, he heard that Castellon's position was in a humiliating state, and the "butcher of Central America" was well received by the Provisional Democratic Liberal party. Walker hoped to capitalize on the misfortunes of the "revolutionary" party, through the preposition of unequal deals. With this power, Walker proposed to Director Castellon that he would like to be under the director's supervision rather than the conceded general Munoz. Castellon accepted this request. Walker attained more autonomy with this hierarchy, and thus attained the rank of Colonel under the banner of Nicaragua. To also be a part of the military, one needs to be a citizen of the nation, therefore many people in the phalanx became citizens, therefore the phalanx turned into a Nicaraguan army and not an American one (Walker, 41). With the use of political correctness one can argue again that "*The Myth of exceptional men*" regarding Walker's American force, is now incorrect because it is now a Nicaraguan force.

Walker was indeed a man of the military and also was the man with a plan. The military tactics Walker employed were very organized and well prepared. Walker proposed to first attack the southern department that would seize funds for the revolutionary party (Walker, 40). By achieving this feat, the democratic party of Castellon would then impose harsh taxes to fund the military and would also dissatisfy the inhabitants. Later, if army were to capture the railroad, he would also be able to reinforce the "U.S." mercenary regiment known as the "American Phalanx" (Falange) and the Nicaraguan Army. Walker unsurprisingly wanted to keep his autonomy and freedom within his own grasp hence he operates under the Director instead of the General, but it was more than that. It was the mixture about racial inferiority, desires, and his own pride in that respective order as Walker stated, "The history of the world presents no such utopian vision as that of an inferior race yielding meekly and peacefully to the controlling influence of a superior people. Whenever barbarism and civilization meet face to face, there must be war." (Walker, 430). Therefore, Walker's exceptionality view changed drastically during the conflict. In the beginning, he was there to colonize a part of Nicaragua and later he became a conqueror. This is opportunism at its finest and the depiction of the nature of "*The Myth of the White Conquistador*", because of his duality in the reasons why he went into Nicaragua, there is no decisive one nature of Walker. Another myth that Walker protrudes onto us is "*The Myth of Superiority*", but to the simple fact that he was invited into Nicaragua makes it clear to us that without the help of Castellon and the Natives, Walker could not have "conquered" anything.

A notable figure that supported William Walker and had the same desires to accomplish his goals was a Native American man named Mariano Mendez. It comes to show how Walker was not the only one that held the "celebrity status" when comparing him to Mendez. Although Mendez's peers did not support the enterprise like General Munoz and officer Ramirez, Mendez made it his duty to pursue his "violent passions and uncontrolled desires, he had the courage and experience which made him useful for leaders that wanted to attempt political changes".

Mendez's other criticism denounced him as he was, "utterly unfit for civil life and incapable of being subjected to the rigid rules of military law" (Walker, 43). He also created a very close bond to those that were in his presence though his humble way of interacting with his fellow soldiers (like gambling). He may even display more of a connection with his peers than Walker, which makes him a better leader, and his thirst to quench desires shows the similar characteristic Walker also portrays. Their personalities align quite neatly, and therefore shows the reason why he gravitates to Walker. Above all, it is important that Mendez is highlighted to show that a Native American that has this kind of presence, and completely shatters the myth that Walker was the only exceptional man during the war. The underrepresentation of the natives is also at large and "*The Myth of Native Desolation*" can be applied here to highlight the influence and the strong presence of the Natives.

Another theme that correlates with the exceptional view of Walker's position in life were the Spanish conquistadors. Both parties believed that they were sent by God himself and gave them both the power to go on the civilizing mission into Latin America as the author Smith states:

"It was God in Heaven, not just earthly mortals, who endowed American society with its virtues and its purposes. The pursuit of national greatness therefore could not be a matter of choice. It was a sacred obligation... it was incumbent upon them to act as they did; otherwise they would be committing sacrilege as well as treason" (Smith, 45).

As the heavenly civilizing continues from Realejo to Rivas, the trek between them was as expected from a tropical country, a rainy one. The Falange found out that the Legitimists (conservatives) learned of their advancements through a traveling German, and the Legitimists ordered Rivas to be prepared for battle. Regardless to the Legitimists finding out of the phalanx's advancements, Walker continued the march and at the same time, questioned his intelligence and arrogance (exceptionalism). As he and his Phalanx continued to advance towards the village named Tola, the legitimists sent horsemen there to inspect the democratic town and sought refuge there because they were injured. When Walker observed the situation in hiding during a torrential storm he realized that the legitimist horsemen were all in a house playing cards with no one on lookout. This was the decisive factor that led Walker to waltz on in and capture the injured horsemen soon to realize that some left to Realejo to report that Walker is coming. The Nicaraguans in his Phalanx wanted to shoot the prisoners as they were the enemy, but Walker wanted to keep them alive and treated them, thus appearing noble and merciful compared to the native officers. The day ended with sentries posted and the acquirement of horses for the attack on the next day concluding that there is a major difference between the basic tactics of Walker and the lack of tactics of the legitimists.

The battle of Rivas was again organized by Walker. He was closing in quickly and devised the plan to attack from the north as it was the location where he can use plantation houses for either defending or attacking. While holding on to the houses as the foothold of the operation, the Americans led the center in the thirst for battle and glory. The ones responsible for their flanks were Kewen and Crocker. The latter was commanding the natives to support the left flank, however since they were not battle hardened they wavered on the first few rounds of fire. Their state of mind caused the Americans in the front to be stranded in houses within the town being pinned down by legitimist fire. Ramirez took note of this situation and routed for the Costa

Rican frontier. The tactics were on point, but the reality of the cruelty of war was in fact the decisive factor that led to this situation. The Americans were pinned down on all sides with their numbers reduced to only 35 men, and with 500 legitimists coming down on them, they managed to retreat. The casualty of 15 Americans including Kewen and Crocker, resulted in a decisive defeat. In their retreat, one of the Americans named Doubleday was a captain that was specialized on the warfare of the natives. He was a man who was injured to the head but did not falter mentally. Walker was perplexed and held his comrade's nature as a virtuous one. It seems as if Walker blamed the entire conflict on the natives and their weak mind, therefore inciting a racist tone, but in realistically, they were simply not battle ready. Also, since Walker had a specialist on the natives, why didn't Doubleday pay closer attention to the status of the natives? This event depicts that Walker was indeed savvy with military tactics, but deep down it also displayed the reality of the necessity of the professional white Americans. This defeat also signifies that Walker did not waltz on in and sat on the presidency "throne", but he first failed in his earliest endeavors showing that this task was not an easy one. Another uneasy task was the conquest of Latin America by the conquistadors thus depicting "*the Myth of the White Conquistador and the Myth of Superiority*". Walker's defeat also highlights "*The Myth of Superiority*", because if he was so tactful, then he should have noticed the wavering natives.

On their retreat, an incident occurred where Walker had to exercise, once again, decimation of his fellow American. On the shores of San Juan del Sur, the Democrats sought refuge in a local barrack waiting for a ship to board and go back to allied land. Once boarded, Walker saw the barrack set ablaze taking half of the town with it. The perpetrator was by a fellow American and a native. It seems that wherever Walker's crew travels, whether it is from Texas to San Francisco or their retreat from a crushing defeat backed by an exhausting trek, the "liberating" Americans tended to attract antisocial behavior. In this case, it was done by 2 individuals named Dewey and Sam, the latter bring an American convict wanted in the U.S and the former being a native ship launching worker. Their private hatred towards the legitimists led them to incite revenge on the local populace, and as Walker stated: "Thirst for plunder and the hope of satisfying their avarice during the confusion to escape the punishment of his crimes" (Walker, 59). Walker continues and calls them barbaric because the town was undoubtedly innocent, but more importantly shows that the U.S. should not be depicted by one man like Walker, but instead through the actions of the Americans. Therefore, to label the United States as all good and liberating is misleading the public's view and leads to the creation of "The Myth of Superiority" and the myth of the exceptional white man. Even Walker wanted to save face of his entire Phalanx as he stated: "Their act had jeopardized the whole town [...] the responsibility of the act might fall on the Americans in the democratic service" (Walker, 59). Walker wanted to bring justice as it was the major theme to his actions, but he instead tried to mask his true selfish intentions though the shawl of the civilizing mission as we saw previously from the U.S.'s Manifest Destiny (also known as the destiny to conquer).

Dewey's execution depicted what the Nicaraguans called "American Justice" and "respectable". Walker also noted that: "they "Nicaraguans" saw that the men they had been taught to call themselves "filibusters", intended to maintain law and secure order wherever they went; that they had the will to administer justice, and would, when they had the power, to protect the weak and the involvement from the crimes of the lawless and abandoned. And it is this sentiment stamped deeply on the people of Nicaragua which makes the evil-doers of that land

dread the reappearance of the Americans in the country.” (Walker, 63). Walker’s perspective of his work is highly exceptional, but later, after his tyrannical rule of the Nicaraguans, they saw him as the destroyer and slayer of Nicaraguan culture (Gobat, 1). Also, one imagines the scenario: “what if the Nicaraguans have done if they caught Dewey instead by Walker?”, the answer would be the same as what the democrat officers wanted when they captured Legitimists at Tola, which was death. Therefore, again would show the exaggeration of the exceptional and noble nature of the American filibusters. It is hypocritical that Walker imposed his own justice as if he knew better when he planned to attack Mexico back in 1853, and he was judged at San Francisco due to the violation of the Neutrality Act (May, 43).

After the retreat from Rivas, Walker continued to fight under Castellon with the help of the Native American colonel Jose Maria Valle. Due to the defeat in Rivas, Castellon gave Walker even more power due to his desperation when the legitimists were launching a counter offensive (Walker, 75). Before the engagement, Walker received news that his counterpart General Munoz died from a firefight, thus making Walker even more closer to securing his own hegemony in the provisional government (Walker, 85). With the Native officer, the defense was held at the Virgin Bay on September 3rd even though Castellon urged Walker to instead defend the capital. This defense may actually depict Walker’s exceptional ability because there were no casualties for the Democrats, instead, the Legitimists took heavy casualties approximately in the 60’s. However, it is unfair to give all the credit to Walker since the majority of the Phalanx consisted of Natives and Nicaraguans. The day after the battle, Castellon the director dies due to an aquatic disease called cholera, and the helm was left to the new director named Nasario Escoto. Walker later finds out that Granada the capital of the Legitimists, was undefended and attacked on the 13th of October. After he took power with the help of the American logistics, he disposed his Legitimist rival Ponciano Corral due to treason. Valle, Walker’s Native American ally found out that Corral was leading a secret provisional government that was a coalition to invite all of the other Central American states to invade Nicaragua. Walker later became the president by tainted balloting, and by issuing a proclamation that that all anti-filibusters were to be removed, thus the puppet ruler Rivas and the minister of war would be disposed as well (May, 48). This story highlights the exceptional view that Walker saw of himself, because filibusters were American, and being anti-filibuster were to also be anti-American furthermore, Walker’s quote is applied here again, “The history of the world presents no such utopian vision as that of an inferior race yielding meekly and peacefully to the controlling influence of a superior people. Whenever barbarism and civilization meet face to face, there must be war.” (Walker, 430). “The Myth of Superiority” is perpetuated onto the society by Walker’s rhetoric, because when anything doesn’t go Walker’s way, he blames it on the Natives or the Nicaraguans. Walker’s hate can be seen when critically observing his diction and statements in his book, and U.S. exceptionalism or the necessity of the U.S., leads towards the dependency of them in the Nicaraguan government.

U.S. exceptionalism and its flaws can be seen in the point of view of Augusto Cesar Sandino. After 50+ years of U.S. interventions to secure Nicaragua for themselves, Sandino was one of the few major responses to the U.S. as one scholar puts it, “Sandino Nicaragua’s enemies included not only the Wall Street bankers and the U.S. government, but also the American people, personified by Gen. William Walker. Sandino regularly referred to American “pirates” and “freebooters,” and considered the marines an “avalanche of Walker’s descendants” upholding the cause of U.S. imperialism.” (May, 295). To Sandino, he took Walker’s American

exceptionalism and used it against the American people that were terrorizing and invading Nicaragua, therefore he and Walker depicts the war against races. Sandino was also a dreamer that was inspired by the famous Pan-Latin Americanist Simon Bolivar. Sandino wrote a plan that wanted to do the same thing Bolivar wanted to do at the Panama Conference, to create a Pan-Latin American alliance, but with Anti U.S. rhetoric (Booth, 61). The U.S. and Nicaraguan elites believed in the “civilizing mission” that the U.S. were the only ones capable to achieve. We can see Castellon inviting Walker to civilize Nicaragua through farming, also Walker’s multiple remarks of racial and U.S. exceptionalism, and later after Walker’s age, the Nicaraguan conservative party’s desires to continue the U.S. involvement to civilize/ modernize the nation (Gobat, 141-2). Walker’s story and his legacy, with the help of Latin American scholars, depict the true nature of U.S. imperialism and exceptionalism between Nicaragua and the U.S.

Society tends to think that Walker and his crew of Americans were the only force that conquered and made Walker the President of Nicaragua thus promoting U.S. exceptionalism. But, when applying the original use of the four of the six myths, “*The Myth of Exceptional Men*”, “*The Myth of Native Desolation*”, “*The Myth of the White Conquistador*” and “*The Myth of Superiority*”, those myths were originally used to debunk the lies that the white Spanish Conquistadors were the only sole proprietors that easily conquered Central America, therefore, displaying Spanish exceptionalism and imperialism. Walker’s case is no different, since Walker and his crew were actually hired by the Nicaraguan provisional government, he was invited to fight against the legitimists for a large area for farming instead of the false famous “conquest” that never occurred, therefore disproving “*The Myth of the White Conquistador*”. Also, the natives played a large part in the military force that aided walker and Castellon thus displaying “*The Myth of Native Desolation and The Myth of Exceptional Men*”. This is even more evident when Walker stated, “The whole force (American Phalanx) consisted of about fifty-five Americans and one-hundred and ten natives” (Walker. 45), and with the combination of the influential figure life Mendez it is evident that both races were equally performing if not more in favor of the natives’ contribution into the war effort, thus ridding of “*The Myth of Superiority*” and finally, “The Myth of American Exceptionalism”. Sandino was also a fighter but for a different cause, Anti-Americanism/ imperialism and Anti-Capitalism were two products of U.S. intervention and U.S exceptionalism/ racism, simply because they negatively impacted Nicaraguan sovereignty. Therefore, with the combination of the myths of Walker, and Sandino’s response, society must see the reality of the myth of U.S. exceptionalism in Nicaragua and that Walker was not a conqueror but an opportunist that got very lucky by capitalizing on Castellon’s desperation.

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The French Intervention in Mexico

Connor Bonelli

Latin America has always had a rich history, but along with that it is an area that constantly has been afflicted with conflict. Whether it be the modern day drug problems or the early problems of imperialism. Due to the geographic location of Latin America, the U.S. has always had close relations and interactions with this area. The U.S. has always been regarded as one of the greatest nations, they are seen as exceptional. Events that have transpired between the United States and Latin America have either added to its exceptionalism or have undermined it. This fact remains true in the event of the French intervention of Mexico in 1861. This event affected diplomatic relations between Mexico and France, but also affected the area culturally. This situation also led to the United States of America's important decisions that would reflect on its government. The relationship that formed from this changed the nature of relations of Latin America with the rest of the world. This event shows the heavy degrees of appropriate diplomacy that the U.S. exhibited and it helped define U.S. exceptionalism.

Wait France...Why are you here?

Mexico had erupted in a civil war fought between two differing schools of thoughts of how to move forward. This civil war was fought by the Conservatives led by Félix Zuloaga against the Liberals who were led by Benito Juarez. By 1859 the U.S. recognized Juarez's government, then the Liberals were able to capture Mexico City which was the conservatives base. Both of these things helped increase Juarez's power and public appeal. But as the war raged on, there was a perpetuating instability within the state of Mexico due to their growing debts that they were not able to pay back. Thus, the Secretary of State Seward offered a plan that would provide mining concessions in exchange for American loans. In the case that the debts were not repaid, Mexico would agree to the cession of Baja California and other Mexican states. The terms of the loan were onerous to the Mexican government. But, U.S. diplomat Thomas Corwin was able to successfully negotiate a treaty with a representative from Mexico named, Manuel Maria Zamacona. However, Congress would not sign the treaty as it was not fiscally wise, due to their own Civil War.

On October 31, 1861 Spain, France and the Britain met in London to sign a tripartite deal. This was an agreement that formed in response to Juarez decision to suspend payment on the debts for two years, so the deal was made for them to intervene and help pay the debts. December 8th, European troops arrived at Veracruz. Obviously, Juárez called for people to rise up and resist, but the Conservatives saw this arrival as "changing of the tides" in their struggle against the Liberals. Although Britain and Spain had more limited plans for intervention, "Napoleon III was interested in reviving French global ambitions, and French forces captured Mexico City, while Spanish and British forces withdrew after French plans became clear"lxxxvii Napoleon believed that if he controlled Mexico the rest of Europe would have easier access to Latin America in regards to trade. Miss. Hanna states Europe was growing jealous of the success of the United States and "Mexico was the logical place to build a check to the United States."lxxxvii Napoleon was also very interested in the silver that could be mined there.

Napoleon III invited Maximilian, Archduke of Austria, to become the emperor of Mexico. Maximilian accepted the generous offer and arrived in Mexico in 1864. Although Maximilian's Conservative government controlled much of the country, Liberals held on to power in northwestern Mexico and parts of the Pacific coast. The French invasion was not one of peace, their arrival was faced with violence and they of course, retaliated with violence. Mr. Martin writes:

But it has to be remembered that the French troops were likewise prove guilty of nameless and a cruel retaliation, of inflicting needlessly savage punishment, wrecking implacable revenge, and as often committing ferocious deeds of a rage. The complete account of the French attack upon Puebla, of the oppression to which innocent women and children were subjected, of the inhumane treatment meted out to the luckless men who fell into their hands as prisoners of war, of their hunting from their concealment with faggot and sword those who had hidden themselves, of the number of illegal and unwarrantable private executions of civil prisoners, untried and undefeated, history has preserved no record. lxxxvii

There was resistance from arrival, which made colonization of this area much more difficult. Also, it was not as if the Mexicans did not have access to modern weapons, such as guns, this was not 18th century imperialism, where the European had far superior weapons and tools than the natives.

Hasta la Vista, Baby

France may have had control of Mexico this did not mean the people were happy. From the start there was always resistance to the French presence there. Miss. Stevenson states "At no time was Napoleon's Mexican policy popular with the great mass of the French people, and he received many warnings of the seriousness of his action, how he brought chosen to heed them. But Napoleon seldom devoted much consideration to the opinions of other, and still less to the wishes of these people" lxxxvii Due to the widespread animosity felt for the foreign presence in their nation, there was constant conflict. As time went on the Liberals were able to win some decisive battles against Maximilian. The biggest problem Napoleon faced was the unpopular feelings felt by those in France. Mr. Martin writes, "At no time was Napoleon's Mexican policy popular with the great mass of the French people, and he receive many warnings of the seriousness of his actions, had he but chosen to heed them. But Napoleon seldom devoted much consideration to the opinions of others, and still less to the wishes of his people." lxxxvii It could argued Napoleon would have been able to hold on to Mexico longer if he hadn't handled the situation so poorly. Stevenson touches on this matter by stating,

"Napoleon's personal responsibility for the Mexican expedition and its disastrous mismanagement has, as already stated, never been denied...The voluminous documents which are available, relative to both official and private correspondence, bear unmistakable evidence of the feverish haste with which the expedition was conceived and carried out, and the fixed determination in the emperor's mind, when once he was convinced

that he was not destined to realize either his dreams of colonial expansion or the restoration of the power of the Church of Rome in Mexico, to withdraw from the gallant young prince who had put his faith in his pledged word, and had entrusted his life into his hands”lxxxvii

On January 31, 1866, Napoleon III ordered the withdrawal of French troops from Mexico, it was to be conducted in three stages from November 1866 to November 1867. U.S. Secretary Seward, who had previously preached about being cautious, warned Austria against replacing French troops with that of their own. Due to the respect they had for Secretary Seward and also realizing the probability of war, the Austrian government held back from sending reinforcements Maximilian. Consequently, Maximilian was now without the support of Europe leading to his inability to hold off Mexican resistance. He was captured, stripped of his power, and sentenced to be executed.

There were several consequences of this event, the foremost being this was the end of direct European intervention in Mexico. There was a realization that it was not economically and politically wise to intervene in this area again. All the other outcomes involved matters with United States of America. Throughout the French intervention, America made the decision to not intervene. This was so we would not have conflict with France was an ally, but we made sure that they knew of our disapproval of their presence in Mexico. President Lincoln at the time wanted to respect the demands of the Monroe Doctrine, and wanted to keep the people of Latin America independent and autonomous. The United States support for Juarez through this time frame, aspired hopes of increase positive relations with Mexico. And eventually these positive relations would lead to the convincing of Mexico to join the United States. Though the United States had little intervention with this affair, (especially if one was to compare it to other situations regarding foreign relations with Latin America) there was some uproar in France when the U.S. demanded France to pull their troops. The situation in Mexico was not just a mere internal affair with consequences that only affected those in the vicinity, but it effected Europe as well. Robert Ryal Miller writes, "Maximilian was gradually weaned away from the French advisers by his Mexican condiments until he was not even on speaking terms with Marshall Bazaine, commander of the French forces in Mexico. French troops, like any occupation army, naturally aroused the hostility of many Mexicans-republicans and imperialists."lxxxvii This large impact this situation could have on the rest of the world was perhaps amongst the reasons why the United States felt it was appropriate to intervene.

Besides the diplomatic and relational effects this event had on Mexico, the French also brought their culture to Mexico. This can be seen in their art, cooking and even in their music. The mariachi, which is a famous type of Mexican music, is rumored to be derived from the French word “marriage.” The story goes that some French soldiers witnessed a marriage, where a band was playing, when the French asked an interpreter what was going on, the interpreter answered “C’est un mariage.” So the French would continue to call any band or musician they saw playing “mariachi.” This story is based on speculation, and can not be backed by fact, but there is actual French influence in Mexico. The first is Mexican law, after the French left Mexico, the Mexican government created laws that resembled Napoleonic code. Another influence was on the architecture many French style building were built for the French elite in Mexico, these mansions are now used as office in modern day Mexico. The final major impact the French had on Mexico was their food. French influence can be found in many Mexican

dishes. Though many people discredit the French having any influence in Mexican cuisine, “French techniques and Mexican ingredients made an excellent gastronomic pairing. Native ingredients such as squash blossoms, *huitlacoche* and avocados took beautifully to French style soups, crepes and mousses... The following recipes, while containing many indigenous Mexican ingredients, would never have come to be created without the techniques learned from the French.”lxxxvii

It’s a bird. No, it’s a plane. No, it’s the U.S. interfering in Latin American affairs again.

The United State’s role in this affair created differing perspectives, where people believed the U.S. intervened more than they should or where others believed the government maintained a respectable level of diplomacy. There was an obvious clash of differing political ideologies of the U.S. and Europe. There are two main arguments that can be made about the role of the U.S. during this affair, if they either intervened too much or a justified amount. I don’t believe there are scholars arguing that there was enough American presence interjected into this affair. I believe the United States performed within reason and didn’t infringe on the Monroe Doctrine. Exceptionalism can be defined as, “the condition of being different from the norm”lxxxvii which is something that the United States of America exudes throughout it’s history. But, did an event like this undermine its exceptionalism? Perhaps, the U.S. violated their own doctrinaire beliefs with even with the little intervention that occurred. It could be argued that this is a form of hypocrisy and mitigates the exceptionalism. However, there is clear aspects of U.S. exceptionalism shown in the handling of the France’s intervention in Mexico. The first, is American policy in relations with Latin America was different from all of Europe, nations who were all proponents of imperialism. This could be attributed to the fact that it was only within the last 100 years that the U.S. became independent for Britain’s tyranny. Another reason why America showed exceptionalism is with how they went about their interactions. They made efforts of not vexing France, but also was able to be concrete on their platform of foreign intervention. It was because of Secretary Seward's ability to negotiate with many different parties involved in this situation that there was no direct intervention of the United States. His approach can be described as “The United States Secretary of State was attempting to practice ‘the cold neutrality of an impartial judge,’ which would have been the most proper course to have followed” lxxxvii He was able to keep Austria from also intervening in the situation. This in no way is to say that America was steadfast in their pursuit of upholding their doctrines, it would not be too soon after that they would be involved in many different affairs dealing with Latin America. But, in this specific event there was a clear example of U.S. exceptionalism.

The United States indirectly intervened into an affair in which they saw unfair treatment being given. Three powerful European nations took advantage of a weak, divided Mexico and invaded. It was here that Napoleon became greedy, and decided to place someone in office to rule. The U.S. was in a bit of a quagmire, for they disagreed with what France did, but they did not want to offend them. They also could not intervene too much as it would violate the Monroe Doctrine. But through craftiness and diplomacy they were able to achieve what they wanted. They took a different approach to than their counterparts. However, many people were not happy about the U.S.s intervening in the matter. One French dissident of the United States’ role in this situation stated:

But, with what right and for what purpose to the United States interfere in the affairs of Mexico? The population of Mexico is composed of creoles, half breeds and Indians. There is no kind of analogy or relation between the Mexican race in the Anglo American. Manners, temperament, language, religious faith-all differ; all are in opposition and contrast. The question of race, therefore does not apply. There is talk of the Monroe Doctrine. Since when has a doctrine, annunciated in a message address to the nation, taking the force of law for formation? We could understand that the United States should be moved by an aggressive neighbor, or one threatening the internal institutions of the Union; but because one nation is ruled by the republican form cannot be pretended that monarchical institution should be excluded from the New World...There can be no danger to the United States from the Mexican monarchy.'lxxxvii

As mentioned before the situation was a bit convoluted for the United States, for they did not want to upset any certain nation whether it be there longtime ally, France, or their neighboring country, Mexico. A state of neutrality was difficult to uphold, many accusations were thrown at the U.S. from both sides; for example, "The United States were accused by the Mexicans for selling mules, wagons, etc.... to the French for their campaign in Mexico, while a like privilege was denied for Mexico"lxxxvii Arguments about denial of supplies/acceptance of supplies, whether the U.S. broke their laws of neutrality were amongst the biggest problems in U.S. diplomatic relations. Secretary Seward was able to take control of the situations and workout conflicts. He was able to mitigate the tensions and in doing so made sure the situation never got out of hand. This position of mediator was difficult as Seward had to coordinate between two different nations and keep a state of neutrality.

Now this was not to say there was not a degree of hypocrisy found within the United State's actions. Statements describing their position such as, "This government has not interfered. It does not propose to interfere in that trial. It firmly repels foreign intervention here, and looks with disfavor upon it anywhere. Therefore, for us to intervene in Mexico would be only to reverse our own principles and to adopt in that regard to that country the very policy which in any case we disallow"lxxxvii Clearly this statement by the United States minister to the French government is a clear expression of U.S. non-intervention ideologies and policies. This however remains untrue as there is extensive records of U.S. sending aid to Mexico, Robert Ryal Miller writes about the aid given to Juarez during the France's occupation of Mexico. The U.S. provided everything from rifles (20,020) and pistols (1,055) to a torpedo boat.lxxxvii

Maneuvering through a Storm

An important aspect of the U.S. at this time was that it was amidst its own civil war. The American Civil War, which was fought between the years 1861-1865, was raging on at this time, which caused more complications for this situation. The South, or the Confederacy, decided to use the situation in Mexico to benefit themselves by trying to garner positive relations with Emperor Napoleon III, "the prize for the South was recognition by France, and early in her efforts toward this end the Richmond government endorsed the French Intervention in Mexico,

regarding it as bait irresistible to the Tuileries.”lxxxvii However after Gettysburg and Vicksburg, the tides had changed and the war began to favor the Union, Maximilian realized this and double-crossed the Confederates. This was at the time the weak economy started to play a vital role in the overall state of France occupation of Mexico, by early 1866 the French government abandoned their pursuit of colonization and in doing so the “the Southerners lost their role in the Mexican Intervention”lxxxvii There were many moving parts, making this situation a lot more difficult for the U.S. than people realize.

Now the question to ask would be, “did the U.S. intervention within this affair undermine, U.S. exceptionalism?” For the most part within Latin America and U.S. history, U.S. intervention of Latin American affairs has been meddlesome and arguably contradictory to policies. For example, when the United States had enacted Good Neighbor Policy, which stated it would not meddle with Latin America, the U.S. government contradicted their own policy with their operation of extracting escaped Nazis who had fled to South America. This is just one of many examples in which the U.S. has contradicted policy, and/or overstepped their boundaries. But in this situation, based on research, I do not believe the U.S. undermined their exceptionalism in this situation. Though they did slightly break their state of neutrality, it was because of the predicament they were in that they had to intervene in some way. They could not agitate relations with a longtime ally nor could they create conflict with a bordering nation. It could be argued U.S. exceptionalism was defined by this situation, it showed that the United States of America takes it upon themselves to lead and intervene when they see fit. Secretary Seward was able to beautifully negotiate with both parties, and assure there would be no unnecessary tension/conflict that would arise from this event. The United States of America handle this situation as perfectly as they could, which has helped define U.S. exceptionalism.

What does this all mean?

The French intervention of Mexico not only defined European and Latin American relations, but it also helped shape U.S. and Latin America relations. The U.S. intervened in this situation because they thought France’s presence in this area was unwarranted, but they could also not physically retaliate against the French because of long lasting diplomacy between the two nations. Through much indirect intervention, such as providing supplies or being a mediator between the two nations, is how the U.S. played a role in event. Though many critics could argue that it U.S. exceptionalism was undermined in this circumstance, because the U.S. government tend to abuse this notion, upon closer research one can conclude that this in fact is false. U.S. exceptionalism shines here. It was from their ideology of neutrality throughout their interactions with both France and Mexico that the U.S. manages did succeed in representing this ideology. Secretary Seward, representing the United States, was able to mollify tensions between France and their allies and Mexico. The U.S. was *exceptional* with handling this situation, and from their action helped create a deeper understanding of what U.S. exceptionalism really is.

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Section 2: The Ever Changing Diaspora.

The Americanisation of Latin American Food

Tara Muruthi

When one refers to America, what is thought of is the United States. However, it is made up of two large continents with a melting pot of cultures in each. The Columbian exchange was the kick-start to the mix of Native and European cultures.^{lxxxvii} In all cultures around the world, food is the only aspect that is constantly remains. Food plays such a big part of everyone's lives that it represents an array of meanings. Without it, it's impossible for someone to survive. Not only is food an instrument for survival, it also serves the individual a source of comfort and pleasure.^{lxxxvii} What we eat, how its prepared and served, and even how we eat it is affected by our individual cultural inheritance. The human race has been known to migrate. This has been and always will be a cause of cultures coming together. It is recognised that people move from place to place for multiple reasons. What is often overlooked is that many people have migrated to find food. When this blending of cultures happen, food is the first recognisable outcome. Historically, this has frequently resulted in the necessity of relinquishing customary tastes according to what foods, seasonings, and even cooking methods are available to them in their new home.^{lxxxvii} When new foods are brought over, recipes change as one has to be adaptable to the surroundings. This can be seen in the United States. Cuisines have taken on new ways of being eaten or prepared. This can be seen in my many cuisines but is most prevalent in Latin American food. Over the years, Latin American food has been modified in many ways, whether it being by the way it is being prepared or simply down to the basic ingredients. This is usually the case in the United States. Food and different types of recipes have a spin on them to suit the taste buds of the average American. Ethnic foods have seen the most change in terms of them being commercialised and mass produced. This can be seen especially with the taco and burrito. The paper will explore how the mixture of cultures within the United States of America has influenced the development of Latin American food. It will also explore how different elements have influenced food over time.

Food is an important part of our daily lives. Without it, we cannot survive. Each and every culture around the world has their own type of cuisine. Before the indigenous people of the Americas were met by European explorers, they had been going about their lives for many decades. They were full-fledged cities with culture, religion, infrastructure and food.^{lxxxvii} They had certain food practices which were part of their daily lives. Before the Columbian exchange, there were certain food products that were not available to these native peoples. With the exchange, the diets of the people changed as they were introduced to new foods. Since the discovery of the Americas, waves of immigrants came to this 'new' land. With them, they brought their culture, religion and food.^{lxxxvii} This migration changed the way people ate, whether they were of European or Native descent. Throughout the history of the Americas, there has been an evolution of food and its culture.

There is a distinct difference between North and South America solely due to the types of migrants that came during the Columbian exchange and thereafter. This is what has shaped each individual continent through the years. In the beginning, North America's immigration was mainly made up of the British and other Europeans. They set up their lives primarily on the East Coast. The United States has had many different waves of migration. In recent years, there has been an increase of migration from Latin America. Latin communities throughout the country have been increasing and so have the varieties of food. Right before the Gold Rush, the Mexican-American war had caused the annexation of northern Mexico.^{lxxxvii} This led to the increase of Mexicans in the United States. During the Gold Rush of 1849, the West Coast had seen a large number of migrants who all wanted to reap the benefits of the economy. With immigration comes culture and most of all, food. "Assimilation was likewise fundamental to the immigrant paradigm in the United States, one aptly captured by the phrase, the 'melting pot'."^{lxxxvii} The mixing of cultures in a new land goes to show that they integrate with each other to form a "new" way of life. This can be seen with many cuisines that have been popularised in the United States, especially with the taco.

When one thinks of the taco, the first thing that comes to mind is Mexico. The exact origins of the taco are very hard to locate. "Only in the mid-nineteenth century did the Spanish Royal Academy expand the meaning to encompass a snack of food, and the specific Mexican version was not acknowledged until well into the twentieth century." To make it even harder, cookbooks in the 19th century were of no help too. The emergence of the taco started with shops where people could gather and socialise, mainly to the lower class. These shops got more popular as there was an influx of labour migrants in the 20th century.

The taco starts with corn, a staple in Mexican cooking. The process of making tortillas is very time consuming and takes a lot of labour. Machines were built to produce tortillas at a faster rate but they never grew to achieve economies of scale, as Mexicans still preferred fresh tortillas. This led to the small factories being set up along streets throughout Mexico. "Research began in the late 1940s to create a dehydrated formula to make corn tortillas" (Pilcher, 534). This implies that technology around the world was growing and companies were looking for ways to mass produce the tortilla, but people still wanted their tortillas to be fresh. "By the 1970s the partnership had developed a workable powdered formula, although consumers found the resulting tortillas to be rather dry and tasteless, and sales grew slowly" (Pilcher, 534). This showed that even though people wanted the real deal, convenience was a contributing factor to these sales.

Only a small array of Mexican food has been globalised. These dishes are generally from the lower classes. Usually, when Mexican food is brought around the world, it is not accredited to be seen as ‘fancy’ even though the amount of labour put into it is high. When people think of fancy, they usually see French cuisine as a higher-class form of food. “Mexican food has long been denied social status, even within Mexico, in part because of ambivalent feelings about the indigenous heritage.” The upper classes preferred to eat dishes more like stews rather than the taco which was seen as a street food. Today, the world sees fancy food as food that is made with high quality products. Many ethnic foods are not taken into consideration. Even though lots of labour is utilised to produce one dish, it is still not given the credit it deserves. For example, the corn tortilla is a something that does require a lot of labour. This is failed to be recognised as Mexican food is seen as ethnic. European cuisines such as French and Italian are seen as the epitome of class. Ethnic food is usually coupled with a negative connotation.

In today’s world, McDonald’s has become the icon of contemporary globalisation. The aim of the company was to sell an American staple to the masses at a cheap price. McDonaldization is when society adopts the characteristics of the fast food chain. This term was coined by George Ritzer. This process, in the modern world, can be seen happening to many cuisines globally. An example of this, would be Taco Bell. “Taco Bell appears to illustrate the inevitable capitalist transformation of traditional ethnic foods” (Pilcher, 539).

The emergence of the taco as a fast food in the United States happened in the 1950’s in Southern California. Founder of Taco Bell, “Glen Bell attributed the success of his eponymous chain to the application of North American technology to Mexican taste”. Before he started Taco Bell, Glen Bell thought they were delicious but the way they were prepared had to change. This was when he thought of the ‘taco shell’, a pre-fried tortilla that could be stuffed with fillings and served to waiting customers. He came up with a solution for the inconvenience of waiting for fresh tacos. However, Mexicans claim to have invented all aspects of the taco. “Regardless of its origins, the taco shell facilitated the globalization of a particular version of Mexican food by distancing it from its ethnic roots.” This shows that the taco has changed to suit the ever-changing wants of the consumer. The shell has taken a different form and is steering away from its origin. One could say that this new taco hybrid is not traditional any longer. It also meant that people did not need fresh corn tortillas anymore as the shells were being mass produced and shipped around the world.

According to a Taco Bell employee, who makes the tacos, said that the meat that goes in them comes to the store in a bag. In order to cook that meat, all one has to do is boil up the bag. He claims that that is how tacos are made. The American version of the taco comes with ground meat, chopped up salad and Kraft cheese. When Taco Bell went into Mexico and opened their

first store in 1992 in Mexico City, they tried to make their tacos more authentic and traditional. This however, backfired. There were complaints from customers that their tacos didn't taste like the "real thing". These customers had come for the Americanised version of the taco. This Americanised version of the taco is what people want when they get fast food.

Another dish that has fallen in the same trap as the taco, is the burrito. Before the modern burrito, like the taco, Mesoamericans were eating their foods with corn tortillas. The burrito, which was originally eaten with a corn tortilla, is now commonly eaten with a flour tortilla. These days, anything wrapped in a flour tortilla can be called a burrito. Over the past 20 years, multiple Mexican food chains have seen a rise in their sales. In 1993, Steve Ells opened up the first chain of Chipotle.^{lxxxvii} He had recently got the idea from a taqueria in San Francisco that had long lines and a small group of workers behind the counters prepping the food. It intrigued him that the food was prepared fast and still, the quality of the food was not compromised.

Although the burrito is one of the most popular examples of Mexican cuisines, not everybody in Mexico eats it. It is only popular in the northern part of the country. Today, the burrito has become a staple food that many varieties have emerged. These include the breakfast burrito, the mission burrito, the San Diego burrito, the California burrito and the Los Angeles burrito.

The breakfast burrito which looks like a breakfast wrap, is comprised of American breakfast fillings. These include scrambled eggs, sausage, bacon or onions. It was invented in Santa Fe, New Mexico in the 1970s. This style of burrito is far from a traditional burrito.

The mission burrito came to fame in the 1960s in the Mission district of San Francisco where it was a popular meal for being cheap, filling, and portable. The ingredients are commonly held on a steam table, and the burritos are made assembly line-style. The large flour tortillas are usually steamed before they're filled, so that they are flexible enough to hold all of the ingredients without falling apart. What makes this stand out is its size. Larger in size, because of an increased amount of rice and ingredients. This style of burrito has been made widespread across the country through chains like Chipotle and Qdoba.^{lxxxviii}

**Changing Tides: US-Mexico relations through
the concept of immigration relations.**

By: James Benjamin

Immigration has drastically affected the United States and Mexico, both in their relationship with one another and with their attitudes toward immigrants and migrant workers. Since the 1850's the US has drastically altered its position on immigration, however is this changing attitude new, or a repeat of the past? How does a country founded on the concept of freedom and on immigrants themselves go from the acceptance of all, to the acceptance of few? The United States and Mexico's complicated relationship can be seen through the two countries' immigration stances throughout their history. By analyzing the complicated history of the two nations, a common pattern begins to form as to explain the drastically shifting attitudes on immigration, and labor migration both legal and illegal, between the two nations since the mid 1850's till present.

The most defining of the US's belief in immigration is the statue of liberty. Supposed to be a beacon of hope for those looking for the American dream and opportunity to start anew. This was its purpose when it was erected in 1875. The most defining of its core values however is found on the plaque just at the base of the statue. On that plaque lies a poem by Emma Lazarus that strikes deep into the core value of the US's past and what it originally stood for, hope.

*“Not like the brazen giant of Greek fame,
With conquering limbs astride from land to land;
Here at our sea-washed, sunset gates shall stand
A mighty woman with a torch, whose flame
Is the imprisoned lightning, and her name
Mother of Exiles. From her beacon-hand
Glows world-wide welcome; her mild eyes command
The air-bridged harbor that twin cities frame.
“Keep, ancient lands, your storied pomp!” cries she
With silent lips. “Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,*

I lift my lamp beside the golden door!"

-Emma Lazarus, "The New Colossus", 1883^{lxxxvii}

This poem is magnificent and almost stands as a myth or a testament to the fundamental value of the United States' past. By analyzing this you can gain a better understanding of what immigration meant during the mid-19th century. As BJ Smith noted, the statue stood "as a welcoming sign of friendship to all visitors.", and just as much a sign to all those looking to start anew.^{lxxxvii} This is the exact same reason for those who came to the new world all throughout history. This was their chance to change or bring prosperity to their family and loved ones, and it is still the same reason why people emigrate from Mexico to the United States even today. Up "until the mid-1870's U.S. Immigration Laws generally stimulated immigration.", and primarily from that of Mexico.^{lxxxvii} It is the attitude promoted in this poem that gives the true idea of what the US saw immigration as. One of the most determining phrases in the poem is that of "Mother of exiles"^{lxxxvii} as it is meant as a symbolism for the Statue of Liberty, however the statue itself is a symbol of the US and its people. By using that as the base point for which US immigration relations started will help extrapolate onto the ideas of the later eras in US-Mexican relations, and attitudes towards immigration.

It is a sound idea to first assess the history of the relationship from the viewpoint of Mexico to gain a more intuitive insight into the whole schema of relations. Starting from just after the Mexican-US war with the signing of the Guadalupe-Hidalgo treaty in 1848, where in which Mexican people living within the United States were given the ability to become US citizens or return to Mexico.^{lxxxvii} The most important fact to note however that is due to illiteracy rates throughout the borderlands especially with migrants able to speak English, the Mexican people in the US borderlands and the newly acquired lands were in essence coerced into becoming citizens.^{lxxxvii} The US played a larger role in making sure that many of Mexico's Consuls were unable to visit the Mexican people living in those lands to explain to them the treaty, leaving them essentially unknowingly signing away their citizenship.^{lxxxvii} The concept of that was quite frightening to many of the Mexican governments' officials especially the Consuls, however there was not much they could do after losing the recent war. By this time the Mexican government had begun to contemplate what was to be done with its migrant population that was being hurt by lack of employment in the northern agricultural sector. After some deliberation, Porfirio Díaz the president of Mexico since the 1870's until the revolution in 1911 had decided to allow for the migrant population to continue migrating to the US as what he termed, "a safety valve", essentially meaning that at the time he did not wish to risk the stability of his country or his reputation with the US particularly.^{lxxxvii} The other most important part to note however is that this "safety valve" offered a way for Mexico to not have to deal with its unemployed northern masses, and in return those migrants moving to the US would bring back money to spend with their families helping their own economy in the process, while not risking their infrastructure.^{lxxxvii} This however was viewed by the US as causing only border chaos in the form of gangs, marauding bands of Indians, and cattle thefts which lowered the US's opinion especially in that area and created a more xenophobic atmosphere.^{lxxxvii}

After the Mexican revolution of 1911 which lasted until 1917, there was a massive influx of migrant workers and emigrants to the US for many reasons. First there was a dire need for many people living in Mexico to escape the revolutionary atmosphere and the revolution all

together whether it was due to political ties or dissatisfaction with the new government of Mexico.^{lxxxvii} The other main point for leaving was the availability of jobs for the people of Mexico. Since the entire country had just gone through a massive upheaval, the availability of jobs tends to be quite scarce, especially for those working in agriculture or industry, precisely the jobs most affected by the revolution.^{lxxxvii} The Third point that ties it all together is the advent of the Great War, or the First World War, where in which the US at the time had a dire need for agricultural workers primarily in the south and southwest where a large portion of the US had its most needed products and food resources.^{lxxxvii} The Mexican government responded to this by again viewing it as a “safety valve” or in this case, “an escape valve for revolutionary and political enemies.” Where there would be quite a few after having their revolution just come to a close within those few years.^{lxxxvii}

Just after WWI, a majority of the migrants left due to a short recession just after the war in the US, however shortly after that much of the population began to immigrate to the US during the 1920’s as the economy boomed greatly and the opportunity for work rose significantly especially for the Mexican migrant labor force.^{lxxxvii} However just after the stock market crash that started the great depression, much of the migrant labor forces left in the US were forced out by a mass paranoia and xenophobia attributed to the loss of jobs in the US and the idea that undocumented migrant workers were taking them, which is currently very reminiscent of today’s society with the anti-Mexican immigration of the Trump administration.^{lxxxvii} This rejection of migrants was troublesome to the Mexican government as they were unsure of what to do with their unemployed masses as they too were greatly affected by the depression, and now they were unable to use their “safety valve”.^{lxxxvii} This shows another low point in the relations of the United States and Mexico as it pertains to the immigration of Mexican citizens. The US and Mexico have had a rollercoaster type relationship pertaining to this topic and are constantly changing, usually due to the whim of the US government which could be traced again back to the Guadalupe-Hidalgo treaty as Mexico was forced to adhere to the US’s demands.

After the depression and the United States introduction into World War II, the need for a cheap and productive labor force was extremely high. The United States was forced to call forward most healthy males into service to fight the war, which left a massive gap in the workforce. This gap was then quickly filled with cheap migrant labor, however this time the US had asked for the assistance of Mexico by asking them to supply the labor through the new Bracero program which allowed for the legal hiring of Mexican workers and for the possible immigration of the workers as well into the US.^{lxxxvii} This program lifted a heavy burden from both the US and Mexico, it allowed for Mexico to bring in foreign wealth, and release the pressure from its unemployed masses risking looking for undocumented labor and risky dealings in the US which the Mexican government had been working on halting, and to bring rights to its citizens forced to work away from home.^{lxxxvii} The Bracero program took time for the Mexican government to accept as they were already wrestling with the attempts to give better protections and rights to their Citizens working in the United States.^{lxxxvii} However in the end, “Mexico acquiesced to the Bracero Program because its advantages far outweighed its disadvantages. It was the U.S. who eventually rejected a program that Mexico by necessity accepted.”, this is a common theme throughout the US-Mexican relationship whereas the US seems keen on only keeping Mexico in its list of allies when they need them, otherwise they want nothing to do with their close neighbor.^{lxxxvii}

The Bracero program lasted for a number of years, even after the war had ended. Mexico still reluctant to keep so much of its population moving to the US for work and due to the reportedly terrible conditions they possibly faced leaving for the US or their treatment when they arrived particularly in Texas, Mexico placed a veto on the Bracero program to protect its people, however as was the common theme, they ‘gave in’.^{lxxxvii} The Mexican government feared that it would hurt their relationship with the US if they were to reject. It was not until 1964 that the program was ended and the US again changed its stance on immigration leaving the Mexican government again wondering as to what they should do for their large northern groups.^{lxxxvii} As a result of the end to the Bracero program Mexico attempts to try and make more use out of its migrant work force to help build up Mexico’s infrastructure and northern industries by creating more at home jobs since cooperation with the US was again at a low point.^{lxxxvii} Mexico then in 1965 passed the Programa Nacional Fronterizo to bring more northern workers into the Mexican industries particularly in the north, however in the end it did not prove very fruitful and only proved to the Mexican government at the time just how big of a tie the people had to the US as they were more willing to work as undocumented laborers then they were to work in a Mexican product industry, not to mention that Mexican citizens had many family members already in the US.^{lxxxvii} Nearly two thirds of all Mexican people, or about 60% all knew someone living in the United States.^{lxxxvii} This gives a distinct number as to just how interconnected the two countries are through immigration and their borders, giving a better picture as to the love-hate relationship over immigration these two countries have had. Following the decade of stricter quota control over immigration from the world, and now the western hemisphere, the Mexican government adopted the policy of having no policy as it was deemed.^{lxxxvii} The idea behind this was that it would allow for Mexico to remain at its “status quo” where as they allow for their people to continue crossing as undocumented workers and bring back foreign currency to raise Mexico’s GDP in the long term, as well as keep the US supplied with cheap labor and happy.^{lxxxvii} Since the 1960’s as laws in the United States pertaining to immigration became stricter, the Mexican government primarily focused on protecting the rights of their people and making sure that no harm comes to them on US soil, however it has been an uphill battle. The current solution to these problems is however to continue seeing the migrant population as a safety valve for unemployment and as a source of income for the country, and Mexican president Vicente Fox was reluctant to want to change that despite, ‘a few migrants lives’.^{lxxxvii}

Taking a step back to the view of the United States to give a cross comparison of the relationship on immigration the border you get a fuller view of the complexities that emanate from the changes taking place. Throughout the US’s rollercoaster of views on immigration and Mexico most importantly, you can pinpoint specific reasons as to how the values of the US people change so drastically from supporting immigration and stimulating it, to placing strict quotas and looking to be independent from the world. “People who find that things are not going well in their lives often want to blame someone or something for their problems.”, a quote from Thomas J. Espenshade and Katherine Hempstead, and based off of the history of the countries relations, it proves to be quite accurate.^{lxxxvii} Two of the biggest proponents of this situation however is war, and the economy. When the economy is not doing well neither is immigration in terms of acceptances or flow. That’s why economics plays such a major role in the attitudes on the view of immigration.^{lxxxvii} Mexican migrants were generally “welcomed as a crucial element for U.S. economic growth and the population of its territory” throughout much of the 19th

century.^{lxxxvii} Not only that but Mexican labor was the replacement for cheap labor after the Chinese Exclusion act of 1882 and the US freely supported their immigration, if not pushed for it.^{lxxxvii} This cheap labor force was as well extremely sought after during periods of conflict, especially large scale wars such as the WWI or WWII. During WWI while a large portion of US citizens were at war, the US government had a massive need for a large cheap labor force, which inevitably came from Mexico and was essentially the first Bracero program.^{lxxxvii} Just after the war however the US faced a short recession and large anti-foreign and anti-immigrant sentiment raged causing much distrust in the US's view of countries such as Mexico, but that changed again with the economic boom in the 1920's where a 'flood tide' of migrant workers moved to the US for the plethora of opportunities available.^{lxxxvii} That did not last however and just as the stock market crashed causing the Great Depression, many Mexican migrant workers and immigrants were forced to leave the country for both safety from the mass xenophobia and distrust, and for the opportunity for work, however with Mexico having the same problems with its economy, this only furthered the pain of it.^{lxxxvii} This was again repeated in 1942 with the introduction of the actual Bracero program where in which Mexican workers were hired to fill the need for workers in the southern agricultural sector of the US as well as that of industrial needs for production, which is in strict contrast to the prior became where immigrants and foreign people in general were not accepted by society and the US looked to turn those people away.^{lxxxvii} The reason for its continuation was the economic boom post WWII, however what kept it going even longer was the US's intro into the Korean War which again called for more Mexican migrant workers to keep the southern US agricultural sector strong.^{lxxxvii} Though just before the Korean war during the McCarthy era of politics in the US, a massive influx of xenophobia and anti-communist paranoia entered the consciousness of the US people and so the US and Mexico's relationship was again strained.^{lxxxvii} This has been a recurrent theme throughout US-Mexican history. The US only seems to value its neighbor when it has a need for them, otherwise tends to disregard them or want nothing to do with them. By tying both wartime and peacetime together you begin to notice a pattern of need and just how the relationship between the US-Mexico is forged through their constantly changing attitudes on immigration. However low the relationship gets on the basis of immigration, "If we ever closed the door to new Americans, our leadership in the world would be lost.", and by "our", Edward Kennedy meant that of the United States.^{lxxxvii}

Looking past 1964, the US enacted a great deal of lasting laws on immigration. In 1965 the US enacted a quota system for countries, including those in the western hemisphere, where in which there was none before.^{lxxxvii} That marked the beginning of massive change in the US's standpoint on immigration and particularly of those from Latin countries. This change can be summed up on the feeling that the US needed to protect itself from those who wish it harm, as "America was not just a country of immigration but also a country devoted to protecting its own citizens.", which is the basis for the US's tightened stance on immigration.^{lxxxvii} This is further exemplified by the way in which fear has played a role in the creation of new laws such as the National Origins Act of 1924, "Finger printing and registration of all immigrants" in 1946, and the creation of security forces for monitoring the border for illegal crossings in the 1980's.^{lxxxvii} In 1986 the Immigration Reform Control Act (IRCA) was enacted and marked the shift from "Tolerance to Repression".^{lxxxvii} The IRCA brought about the creation of a strong border patrol, walls, virtual fences, and blockades as well as a stricter registration and admittance policy into

the US which was predominately focused on limiting the number of undocumented migrant workers coming into the United States.^{lxxxvii} This since of tolerance is most noted when there is either a need for immigrant workers or undocumented workers, or as Ian Davies states, “When times are economically prosperous, politicians, law enforcement agencies, and regulators turn a blind eye to the illegal immigration that feeds the economy so well”.^{lxxxvii} When they are not needed or the economy is bad, they are feared. This occurs for a number of reasons, whether it be a fear of losing one’s job to cheap labor or fearful for your safety or the safety of the country as a whole. This sort of thought process occurs commonly in times of recession or depression as people look to turn away from globalization and focus on nationalism.^{lxxxvii} The problem with the US’s seclusion is that it hurts its own economy and its own industries, because “The worlds 200 million migrants are the labor that fuels the engine of the service economy.”, and as well they are a necessity for the world as it is a large portion of savings and income for each country involved with them.^{lxxxvii} The migrant workforce raise the populations standards of living in both their home country and the one they are working in, even though they are the ones suffering the most from the process of it all.^{lxxxvii} Post 9/11 everything changed in the US, especially its rationale on immigration. The fear of foreign terror attacks entered the US psyche and turned into mass paranoia all around, which led to multiple attempts to control their borders.^{lxxxvii} George W. Bush created the Department of Homeland Security which was “established with a clear mandate to protect the nation from terrorist threats, but its principal effect has been to terrorize immigrant workers from Mexico, and Central America, many of whom were displaced from NAFTA.”, however not only did it deport, arrest, and “terrorize” those from Latin countries, it also created more strict pathways to become a US citizen legally and made any attempt to access the US very difficult.^{lxxxvii}

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), was first initiated by the Mexican government as to “attempt integration into the global economy”.^{lxxxvii} Mexico previously falling behind in the world economy was looking for ways to keep its country financially stable. The US saw this rather as an opportunity to control Mexico’s debt and credit by “increasing the extension of credit substantially”, essentially causing Mexico to fall into a debt to the US that the US could control.^{lxxxvii} The major problem with NAFTA however was the fact that, “NAFTA utterly ignored international labor mobility and took no steps to equalize different levels of economic development among participating countries.”^{lxxxvii} Because of this, Mexico is left with a poor credit rating, and more debt. The US as well passed stricter immigration quotas on the western hemisphere pertaining particularly to Mexico in the years 1990 and 1993 as NAFTA “made headlines”, however it did not stop there as the US at the same time greatly increased its boarder control measures.^{lxxxvii} Since its foundation, NAFTA has caused a great deal of migrant workers to illegally cross into the US to secure work as the northern agricultural center in Mexico was hit hard from the excess of imported GMO crops from the US which inevitably caused a drastic increase in illegal immigration to the US from 114 million in 1986, to 290 Million in 2000.^{lxxxvii} This pattern has long continued until even now. With Trump gaining presidency, he brings a drastically different mindset to the relations between the US and Mexico which may drastically change in the years to come. As Trump is currently looking to draft new policy to either revise or destroy the agreement, this could mean drastic change for Mexico, and particularly the relationship between them and the United States.^{lxxxvii}

Mexico and the United States have had a much storied relationship over the topic of immigration, and it is one that continues today as it is a very intense topic with the Trump administration, with the people in the borderlands caught in the middle on this conflict. After the contrast of the US and Mexico's policies on immigration and past records of immigration you can see the pattern of how the US's immigration values change as their economy prospers. If they are not prosperous, neither is their relationship with Mexico or the migrant workers. From "Mother of Exiles", to a securitized border controlled state, the US has changed quite drastically over the last two centuries. It will be interesting to see how it will change next.

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Section 3: Latin American Representations in the United States.

Identity Through Religion in the Borderlands

Mary A. Crisafulli

Zest from independence and a common interest in plundering European oppression back across the Atlantic sea led citizens of the United States (US) to raise a glass to their southern neighbors. Unfortunately, as political and economic affairs shifted this enthusiasm faded to dust and the borders within America (this term is meant to include north, central and south American continents) stood tense. The US filled themselves with false truths of destiny as they turned their greedy eyes towards Mexico. While the US pugnaciously pushed their borders further west into Mexican occupied territory the two cultures collided. Identity was forced to cross the lines of ethnic distinctiveness to create a space for the Mexican culture within the United States.

Mexicans inhabiting the borderlands found their identities threatened. They coped with their new environment through negotiating traditional Mexican beliefs to establish themselves as a US citizen while also maintaining their Mexican identity. Thus, emerges the Mexican-American, an identity of dynamic construction. While historians have addressed the dual aspects of the Mexican-American uniqueness this study seeks to further these interpretations by focusing on the development of this identity through its religious dialectical process. By holding onto their Catholic heritage, Mexicans set the stage for a Catholic presence within the United States during the early twentieth century.

The study is sectioned into four parts that emphasize the connection between the existence of Catholic and Mexican culture within the US. The first section explores the environment that provided context for Catholic diaspora. Economic and political issues caused an influx in Mexican migrants heading north into newly acquired US territory for which ethnic hostility was high. European Catholic immigrants from France, Germany and Italy also struggled – as the Mexicans did – to establish themselves within the United States as the population was predominantly Protestant. Religious and ethnic tension created a space for conversation regarding identity.

The next three sections of the paper will explore the ways in which these groups became active agents in negotiating their identity. These two groups of Catholics [European and Mexican] worked together to negotiate their new identities. They created a space for Catholic diaspora within the United States and facilitated their identities as individual simultaneously – different and united. Thus, they developed three sects of identity: Mexican-American, European-Catholic-American (from this point forward I will refer to this identity as simply the European Catholics) and the US Catholic. Together they were US Catholics and within this identity they held more exclusive identities that connected them to the culture of their homelands and their separate struggles for US identity.

Setting the Stage

At the dawn of the twentieth century political tensions between the United States and Mexico were settling, however unsatisfied lingering's of ethnic hostility continued to present itself within the social world of the borderlands. After the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 – where

Mexico was forced to surrender the land from New Mexico and Colorado to California to the US – Mexicans continued to hold resentment towards US imperial motives and their lost territories.^{lxxxvii} On the other side, US-Americans maintained their beliefs of superiority over Mexicans. The assertion was that nonwhite people were incapable of self-government, which offered justification for their influence in Mexican territories.^{lxxxvii}

Regardless of these tensions, many Mexicans fled to the borderlands for asylum in the early twentieth century. The Mexican Revolution of 1910 resulted in massive reorganizing of society. With economic and political turmoil, many fled to cities such as El Paso, San Antonio, San Diego and Los Angeles.^{lxxxvii} For example, the Mexican population in San Antonio jumped from 25 percent in 1900 to 40 percent by 1940. These cities were not only geographically favorable to migrants with hopes of one day returning home, but they had an influx of available jobs as they were in need of agricultural labor.^{lxxxvii} Many migrants who uplifted themselves for economic gain believed they would travel to the US for a short time before returning to Mexico to build a home. However, conflicts at the border persisted interrupting economic activity trapping many of these migrants in financial struggles permitting them to a life in the borderlands.

US companies who profited favorably under the Porfirio Díaz administration did not take kindly to the new policies of the Mexican Revolution. Conflicts between Mexican politicians and US investors created tensions and economic strife at the border.^{lxxxvii} The border of Arizona and Sonora experienced these hardships after the revolution. The two states developed along similar lines since they shared geography, environment and resources and tied them economically. In 1913 Francisco Madero was assassinated leaving Sonora a target for revolutionary violence. Mexicans moved back and forth between Sonora and Arizona for jobs and escape from danger. Sonora leaders immediately sought to gain control of border towns in order to control supplies coming into the state. The battle pushed both Sonora and Arizona into a constant struggle of economic uncertainties.^{lxxxvii} This was the case for many border territories, leaving the Mexican migrants in financial turmoil. “The vast majority of our Catholic Mexicans are poor herders – not sheep owners – hardly able to make a living” states Rev. John Baptist Pitival, Administrator of the Archdiocese of Santa Fe.^{lxxxvii}

European Catholic migrants faced similar issues when coming to the United States. Age old confrontations between Protestants and Catholics continued to emerge in the Americas. Although the US and Mexico had declared themselves independent of European powers prior to the twentieth century, the tensions and rivalry between England and Spain persisted through religious and ethnic strife. Mexico retained the structure of the Catholic church while the US continued to spread Protestant beliefs. Catholics migrating to the US of any ethnicity were often met with predigest views and intolerance.^{lxxxvii} Furthermore, European Catholics in the US held low ranks within the Catholic hierarchy as the US was not a high priority for missionary attempts.^{lxxxvii} This made it difficult to gain support and funding to further their missions within the US.^{lxxxvii} Much like the Mexican migrants these European Catholics struggled with discrimination, economic hardships and lost identity.

Mexican-American

Trapped in an environment filled of hostile relations, Mexican migrants searched for ways to establish themselves. Through a process of negotiation and re-negotiation these immigrants developed a new Mexican-American identity. They sought to create a sense of belonging eventually becoming part of

the US while continuing to hold onto their ethnic allegiances. First generation Mexican-American John Phillip Santos expresses his desire to create and embrace this dynamic identity in his novel *Places Left Unfinished at the Time of Creation*. “I wanted to bind Texas and Mexico together” Santos poetically states “like a raft strong enough to float out onto the ocean of time, with our past trailing in the wake behind us like a comet tail of memories.”^{lxxxvii}

Mexico’s Catholic background became an outlet for many to pursue this goal. By holding on to religious beliefs and practices migrants reinforced their affiliation with Mexico. Sonia, a second generation Mexican-American tells of how her mother would keep the Mexican spirit alive through her religious beliefs. She recalls the plethora of religious stuff her mother would keep including a “small plastic statue of the Virgin de Guadalupe.” Sonia’s mother associated her beliefs and practice of such beliefs as having impact in the US. As Sonia continues her narrative she tells the story her mother once told of how she crossed the border with her plastic statue; “she used to say that the Virgin was an immigrant too.”^{lxxxvii} Her mother was aware that in her own migration her religion migrated with her and thus, a little piece of Mexico survived the trip.

The Virgin de Guadalupe herself became a symbol of the Mexican-American dual and complex identity. Santos describes Guadalupe as having developed a complex identity as a Mexican. He states, “the Virgin of Guadalupe, part Indian, part Spanish, a living emblem of the union of opposing worlds in the New Mexico.”^{lxxxvii} In this statement Santos recognizes the story of Guadalupe as having developed out of the transculturation process between Nahua and Spaniards creating what is now modern Mexico. As the spirit of Guadalupe migrated with Sonia’s mother and countless others, her identity was re-negotiated yet again. Santos continues to describe her as the “supreme Mother whose spirit forged the watchful presence of all of the generations of Viejitas who were to come.”^{lxxxvii} In his recount of Guadalupe he acknowledges her complex identity that will continue to develop and change while forever holding ties with her past. The Virgin is thus, a symbol of the Mexican-American identity as she will forever remember their past as she lives on through the generations to come.

The Virgin of Guadalupe also served as a symbol of difference between those who possess a Mexican heritage and those of European descent. Second generation Mexican-American Mary Helen Ponce compares the Virgin Guadalupe to the Virgin Mary in a compelling anecdote from her autobiography, *Hoyt Street*;

Our Church did not have a statue of the Virgin Guadalupe. This really bothered me. After all, were we not Mejjicanos? Father Mueller constantly assured me that the Virgin Mary and Guadalupe were one and the same, but I never believed him. How could they be? One was from Mexico and had appeared to an Indian named Juan Diego. And the other? She was American, with blue eyes and blond hair. Although I accepted them both as holy women, I actually preferred the Virgin Mary; she at least understood English.^{lxxxvii}

Here, Ponce makes the distinction that Guadalupe is not US American, yet can be differentiated from a US American ethnicity. Though she prefers the Virgin Mary, her assertion that the Virgin of Guadalupe should be advertised within the church reviles her own thoughts of identity. Though Ponce sees the two virgins’ as different, she associated with characteristics of each women. She saw her ethnic heritage in

Guadalupe and her language in Mary. The Virgin of Guadalupe served as a symbol for Mexican-Americans to understand their position in the world.

Mexican-Americans also sought to use their religious connections to Mexico during times of economic hardship. Many Mexican migrants living in the borderlands had little money and as a result of the border wars their financial situation fluctuated constantly. Some immigrants made use of religious ceremonies to develop networks within the US. Kinship relationships chosen by parents at the religious ritual of baptism are known as godparents who served as co-parents to the child. These relationships were used by migrants as lending agencies.^{lxxxvii} In other words Mexican immigrants created their own safety nets within the US in the form of loan networks. “Once when the car broke down my mom called my godmother and they talked and arranged things” explains Second generation Mexican-American María “she gave us money and then we paid it back in two months.”^{lxxxvii} By creating these networks, Mexican migrants re-negotiated their previously established system of ritual to fit their new needs as immigrants and accept their new identity as Mexican-Americans.

European Catholics

The high volume of practicing Protestants in the United States directly put immigrating Catholics in a state of defense. As a minority, European Catholic migrants had little to no influence in the western US.^{lxxxvii} The influx of Mexican Catholics coming to the US provided a Catholic presence in the west. In New Mexico alone there was approximately 133,000 Catholics residing the majority being Mexicans.^{lxxxvii} European Catholic leaders on the eastern coast of the US saw this as an opportunity to spread their religion and establish themselves in the US. However, the Protestants were better funded and already recognized in the west and posed as an issue for Catholic expansion. “We all know that Catholic immigrants to a new country must be cared for immediately before they are absorbed by the ubiquitous Protestant Mission churches” argued Rev. John Baptist Pitival.^{lxxxvii} The Protestants strategically took advantage of the Mexican immigrant financial situations. They made significant spending on churches, schools and social work to convert borderland residence.^{lxxxvii} These schools were attractive for immigrant parents looking to educate their children for the prospects of a better life and since the Catholic schools were often too expensive as there were not many available there were little other options.^{lxxxvii} European Catholics required a strategic plan of offence.

Rev. Francis C. Kelley – born in Canada – came to the US in the late nineteenth century to help establish the Catholic faith. Rev. Kelley advocated for the funding of Catholic chapels and schools in struggling rural parishes in order to compete with the Protestants. He did so by establishing the Catholic Church Extension Society in 1905 which called upon better off urban parishes to provide financial support for struggling parishes in the west.^{lxxxvii} The plan was widely successful and helped facilitate Catholic support systems within the borderlands. Rev. Kelley notes such success stating that in only three years the society “has over 100,000 now on hand in securities, most of which represents loans, free of interest, to poor parishes, which would without these be forced to pay exorbitant rates.”^{lxxxvii}

Although the immigrating Mexicans already identified themselves as Catholics the European Catholics saw the mission in the west as their hierarchical responsibility. The Extension Society would send out a magazine once a month to better-off parishes on the eastern US coast with articles endorsing the needs of the Catholic west and the successes of the society’s work thus far in order to promote donations for the cause.^{lxxxvii} Backing the Extension Society was thus seen as saving the Mexican immigrants from losing their faith as they were not qualified to establish Catholic roots in a new place. It was the

responsibility of Mexican presence that helped facilitate the US Catholic church, notes historian Anne M. Martínez.^{lxxxvii}

European Catholic missionaries who set off to work for the Extension Society in the west further distinguished themselves from their Catholic brothers. One report from the Extension magazine stated, “the more I have to deal with these Texan Mexicans the more I doubt their formal practices.”^{lxxxvii} They also found the Mexican Catholic devotion to the Virgin Guadalupe and other saints to be stronger than that of God and fundamentally different from what they believed to be the true Catholic practice.^{lxxxvii} In many areas Mexicans were not in the practice of going to the church, in the way European Catholics did, for rituals or prayer as they often kept home alters in lieu.^{lxxxvii} Thus, when they migrated and lived too far from a church they simply did not go.^{lxxxvii} The differences the European Catholics felt were worth noting were some of the reasons they felt superior and accountable for the establishment of the Catholic church and the Mexican immigrants in the US west. As it was their responsibility, the European Catholic missionaries were forced to adjust in their own practices to encourage the Mexican Catholics to practice the religion how they believed it should be done. For example, the Extension Society created what they called the Motor Chapel or Chapel cars which were simply a church on wheels in which the missionary could travel many places in one day at the convenience of the Mexican Catholics.^{lxxxvii} European Catholic missionaries also often succumbed to Mexican style processions of saint’s days to bring followers to their sermons and continue their Catholic faith.^{lxxxvii} Through their devout duty to saving the US west they affirmed their place in the US. They developed a Catholic identity distinctly separate from the foundations of the Mexican Catholic identity. The European Catholic was one of superiority and responsibility as opposed to the Mexican Catholic who identified with their ancestors and history of cultural migration and survival.

Mexican Catholics also felt the pressures of the Protestant church in their attempt to hold onto their Catholic faith submitted themselves to European Catholic programs. The prejudice thoughts within Protestant schools led many immigrants to search for other options. Second generation Mexican-American Carmen discusses her experience with these issues “our school was getting a bad reputation” according to her father and he would “look around and maybe put us in a Catholic school.”^{lxxxvii} Mexicans quickly accepted the Catholic schooling systems and other rituals as doing so assisted them in establishing themselves within the US while continuing to practice their own faith and escape discrimination.

US Catholics

In the mid-twentieth century US imperialism became strongly associated with the Protestant missionaries. At this same time, the Catholic religion was being threatened by the Mexican revolutionary wars. The practicing Catholics in the borderlands sought to unite as US Catholics in response to political strife. Rev. Kelley addressed the US Catholic public on unity at the first American Catholic Missionary congress in 1909. “We are only Catholics when the interests of God and religion are concerned, that our duty lies here in America.”^{lxxxvii} This meant crossing cultural and ethnic boundaries to create the US Christian.

US Catholics embraced the Spanish Catholic past of the borderlands in defense of Protestant discrimination and global threats to their religion. “To this day the Catholic Indians of California, Arizona and New Mexico, generally speaking, are heritage from Spain” says Rev. William H. Ketcham, director bureau of Indian mission in Washington.^{lxxxvii} Rev. John Baptist Pitival acknowledges this history as well

during the first American Catholic Missionary Congress in 1905. “A century before our nation was born the Spanish had built in New Mexico half a hundred large, permanent churches, nearly all of stone.” Rev. Pitival goes on to embody this history and fight for recognition in US as being shared between Mexicans, Indians and European Catholics stating “behold, we are being dispossessed of our lands; we are a doomed and vanishing race.”^{lxxxvii}

Mexican-Americans had long acknowledged their Spanish heritage in previous land disputes over the borderlands. As the paper discussed early on, many Mexican immigrants sought to hold onto their heritage. This heritage was not only Mexican, yet Spanish and Indian as well as was shown in the Virgin Guadalupe’s identity. José Vasconcelos – a Mexican living in Texas – explains his experience in school during the early 1900s “at home I always heard the opposite, that it was the Yankees who were the newcomers to culture.”^{lxxxvii} Many Mexican migrants favored an expression of their people having settled the borderland before the white Protestant as it protected their right to establish themselves within the land. Although, having European Catholic backing in connecting to a Spanish past further rectified their Mexican-American identity. In this agreement, European and Mexican Catholics were able to associate themselves as US Catholics together and united assisting one another in the negotiation of a new identity.

The European Catholic negotiation in adapting Mexican ideals along with the Mexican Catholics participation in European Catholic church arrangements paved a way for both groups to identify with the US. The similarity of the basic concepts and acceptance of the Catholic religion between the two groups provided room to negotiate and create a larger Catholic diaspora. For example, the US ritual of Christmas was comparable to the Latin American tradition of gift giving for the Feast of the Epiphany and easily caught on. US Catholics invited Mexican notables and officials to such celebrations which they brought back with them and shared with their communities. Christmas celebrations in Sonora became common place by the twentieth century and soon spread into other border communities.^{lxxxvii} The mutual encounters between the European and Mexican Catholics created a space for Catholic diaspora in the US. Within this diaspora was the new US Catholic identity. Though with Catholic unity in the US, Mexicans and Europeans continued to hold connections with their homeland identity.

Latin Americans in the United States' Film History

Melissa Colopietro

Although there have been some positive changes in the representations of Latin Americans in the United States film industry, overall the representations are not exponentially different from the representations in the early 1900s. From *I Love Lucy* in the 1950s to *The Magnificent Seven* remake in 2016, there are obvious stereotypes that many Latina/o actors are casted as. Even major companies like *Disney* are guilty of portraying these stereotypes. One must believe that these stereotypes come from the ever complicated relations between the United States government and the governments in Latin America; from the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920), to the Cold War (1940s-1960s), the Cuban Revolution (1960s) and all the way to 2016 and 2017 with the United States' president, Donald Trump, promising to build a wall on the United States and Mexico border.

An Overview of Latin American Stereotypes

In the United States film industry, there are regular and prominent stereotypes. "The history of Latino images in U.S. cinema is in large measure a pageant of six basic stereotypes: el Bandido, the harlot, the male buffoon, the female clown, the Latin lover, and the dark lady."^{lxxxvii} "Sometimes the stereotypes were combined, sometimes they were altered superficially, but their core defining – and demeaning - characteristics have remained consistent for more than a century and are still evident today."^{lxxxvii} Overall in the United States film industry, the stereotypes are obvious and specific.

El Bandido might be one of the most recognizable stereotypes. "El Bandido is dirty and unkempt, usually displaying an unshaven face, missing teeth, and disheveled, oily hair. Scars and scowls complete the easily recognizable image, this stereotypical character is most familiarly, the Mexican bandit in countless Westerns and adventure films."^{lxxxvii} According to Arthur Pettit, "Bandidos are characterized by complexions shading from pitch black though dark brown to orange, yellow, olive, and gray. Such polychromatic blemishing earns a long list of descriptive adjectives; dusky, dingy, sooty, swarthy, inky, pitchy, and greasy."^{lxxxvii} An example of el Bandido are the two guides who [spoiler alert] betray Indiana Jones at the beginning of *Raiders of the Lost Ark*.

The harlot is another well known Hispanic stereotype in the United States film industry. "The female stereotype corresponding to el Bandido is a stock figure in the American cinema, particularly in westerns. Like the bandit, she is a secondary character, lusty and hot-tempered."^{lxxxvii} An example of this stereotype is Chihuahua, Doc Holliday's girlfriend, "fixes her amorous attentions on Wyatt Earp"^{lxxxvii} when Doc is out of town in John Ford's 1946 film *My Darling Clementine*. A more recent example would be Salma Hayek as Carolina in the 2003 film, *Once Upon A Time in Mexico*. Carolina seduces the male lead in this film.

The Male Buffoon is a prominent stereotype especially recently. "He is simpleminded, he cannot master standard English and he childishy regresses into emotionality."^{lxxxvii} A recent example

of this stereotype is Michael Peña as Luis in the 2015 film *Ant-Man*. Luis is a Hispanic criminal with no intentions of stopping, he convinces the lead male (Paul Rudd) to get back into the criminal life. Luis also speaks very fast with a slight accent about his excess of gang member cousins.

The Female Clown is another well known stereotype. “The female clown is the comic counterpart of the Latino male buffoon and, like the harlot, exemplifies a common device that the Hollywood narrative employs to neutralize the screen Latina’s sexuality. ... Generally, her character is sullied (she is made promiscuous and criminal, as is the case with the harlot stereotype) or ridiculed (portrayed as sexually ‘easy’ or simply silly and comical, as with the female buffoon)^{»lxxxvii} An actress that always comes to mind is Carmen Miranda. She was known for her “exaggeration to the point of caricature.”^{»lxxxvii} A more recent example would be Sofia Vergara’s character in *Modern Family*. Gloria (Sofia Vergara) is a loud, curvaceous woman with a very thick accent who has a hard time pronouncing English words. She also tells stories of gang members in her family back in Columbia.

The Latin Lover might be one of the most notorious stereotypes. “In the early years of the twentieth century, the common term in the media press was not ‘Latino’ or ‘Hispanic’ but ‘Latin.’ Italians, Portuguese-speaking peoples, and Spaniards were also considered Latin – in addition to those from the Spanish-speaking Americas.”^{»lxxxvii} Due to this media term, “the original Latin lover, Rudolf Valentino, was from Italy.”^{»lxxxvii} “The actors haplessly reiterate the erotic combination of characteristics instituted by Valentino: eroticism, exoticism, tenderness tinged with violence and danger, all adding up to the romantic promise that, sexually, things could very well get out of control.”^{»lxxxvii} A prime example of this stereotype is Antonio Banderas in the 1994 film, *Interview with a Vampire*.

The Dark Lady stereotype is the female Latin lover. “The female Latin lover is virginal, inscrutable, aristocratic – and erotically appealing precisely because of these characteristics.”^{»lxxxvii} An example of this is Jennifer Lopez’s character in the 1997 film *Anaconda*. An older example of this would be Dolores Del Rio’s character in the 1935 film, *In Caliente*.

Latin American stereotypes that are seen today can be seen in the late 1800s. “The first image of Latino culture in the United States cinema was in an obscure 1894 short entitled *Pedro Esquirel and Dionecio González: Mexican Duel*. It was the first character reference as well. It froze in time forever the violence-prone, crime-oriented Mexican with a pronounced inability to control his primitive passions. It is a distorted image that has remained static for more than a century.”^{»lxxxvii} Unfortunately this very storyline is still seen today in the 1983 film, *Scarface*.

West Side Story and The Magnificent Seven

The very popular musical *West Side Story*, written by playwright Arthur Laurents, debuted in 1961; during the Cold War era. The Cold War changed the relations between Latin America and the United States. Before the war, the United States was drawn in Latin America but the Cold War created a fight between Communism and Capitalism. In the film version of *West Side Story*, America is portrayed as the land of opportunity, while San Juan is portrayed as a dirt village, there is an entire song dedicated to all the opportunities America provides immigrants. This movie is about two gangs fighting over territory, the Jets (Americans) and the Sharks (Puerto Rican immigrants). Most of the members of both gangs are not named or important. The leaders of the Jets are given somewhat of a back story; they are poor kids with absentee parents, whether from drugs, alcohol or multiple jobs. The members of the Jets

also have some aspirations. One of the gang members, Tony, even has a job. The leaders of the Sharks are not given much of a back story. We know that they have parents but there is no mention of what they do or really where they are. Bernardo is the leader of the Sharks, his sister Maria falls in love with Tony, a member of the Jets. “All the Puerto Rican males are portrayed as gang members and their female counterparts are temperamental sexual objects of gratification. Their hopes and aspirations are nonexistent. Maria is only able to see beyond her world of Spanish Harlem and greater expectations at Tony’s urging”.^{lxxxvii} There are no Puerto Rican characters in the movie that are not either in the gang or dating someone in the gang. There are however, other white characters that are police officers, business owners and innocent by standards. Another important fact to keep in mind is most of the Latin American main characters are not played by Latin Americans. “The only Puerto Rican performer in an important role was Rita Moreno, who played Anita and won an Academy Award for Best Supporting Actress. She became the first Latina to win an Academy Award”.^{lxxxviii} *West Side Story* won ten Academy awards, including Best picture, despite the obvious racial stereotypes. In 2017, *West Side Story* is still popular as there are traveling performances of the movie. The most recent run was in 2009 and there are a few changes from the original movie, the biggest change being the ethnicity of the actors. Latin Americans were casted in the roles of the main Latin American roles, Josefina Scaglione was casted as Maria and George Akram was casted as Bernardo.

Another film in the 1960s incorrectly portraying and stereotyping Latin Americans is *The Magnificent Seven*. “*The Magnificent Seven* remains as one of the key films that represent Mexicans as helpless and cowardly ideological disciples.”^{lxxxviii} The entire plot of the film is that Mexican farmers from a small village can not defend themselves and need seven white, American, gunmen to protect them from a bandit and his men. Every Mexican portrayed in this film is unkempt, unclean and is wearing some form of a sombrero. This movie was nominated for several awards including the “Laurel Award” for Top Action Drama. Mexicans in this movie are portrayed as cowardly and lazy. The only woman featured in this film appears on screen for a total of around six minutes, is the daughter of one of the villagers and tries to subtly seduce one of the white gunmen. Halfway through the movie there is a scene that shows the farmers wanting to give up even though they have won one of the fights. It is the white gunmen that change their minds and make them more courageous. The villagers also need to be taught everything about fighting and how to use guns. Not one person in the village knows how to use a gun or how to fight. This movie has remained popular throughout the years despite the racial stereotypes. There was a remake of this movie in 2016 with some of the current top actors. Although the movie is a remake and even some of the lines are the same, some of the story has changed. Instead of seven white gunmen saving a “helpless” Mexican farming village, it is a group of seven men with different backgrounds helping save a village, in America, from a greedy white man. The villagers they help out are somewhat of a mix but are mostly white. The group is a mixture of ethnicities, some of the men are outlaws while some could be considered bounty hunters. Although there are racist terms used in the movie, it is not directed at one specific group, nor is it inappropriate for the time period. There is a member of the group that is Mexican and he can clearly keep up with the rest of the group. He is not a lesser character and him being Mexican is not portrayed as a handicap in the movie.

I Love Lucy

The television show, *I Love Lucy* was considered to be one of the biggest series that pushed the boundaries of stereotypes in the media. *I Love Lucy* ran from 1951 until 1959, during the Cold War era and right before the Cuban Revolution. This show pushed the boundaries in many ways including the way Latin Americans are represented on screen in the United States. The show follows the lives of Lucy and Ricky Ricardo, a married couple that lives in New York City. Lucy is a white “American” and Ricky is a Cuban immigrant. Even though the show does break down some walls, Ricky Ricardo is still a stereotype: The Male Buffoon. Ricardo could also have been considered to fall into the category of the Latin Lover as he can get quite passionate on the show. Ricky is much different than the other husbands on television during this time period, for one, he is not the main character. Ricky also works with music instead of a more traditional job. Overall, Ricky speaks English with only a slight accent. However, when Ricky is upset or angry he suddenly develops a thicker accent and starts using Spanish instead of English. A line consistently said by Ricky throughout the series is, “Lucy, you have some ‘splaining to do!” This is one of the most famous quotes from the entire series. Despite these stereotypes, *I Love Lucy* is still considered to be one of the most ground breaking shows. As far as positives in the show relating to race, *I Love Lucy* was the first to show an interracial relationship. That alone is groundbreaking. Ricky Ricardo does not just have a job but owns a nightclub. This was almost unheard of for on screen Latin American characters. Usually Latinos are portrayed as lazy and/or unemployed and Ricky is a business owner who is able to provide for his family.

Disney

Today, Disney is considered to be the most family-friendly brand in the United States’ media industry. Generally, when one thinks of Disney, they think of a company that is politically correct and beyond racial and gender stereotypes. At the surface, Disney is exactly that, it’s when one looks a little deeper that Disney becomes less innocent. *The Three Caballeros* is from 1944 and portrays beloved character Donald Duck with two birds representing Brazil and Mexico. In this film, Donald Duck (United States), Panchito Pistoles (Mexico) and José Carioca (Brazil) are singing a song about friendship. At the surface, this may seem innocent but as the video continues, the less innocent it becomes. All three birds are wearing sombreros and at one point the birds representing Mexico and Brazil are kissing the hands of the bird representing the United States. One of the lyrics is “we sing and we samba, we shout ‘aya caramba! What means aya caramba?’”^{lxxxvii} and in another part of the song, the bird representing Mexico disappears into his sombrero and pops out of a piñata. Panchito is typically seen with guns while José is usually smoking a cigar. Some people might think to give Disney a pass for this as relations weren’t the best between Latin America and the United States during this time period. During World War II, the United States violated its Good Neighbor Policy with Latin America. The United States was supposed to refrain from interfering in Latin America however with the threat of Nazis in Latin America, the United States violated the policy and set up detainment centers in various countries throughout South America. Thousands of Germans that lived in Latin America were deported or detained at the “influence” of the United States. This intervention strained the relationship between Latin America and the United States. However, *The Three Caballeros* did not just appear in 1944, they also made an appearance on the popular Disney show, *House of Mouse* in 2001. In the episode of *House of Mouse*,^{lxxxviii} Panchito barges in riding a bull and Donald seems unamused by his once buddies. During their performance on the show, Donald disappears under a large sombrero, José and Panchito remove several sombreros until they finally reveal

Donald in a dress with a fruit hat. While Panchito does not have his guns and José is not smoking a cigar, they are all still wearing sombreros. The 1988 film *Oliver and Company* is another great example of stereotypes beyond the surface. The movie is a “new” version of *Oliver Twist* using animals, it’s very innocent until the Chihuahua named Tito enters the screen and embodies most, if not all, of the Latin American stereotypes. When one of the other dogs insults his wallet Tito embodies el Bandido and responds with “All right, that does it, Frankie, man! You insulted my pride, and this means death!”^{lxxxvii} Tito embodies the male buffoon and the Latin Lover when saying goodbye to Georgette, “I don't have time for long goodbyes, but here's something to remember me by, baby.”^{lxxxviii} He tries to kiss Georgette, she hits him and he falls out of the window. Tito then goes on to say “Ooh, I think she likes me, man!”^{lxxxviii} In 2010, one of the most popular Disney movies *Toy Story 3* introduced some Latin American stereotypes in one of the main characters. Buzz Lightyear has his language switched from English to Spanish and with this change in language comes a complete change in personality. With the flip of a switch, Buzz can salsa dance and charm women. He completely embodies the Latin Lover stereotype. The most recent and perhaps the most prime example is Disney’s new show *Sofia the First*. This show debuted in November of 2012 and gave viewers high hopes. *Sofia the First* was going to be the first lighter skinned Hispanic princess who was going to break the stereotype. Unfortunately that is not what happened. Sofia’s mother is Spanish, so yes, Sofia is the first Hispanic princess. But Sofia and her mother were peasants until the mother married a white king. Sofia and her mother were not able to better themselves and their lives without the help of a white man.

A Silver Lining?

Despite the obvious stereotypes, there were some positive moments for Latin Americans in the United States film industry. “Robert Rodríguez’s *Spy Kids* (2001) was the first Latino-directed film to be promoted through McDonald’s Happy Meals.”^{lxxxvii} This was a huge step in the right direction for Latin Americans in film. Today there are also a decent amount of well known Hispanic actors including, but not limited to, Salma Hayek, Andy Garcia, Jennifer Lopez, Cameron Diaz, Antonia Banderas and Penelope Cruz. In the early 1900s, Myrtle Gonzalez was considered “the industry’s first Latina star. She began her film career at the age of twenty with a starring role in *Ghosts* (1912).”^{lxxxviii} More and more Latin Americans are becoming main stream celebrities. There have even been improvements in old films such as *West Side Story* and *The Magnificent Seven*. The relations between Latin America and the United States are complicated and with Donald Trump as President of the United States, it seems to be getting more complicated. One can only hope that the future brings more understanding and less stereotyping in the United States’ film industry.

Latin America and the United States: Latin Typecasting in the United States Media

Victoria Kustra

Latin America and the United States have endured a challenging and strained relationship. Numerous accounts of conflict, almost always included some type of beneficial gain for the United States. No matter how detrimental the cost, the continuous struggle, which spanned over hundreds of years, often left Latin America in a state of turmoil. Perhaps early conflict helped to create some of the negative stereotypes that exist today in the United States about Latin Americans. Outlandish stereotypes have followed Latin Americans well into the modern era, and it is clear that as long as these notions are perpetuated they will continue to be widely accepted as fact. This paper will argue that Latino/as were and continue to be stereotyped in the United States media, this stereotyping can be explained and traced back to initial conflicts between the United States and Latin America as a result of U.S. imperialistic tactics; this paper proves this argument by exploring how the media in the United States continuously perpetuates negative and racist notions about Latin Americans, which will consequently show how the media perpetuates Latin typecasting. This paper strives to uncover why Latin's are viewed in such an undesirable light and what potential solutions can be utilized to generate more of a positive portrayal in the United States media. Paper sections are organized into four distinct sections. Section one analyzes potential reasons as to how and why Latin stereotyping emerged in the United States media. Section two will discuss a few of the most common and derogative terms given to Latin Americans in the United States. Section three provides examples of Latin stereotyping from several different U.S. outlets, including television shows, film, commercials, and the news. Section four will address potential solutions. Each section has a specific goal of highlighting typical derogatory beliefs concerning Latina Americans, while exploring how the United States continues to perceive Latin American individuals as inferior, this can be seen and is represented in the United States media.

Section 1: The emergence of Latin Stereotyping in the United States

Often portrayed as obnoxious, loud, poor, hyper sexualized individuals, Latin Americans have been harshly judged and inaccurately portrayed throughout the United States media. Although it is merely a fact that Latin Americans are negatively stereotyped in the United States, there is clear evidence that this type of racial typecasting may have been rooted far off in the distant past of Latin American and U.S. relations. We are able to see the roots of U.S. stereotypes of Latin Americans embedded in many sources including the book *Our Sister Republics: The United States in an Age of American Revolutions*, by Caitlin Fitz. In her book, Fitz describes how Latin America became a mirror image for the United States to view their own republic and Latin America respectively. When, "U.S. observers realized that they saw different reflections-as they realized that they had different understandings of revolutions both foreign and domestic-they started to conclude that they were different people with different goals and values."^{lxxxvii} The United States seemed to look to Latin America to see their strong values, but these values were jaded and misguided and only contributed to a further divide between Latin America and the United States. When most people think of America, they

imagine the United States, but this is the problem. By simply looking at the “history” of the United States we are limiting the scope of our historical view and blatantly demeaning any accounts of different nations and people who not only contributed to the history of a collective America, but were every part involved. This is why Fitz and her map of “America” circa 1825 represent an understanding of a hemispheric America. As you can see in Figure 1, the map is interesting because it uses an image to represent how Fitz portrays a collective America. The map is of America circa 1825, and the most striking aspect is that it is not a map of what most people would consider a “traditional” America, which is generally exclusively the United States. This represents Fitz’s understanding of a hemispheric America by not representing the United States as the focal point of the map, which is what is typically done.^{lxxxvii} This map is also a reminder of the divide between Latin America and the United States (see Fig. 1).




Fig. 1

Another source where we can also see the roots of U.S. stereotypes of Latin Americans is the book *Fordlandia: The Rise and Fall of Henry Ford’s Forgotten Jungle City*, by Greg Grandin. Throughout the book, Grandin depicted the trials and tribulations of Henry Ford’s attempt to mimic the

“American” way of life in the Amazon jungle and his desire to create a utopian society. In his introduction, Grandin compares Ford and the Amazon: “Ford represented vigor, dynamism, and the rushing energy that defined American capitalism in the early twentieth century; the Amazon embodied primal stillness, an ancient world that had so far proved unconquerable.”^{lxxxvii} This statement alone encapsulates the entire logic behind U.S. imperialism. The notion that the United States is a superior entity and Latin America is an “ancient” world full of “primal” people. By classifying Latin Americans as inferior, it became easier for the United States to view them as a weaker class of individuals who “needed” to be colonized by the United States. This ridiculous notion has followed Latin Americans throughout history and emerged throughout different media outlets in the United States. The idea of stereotyping Latin Americans in order to prove their insignificance while simultaneously proving U.S. superiority was created by the United States and their imperialistic strategies. This is indicative of both U.S. imperialism and stereotyping of Latin Americans in the United States’ media.

Throughout U.S. imperialism, it is clear that the United States believed that they were superior because they were dealing with individuals who they believed to be from an inferior race. This skewed logic marks the beginnings of the superiority complex that the United States draws from and maintains throughout their relationship with Latin America. This notion drives the United States throughout their imperialistic ventures. At the same time, this conception also sparked racist actions demonstrated by the United States, which were only heightened by U.S. imperialism and only created a larger rift between the United States and Latin America. Berumen explains, “By the mid-18th century, the United States began to establish hegemony over Latin America through the Monroe Doctrine and gunboat diplomacy.” Military conflict soon followed, the first time over the growing expansion of slavery “into then Mexican Texas in 1836.”^{lxxxvii} As a result, these conflicts embedded in racist ideals created a level of hostility between the people of Latin America and the people of the United States, which created a foundation of Latin stereotyping that began to emerge in the media throughout the United States.

Section 2: The Labels Behind the Stereotyping of Latin Americans in the United States

Although it may be impossible to create a complete list of offensive terms that are assigned to Latin Americans in the United States, this paper will discuss a few of the most common ones. Just to name a few, there are Latin lovers, the buffoon, the greaser or bandit, and illegal aliens. The representation of the Latin lover may be the most common and widely known stereotype in popular media. Michelle Ortiz described the typical representation of the Latin lover: “the Latin lover is characterized by his well-groomed and smoldering appearance, exoticness, and aggressive sexual drive. The Latin lover is irresistible to women, who are easily seduced by him,” in her dissertation, *The implications of priming the “Latin Lover” stereotype on perceptions of romantic intentions: A self-categorization theory approach.*^{lxxxvii} Though the typical Latin lover is usually male, there can be representations of the Latina lover, who has the same effect and characteristics as the Latin lover. As described by Berg, the buffoon “serves as second-banana comic relief.”^{lxxxvii} Behnken and Smithers describe the typical greaser as “volatile, untrustworthy, violent, occasionally animal-like, and a thief.”

^{lxxxvii} Behnken and Smithers also describe the typical bandit: “the bandit straddled the line between the criminal, antiestablishment greaser and the stereotypical Latin lover.”^{lxxxvii} In his book *Latino Images in Film*, Charles Berg Ramirez describes the typical illegal alien: “Latino immigrants as criminals (rather than as people who have migrated here for a complex set of historical, political, and economic reasons, some of which involve U.S. business interests).”^{lxxxvii} The following subsections will characterize each individual stereotype.

The Latin Lover

The Latin lover is arguably the most common stereotype represented throughout many media outlets in the United States and expanding to both men and women. It is said that the origins of this stereotype can be traced back to a man named Rudolph Valentino. Valentino was an immigrant movie star who was known for his starring role in the film *The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse* in 1912.^{lxxxvii} In this film, Valentino danced seductively with a woman. This can be seen as the beginning of a new definition of a seductive lover throughout the film industry; shifting traditional love scenes to include images of sensual dances. Valentino unknowingly created a new category of stereotyping that, “maintained the erotic combination of characteristics: suavity and sensuality, tenderness, and sexual danger.”^{lxxxvii} This stereotype is undoubtedly alive today throughout the U.S. media.

The Buffoon

The buffoon is typically a stereotype that depicts Latin males in the media with demeaning characteristics that include “air head” qualities, in settings that include banana comic relief. This stereotype emerged throughout the 1930’s with characters such as Pancho in “The Cisco Lid,” Sgt. Garcia in “Zorro,” and Ricky Ricardo in “I Love Lucy.”^{lxxxvii} The Latin buffoon provides comic relief and suggests that Latin Americans are easily influenced, intellectually challenged, and childish. We can speculate that the U.S. media inflicted Latin American men with this stereotype as a way to, “tame their fearful qualities.”^{lxxxvii} This is an interesting perspective, because by emphasizing differences between Latin Americans and Caucasians, the U.S. media is able to keep Latin Americans on a lower and more demeaning level. In a way, the media is perpetuating Latin American inferiority, by promoting U.S. exceptionality through stereotyping. This is something that can be traced back to U.S. imperialist attitudes. Although the buffoon is a typical stereotype of a Latino, the female clown is the female counterpart. The female clown exhibits many of the same qualities that encapsulate the male buffoon. Also emerging throughout the 1930’s, this stereotype accentuates the colorful portrayals of Latin American women with characters such as Carmen Miranda in her number “Lady in the Tutti-Frutti Hat.”^{lxxxvii} Similar to the male buffoon, the female clown also mocks, mimics, and exaggerates Latin American customs, features, and attributes.

The Bandit

The Bandit has roots that emerged in the silent “greaser” film in the early 1900’s. This character usually exhibits emotional, irrational, shifty, and dishonest behavior that create a villainous

aura. Typically presented as “dirty and unkempt-usually displaying an unshaven face; missing teeth; and disheveled, oily hair.”^{lxxxvii} Films that portray this character include *Broncho Billy and the Greaser* and *Eight Million Ways to Die*. This stereotypes produces similar reactions in the U.S. media that are elicited by the male buffoon and the female clown. The U.S. media strives to limit the successes of Latin Americans by forcing them into an unfair box. If the U.S. can limit Latin Americans, they can appear to be superior. Stereotypes driven by the media and U.S. imperialism were and are still used as tactics to keep Latin Americans segregated so that they cannot reach their full potential.

The Illegal Alien

Negative perceptions of immigrants have been a big part of U.S. identity since immigration became a mainstream topic. In the recent century, Latin American immigrants have been unfairly represented as illegal aliens who wreck havoc on the U.S. economy by stealing jobs away from hard working “Americans.” The typical illegal alien is a lazy leech who strives to benefit off of others for personal gain, typically in relation to occupations. A New York Times article from 2007, suggests that, “illegal immigrants do not just pick fruit, they do not just work off the books, they rarely earn less than the minimum wage and they may even be raising employment without harming incomes.”^{lxxxviii} It is an unfair judgment to lump all Latin American immigrants into the category of illegal aliens. This can be hard considering so many sources, including the news seemingly and unknowingly perpetuate these negative stereotypes.

Section 3: Examples of Latin Stereotyping in Different U.S. Media Outlets

Latin Americans have faced negative racial backlash in the United States, which has been continuously perpetuated by numerous media outlets. Television shows, film, commercials, and the news are just a few of the outlets that participate in degrading Latin Americans. It is outrageous to think that stereotypes that create roots within the media can survive the constraints of space and time. Many of the stereotypes that were discussed in the previous section are thriving in the modern day media in the United States, which makes you wonder how these stereotypes would survive if the media was not a factor.

When most people think of Latin Americans who are portrayed on television shows, most people think of common stereotypes that are propagated throughout the United States. Fictional characters such as Eva Longoria as Gabrielle Solis on *Desperate Housewives* and Desi Arnaz as Ricky Ricardo on *I Love Lucy* are reflections of stereotypical Latin Americans, from the viewpoint of the United States. Eva Longoria was depicted as a loud, unpredictable, and over sexualized gold digger, or the typical Latina lover; the only thing that Longoria’s character was missing was a heavy accent. Desi Arnaz was comically portrayed as a Latin buffoon who was loud, obnoxious, and not particularly intelligent. Characters, one from the 1950s and one from the 2000s both display stereotypical versions of Latin Americans. This shows that discrimination in the U.S. media is not only widespread, but it has escalated with time.

The negativity surrounding the way that Latin Americans in film have been portrayed, has managed to take a turn for the worse as time passed. Clara E. Rodriguez describes this transition in her book *Latin Looks: Images of Latinas and Latinos in the U.S. Media*:

In the past, there were more leading and recognizably Spanish surnamed stars in major movies and they portrayed a wider variety of roles and statuses than appears to be the case today. But a bifurcated approach characterized casting, in which only those Latino stars who were viewed as European prototypes had leading roles. Those who were darker in coloration played extras or were not individually identifiable. (Ironically, as has been the case for other groups-when a character with darker pigmentation was called for, brown face makeup was applied.) In addition, the majority of Latino images, and the Majority of Latinos, were still not displayed in positive terms.^{lxxxvii}

A perfect example of the stereotyping and derogatory brown face makeup that Rodriguez describes is represented in the 1920's classic film, *The Mark of Zorro*. The book *Racism in American Popular Media*, written by Brian D. Behnken and Gregory D. Smithers describes the representation of the character Zorro and other minor characters:

While Zorro represents a silver screen hero, he is a hero who fits into the stereotypical viewpoints that Hollywood, and many Americans, had about Latinos. In this case he is a thinly disguised bandito, a Robin Hood-like character. More importantly, he is a Latin lover who fights for his woman and wins the day, and the heart of the woman he desires. In contrast, the other Latinos portrayed in *The Mark of Zorro* are ignoble, drunken fools who abuse their power and authority and lack moral decency. Thus, while we may find some minor positive attributes in the Zorro character, those attributes are set against a broader cultural context in which more villainous Latinos portrayed by whites in brown face are the norm.^{lxxxvii}

Unfortunately, this was a common occurrence in most films that involved the portrayal of Latin American characters. In this case, Zorro represents the stereotype of the typical Latin lover. Although he may also portray a Latin hero, his successes are overshadowed by his overly enthusiastic pursuit of his love interest. Zorro is also surrounded by a cast of individuals in brown face who represent the stereotype of the typical bandit or bandito, which is highly racist and contributes greatly to the negative views of Latin Americans in the United States. Caucasian individuals imitating Latin Americans with brown face is highly derogatory and can create heightened racist tensions within the Latin American community throughout the United States.

We can also see representations of Latin American stereotyping in commercials.

In her book *Dance and the Hollywood Latina*, Priscilla Pena Ovalle uses a commercial from 2007 for Head & Shoulders shampoo to illustrate how Latinas are often over sexualized in the U.S. media. The commercial shows one Caucasian woman, one African American woman, and one Latina woman relaying testimonies for Head & Shoulders Shampoo; all three women were portrayed differently, especially the Latin woman. Ovalle explains:

Each woman's extolment - delivered in a series of close-ups praises the product according to her (hair) type: after the black woman with dark, curly hair gushes that the shampoo "actually changed my hair," a white woman declares that her straight auburn hair "feels healthy." When the Latina finally delivers her testimonial, she exclaims that her improved hair has "movement, like salsa," and the commercial cuts to its only medium shot, framing the Latina's body from head to hip as she rocks into an abbreviated salsa step.^{lxxxvii}

This commercial used a sexualized version of a dancing Latin woman to sell product, which is all too common in the history of media throughout the United States. Images of Latinas dancing to sell products are a mainstream form of visual media culture in the United States, which unfortunately contributes to the racist and sexualized image of the Latin woman. Latin women and their representation as Latina lovers in the media, only perpetuates racial strain. Although the representation of women in the media as sexualized objects stretches throughout all mediums and all ethnic backgrounds, the stereotyping of Latin American women seems to take on a higher level of derogatory meaning. This may be a result of the fact that Latin women are part of two major minority groups. They are women, which immediately puts them in a lower category, and they have Latin heritage, which also puts them at a disadvantage, especially within the harsh judgments placed upon them by the U.S. media.

News reports tend to be a devious and unexpected form of racist typecasting, because most people who watch or read the news have the expectation that they will learn and understand accurate information. The issue of immigration, especially concerning Mexican immigrants has been and has remained a strong issue for a long time. The problem with the news portrayal of the immigration "crisis," is the way that these individuals are harshly depicted. Latin Americans are often portrayed in the news as leeches that live off of the system and want to take jobs away from hard working "Americans," they are often categorized using the offensive term of illegal alien. This stereotype could not be further from the truth. *Images that Injure: Pictorial Stereotypes in the Media* written by Paul Martin Lester accurately explains the truth behind media interpretations of immigration:

Media accounts of the immigration problem also tend to be one-sided, giving extensive coverage to the political debate over solutions, while inadequately portraying the image of these immigrants who come here in pursuit of the American dream. In that sense, these immigrants are no different from any other previous immigrants: they've come to pursue a better life for themselves and their families. They take jobs no one else will take, work hard and loyally, pay sales taxes disproportionate to their numbers, and are exploited by a number of people they encounter here. Many avoid the welfare lines, either out of personal pride or for fear that they may become more detectable to immigration authorities who will deport them immediately.^{lxxxvii}

It seems as though this image of an illegal immigrant is never ending, especially with the "war" the current U.S. administration has outwardly waged on Mexico and Latin America as a whole.

News outlets also tend to discriminate against Latin Americans based upon their perceived occupations and leisure activities. Not only does the news perpetuate false images of the modern immigrant, the news also tends to criminalize Latin Americans, who are often associated with drug and

gang activity. Lester debunks this stereotype in his book: “Gangs are not restricted to ethnic neighborhoods. Drugs are not the sole property of the inner cities; they are a fact of life in Anglo suburbia as well. Drugs aren’t just sold on the street corners of poor neighborhoods by disadvantaged youth; they are also sold to the lawyers and doctors for their high-priced social parties and “power” get-togethers.”^{lxxxvii} This form of typecasting can be unexpected, because of the media form that it is derived from. Basically, this shows the extent of how much power the media has in influencing and creating racist stereotypes.

Section 4: Potential Solutions

When considering solutions to the large-scale problem of Latin American stereotyping in the media, it is important to evaluate what information the media is feeding the people of the United States. Currently, there is an absence of exemplary Latin role models in the media, and an influx of false myths and negative stereotypical interpretations of Latin Americans. This is the brief version of what was discussed throughout the paper, but a good starting point for the discussion concerning potential solutions. In his book, *Images that Injure: Pictorial Stereotypes in the Media*, Lester examines five solutions for news outlets that are looking to avoid the perpetuation of racial stereotypes: Firstly, he suggests “showcasing the life of the Latin community, just as the media does with white Americans.” Secondly, “showcasing the achievements of individual Latin Americans and their successes.” Thirdly, closely examining stories and photos about “local Latin Americans accused of crimes with the same standards of judgment used on those about Anglos. Such news should not be played up or returned to more often than it would be if the accused were Anglo.” The fourth solution suggests, “subject wire stories about charges against Latin Americans in other parts of the country should be held to the same scrutiny.” Finally, investigate and “report on the reality behind stereotypes. The facts about the race of welfare mothers, cocaine users, and victims of social problems would be a good starting place for story assignments. Reporters could also frame stories in new ways that would challenge stereotypes.”^{lxxxviii} Attempting to change the image of Latin Americans in the United States media is not an easy task, but it can be done. The solutions that Lester mentioned are a great starting point, but it is also important to educate yourself and remember that understanding is key when determining fact from fiction in any sort of media outlet.

Similar to Lester, Rodriguez also discusses solutions for change, directed at government officials and the entertainment industry. In her book *Latin Looks: Images of Latinas and Latinos in the U.S. Media*, Rodriguez suggests that the government could “adopt special legislation concerning negative and stereotypical portrayals of Hispanics by the media and the underrepresentation’s of Latinos in the media.” She also suggests “conducting public hearings, imposing penalties for those who violate equal opportunity guidelines, and finally focusing federal funding on Hispanic issues.” Her recommendations for the entertainment industry have similar moral standards. Rodriguez suggests “developing training and career paths in the Latino community, increasing Latino employment and promotions, enforcing diversity clauses in standard collective bargaining agreements, and developing Latin-focused programming material.”^{lxxxvii} This is an important recommendation, because in many cases, change begins with education. Access to education is crucial for shifting ideals surrounding

stereotypes, especially if there was proper legislation to back up new reforms that aim to halt stereotyping.

Discussing potential solutions can feel like a complete waste of time. How can the entire United States really change their perception of Latin Americans that has been perpetuated since the dawn of imperialism? Although daunting and unjust, this is a fair question, especially with the current U.S. administration that is led by Donald Trump. Trump is the leader of the campaign to “Make America Great Again.” This campaign slogan brings us back to Caitlin Fitz and her map of America, which doesn’t just include the United States, but the entire Americas. When Donald Trump was elected President, he became the main representation of the United States. Trump was quoted after his election was finalized proclaiming, “America First.”^{lxxxvii} This statement can be confusing, because even the POTUS blatantly disregards the Americas as a whole. Although he references “America,” he really only means the United States. Although we cannot predict or control the actions of others, we must do our best as individuals to keep an open and accepting mind, through education and empathetic understanding.

Although this paper included several media outlets that have participated in racial profiling, there are several others that are guilty as well. Essentially, any outlet that has the ability to garner the attention of the masses through media has the potential to racially profile. Looking at images of Latin Americans in the media can help the people of the United States to understand and potentially change the racially charged and negative perceptions surrounding Latin Americans in the United States media.

Section 4: U.S.- Latin American Relations: The Battle for Hegemony.

Panama ('s) Canal

Anthony Scialabba

To understand this paper, one must first know what the terms imperialism, imperialist, and less imperialist mean. Imperialism is the practice that a country uses when it applies diplomatic or militaristic means to spread its influence and power. Accordingly, an imperialist is someone who either practices or supports imperialism. In turn, someone who is less imperialist either practices or supports imperialism to a lesser extent.

Through reviewing more than one hundred years of scholarly writing on the history of the Panama Canal between 1900-2000, I have determined that United States historical perspectives of it have primarily shifted from imperialist to less imperialist over time. This gradual shift can mainly be explained through a steady increase in the awareness and knowledge of acts of imperialism by the United States towards numerous aspects pertaining to the Panama Canal. Moreover, authors using a United States historical perspective can be viewed as an imperialist or as a less imperialist in a number of ways such as by their arguments, assumptions, interpretations, and by what was excluded or included in each of their writings. Generally in the United States, there are many students principally educated with a United States perception of history. Consequently, all sources in this paper have some sort of a background in United States history.

Historically, Latin America has been one of the central focuses of the United States. From analyzing relations between Latin America and the United States, the Panama Canal can be viewed as one of their most important connections. Prior to the construction of the Panama Canal, Nicaragua was under the assumption that the United States would build a canal in Nicaragua. However, the United States eventually desired to build a canal in Panama for various reasons such as the potential financial benefits from it. The United States also sought to build a canal in Panama for the possibility of being able to implement and promote its own image, policies, and ways of life upon Latin America. Ultimately, through imperialism the United States was able to attain many of these desires by doing a multitude of actions and creating a number of policies and treaties pertaining to the Panama Canal, and in regard to several Latin American nations as well.

Besides once being the Secretary of State of New York, John Bigelow was a close friend of Philippe-Jean Bunau-Varilla, who was Panama's ambassador to the United States. In 1908, Bigelow wrote the book *The Panama Canal and the Daughters of Danaus*. In it, Bigelow argued that the United States needed to be thankful of Bunau-Varilla for the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty among other things. Bigelow and Bunau-Varilla argued that Panama was privileged to be the site for where the canal would be built. From Bigelow's high praise of Bunau-Varilla, and from the argument that Panama was privileged to have the United States to construct the canal, Bigelow can be viewed as an imperialist.

In truth, Colombia did not want to see Panama as an independent nation. However, on November 18, 1903, the United States Secretary of State John Hayes along with Bunau-Varilla went against Colombia's desire through the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty. The Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty did not only go against Colombia's desire, but instead it also formed an unforgettable bond between Panama and the United States. Moreover, the praise Bigelow gave to Bunau-Varilla in regard to aspects of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, and the imperialist thoughts of Bigelow can be seen from this quote:

“We were thus and still remain indebted to Mr. Bunau-Varilla, not only for rescuing us from the disastrous folly of attempting a waterway through Nicaragua, and for the independence of the State of Panama, but for what is more immediately and specifically important to us, for drawing with his own pen the treaty known to history as the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, which secured to us privileges of incalculable importance for the prosecution of our great national and international enterprise of which the State of Panama is to be the theatre; privileges the value of which at some future day will be more fully realized than they are at present.”^{lxxxvii}

Upon reading the beliefs of Bigelow in regard to the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, it can be inferred that one could believe that it was a beneficial treaty in all aspects for all of the parties it involved. However, the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty was not a beneficial treaty in all aspects for all of the parties involved, and it ultimately created many tensions between Panama and the United States. Additionally, Colombia garnered more tension towards both Panama and the United States as a result of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty as well. Historically, Panama has not been privileged from the Panama Canal to the extent that Bigelow imagined.

Richard Warner Van Alstyne was once the Professor of International History at the University of the Pacific. In 1980, Alstyne wrote *The Panama Canal: A Classical Case of an Imperial Hangover*. In it, Alstyne argued that the United States was imperialist through his depictions of how the United States used imperialism in its diplomacy. Furthermore, Alstyne revealed how the Panamanian leaders reflected on the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty. However, it is from Alstyne's exclusion of Panamanians requests besides that of Panama's independence that he can be observed as a less imperialist. From the exclusion of requests, Alstyne was successful in limiting the grand scale of what his readers knew of the impact United States imperialism had on Panama. Moreover, it can be inferred that Alstyne wanted to downplay the impact United States imperialism had on Panama to prevent any potential additional negative feelings from his readers towards the United States.

Since the Panama Canal is so important, it must not be understated the role that the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty played in cementing a lasting connection between Panama and the United States. “The United States now had its canal zone, a strip of land ten miles wide bisecting the

new republic from sea to sea. The grant was to be ‘in perpetuity’, and, if found necessary for the operation of the canal, the republic obliged upon demand to yield additional territory.”^{lxxxvii} As shown by the multitude of advantages the United States had over Panama in the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, United States imperialism was certainly present in the sense of diplomacy because it acquired the Canal Zone through diplomatic means. “The Panamanian leaders reflected ruefully over their disappointments, but at least they had their ‘independence’, which they did not propose to part with.”^{lxxxvii} Although United States imperialism ultimately acquired many advantages for the United States, the Panamanian leaders greatly valued Panama’s long awaited independence. Consequently, even though the Panamanian leaders were displeased with most of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, they were still very cautious when it came to disputing any aspects of it.

For a time, Maurice Hudson Thatcher had been the Isthmian Canal Commissioner. In 1915, Thatcher wrote *The Panama Canal*. In it, Thatcher argued that the Panama Canal was representational of peace. Also, Thatcher argued that through more interactions between Latin America and the United States there was a brighter future ahead. Thatcher assumed that Latin America was willing to appease Americans, and that success would happen in Latin America with assistance from Americans. Furthermore, Thatcher can be viewed as an imperialist through what he argued, and through what he assumed of Latin America.

Eleven years after the agreement to have the United States build a canal in Panama, the wait of many had finally become over. On August 15, 1914, the Panama Canal had at long last become open. “Moreover, the tendency is toward a greater measure of stability; and when the youthful and vigorous of our own country shall emigrate in numbers to the tropical countries of Latin America, carrying with them American ideas of government and sanitation, there will result there an increased measure of stability.”^{lxxxvii} Contrary to what Thatcher argued about peace, it is clear by this quote that the United States wanted to continue its imperialism towards Latin America, which in turn meant that the Panama Canal could not represent peace.

Consequently, unlike what Thatcher argued about the future, a brighter future through more interactions was highly unlikely. Moreover, contrary to what Thatcher assumed of success, just because certain things worked in the United States did not mean that they would work somewhere such as Latin America as well. Furthermore, it was unjust of Thatcher to assume that Latin America would be immediately welcoming to all of the changes. Historically, it is quite evident that Latin America has garnered much despise and distrust towards the United States because of the United States use of imperialism.

Peter Hopkinson Smith was once the Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. In 2013, Smith wrote the book *Talons of the Eagle: Latin America, the United States, and the World*. In it, Smith argued that the United States has practiced imperialism ever since it entered the international stage, and that Latin America was caught in its path of imperialism. Smith can be seen as a less imperialist only from because there was an exclusion of Latin American views present in his book in regard to the opening of the Panama Canal. From the

exclusion of Latin American views, Smith softened the perspectives of what his readers might believe Latin American's thought towards how United States imperialism shaped the Panama Canal. Furthermore, it can be inferred that Smith did this to prevent any possible additional unfavorable feelings from his readers towards the United States.

The creation of the Panama Canal was a monumental event. Through the Panama Canal's creation, there were more impacts from United States imperialism felt. Much of what Smith depicted about United States imperialism concerning the Panama Canal can be viewed by this quote:

“Opened in 1914, the canal immediately became a major international waterway, and the Panamanian government began receiving steady annuities. The Canal Zone became a de facto U.S. colony, an area of legal privilege and country club prosperity that stood in sharp and conspicuous contrast to local society. Outside the Zone, Panama developed the characteristics that typified Central America as a whole: dependence on agricultural exports (especially bananas), reliance on the U.S. market, and domestic control by a tightly knit landed oligarchy. Washington had established a protectorate that would help promote, protect, and extend its commercial empire. With possession of the canal, the United States completed its century-long efforts to gain territorial footholds around the Caribbean Basin.”^{lxxxvii}

As observed by this quote, once the Panama Canal was opened it basically became a colony of the United States. Through imperialism, the United States was able to attain a presence in the Caribbean Basin with its control of the Panama Canal. Although not displayed by Smith, it can be logically inferred that there were at least some aspects of the United States that many Latin Americans did not want to replicate in their own life and or culture.

Charles E. Hill was formerly the Professor of Political Science at George Washington University. In 1922, Hill wrote the book *Leading American Treaties*. In it, Hill argued that the United States was justified in its actions that led to Panama's independence from Colombia. Moreover, Hill can be regarded as an imperialist from his argument that the United States should not need to pay Colombia the required amount in the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty. Through Hill's argument over compensation, it can be perceived that Hill was supportive of the United States imperialism that was used in Colombia.

The Thomson-Urrutia Treaty was made to alleviate the tense relations between Colombia and the United States. These tense relations stemmed from the United States actions in assisting in Panama's independence from Colombia. One thing the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty stipulated was the payment of \$25,000,000 to Colombia. “Why should the United States pay \$25,000,000? Had any right of Colombia under international law been violated? John Hay, Elihu Root, and Philander C. Knox maintained that no such right had been affected in the least. Nowhere in the

diplomatic correspondence available do the representatives of Colombia show that such a right had been infringed upon.”^{lxxxvii} From this quote, it can be seen that the United States did not violate any rights of Colombia under international law. However, it must be noted that the United States actually did use means of imperialism in Colombia. Moreover, contrary to what Hill argued over compensation, the United States should have needed to pay Colombia \$25,000,000 since the United States needed to repair relations between itself and Colombia for its imperialist role in helping to attain Panama’s independence.

Michael J. Hogan is Professor of History at University Illinois at Springfield. In 1953, Hogan wrote the book *The Panama Canal in American politics: domestic advocacy and the evolution of policy*. In it, Hogan argued that relations between Latin America and the United States have not always been equal. Moreover, Hogan can be perceived as a less imperialist through his inclusion of quotation marks around the word stolen. From Hogan’s inclusion of quotation marks around the word stolen, Hogan softened the view that Theodore Roosevelt stole the canal from Colombia. Furthermore, it can be inferred that Hogan did this to avoid any potential additional adverse feelings from his readers towards the United States.

From Hogan, it was evident that even after the opening of the Panama Canal, there were still many issues concerning it. Many of these issues regarding it were from the imperialist roles played by the United States in helping Panama attain its independence from Colombia. As seen by this quote, the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty sought to solve some of those issues:

“Seven years later, however, on April 10, 1921, the U.S. Senate ratified the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty. No longer did it express “sincere regret”, but the United States did pay Colombia the \$25 million. The treaty went into effect on March 1, 1922, almost two years after the formal opening of the Panama Canal and over three years after Roosevelt’s death. With Roosevelt no longer around to defend his actions, the United States admitted to impropriety warranting monetary compensation. In effect, ratification of the treaty endorsed the view that Roosevelt had “stolen” the canal from Colombia in 1903.”^{lxxxvii}

Hogan made it clear that Roosevelt had unbalanced relations with Colombia, which was one of the reasons why many Colombians despised him. Once Roosevelt died, the United States took responsibility for some of its unjust actions. By the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty, the United States had finally admitted to impropriety warranting monetary compensation. In addition, the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty supported the widespread view that Roosevelt stole the canal from Colombia.

Norman Judson Padelford was once the Professor of International Law at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. In 1940, Padelford wrote *The Panama Canal in Time of Peace*. One of the things that Padelford argued in it was that Panama and the United States continued to have relations with each other principally because of the Panama Canal. Moreover, Padelford can be recognized as a less imperialist through his exclusion of appeasement as one of the United States reasons behind the General Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Furthermore, it can be inferred that Padelford did this to ward off any possible additional negative sentiments from his readers towards the United States.

The Panama Canal still had many issues concerning it in the 1930's. Signed in 1936, but not ratified until 1939, the General Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was in part an attempt to improve many of the issues pertaining to the Panama Canal. Much of the significance of the General Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation can be seen through this quote:

“Disagreements regarding smuggling from the Canal Zone into Panama, and concerning the imposition of duties on goods destined for Panama, were removed by the 1936 General Treaty, by which Panama and the United States agreed to cooperate to reduce smuggling, to recognize the right of Panama to impose duties and taxes on goods and persons entering Panama, and to permit the establishment of Panaman customs houses, with Panaman officials, in ports of the Canal Zone for the examination of goods and persons destined for Panama.”^{lxxxvii}

For the United States to maintain its imperialist control of the Panama Canal, it was central for the United States to appease Panama from time to time. Through the General Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, the United States can be seen as conducting balanced relations with Panama. Moreover, Panama had yearned to have control of the Panama Canal. From the General Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, Panama attained more of a responsibility over aspects ultimately pertaining to the Panama Canal.

Malcolm E. Wheeler had been the Professor of Law at University of Iowa College of Law. In 1969, Wheeler wrote *Toward the Peaceful Modification of Treaties: The Panama Canal Proposals*. Wheeler had argued in it that Panama and the United States continued to have relations with each other due to the Panama Canal. Also, Wheeler argued that the United States relaxed its extent of power first during the administration of Franklin Roosevelt. Through exclusion of past imperialistic efforts of the United States, Wheeler can be known as a less imperialist. Additionally, it can be inferred that Wheeler did this to circumvent any imaginable additional negative feelings from his readers towards the United States.

The United States relinquished more of its power in regard to aspects of the Panama Canal in favor of Panama by the General Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. “Indications of a relaxing of the United States’ position on the extent of its powers began to appear during the administration of Franklin Roosevelt.”^{lxxxvii} Contrary to what Wheeler argued about power, the General Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was not the beginning of the United States seemingly more relaxed position on the extent of its powers. Furthermore, the beginning of the United States seemingly more relaxed position of the extent of its powers can be seen by many previous interactions such as the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty.

Lester Hood Woolsey was a former solicitor for the Department of State. In 1943, Woolsey wrote *Executive Agreements Relating to Panama*. In it, Woolsey argued that the United States desired to improve relations with Panama in concern to the Panama Canal. Through this argument, Woolsey can be seen as an imperialist because the United States actually still held a heavy interest in acting with imperialism in regard to the Panama Canal. Furthermore, it can be inferred that Woolsey argued that the United States sought to improve relations with Panama in concern to the Panama Canal to help cover the United States true intentions.

Historically, relations between Panama and the United States have often been tense because of the impact United States imperialism has left upon Panama. In 1942, two agreements were made between Panama and the United States that made the United States appear as only interested in improving relations. These two agreements are shown through this quote:

“On May 18, 1942, the United States and Panama entered into two agreements:

One relates to the temporary use by the United States of some hundred defense sites in Panama for air fields, detector stations, searchlight positions, etc., in many parts of the Republic for the better protection of the Canal during the war. This agreement was not submitted to the Senate for approval, although it provides for approval by the National Assembly of Panama. The other agreement, embodied in an exchange of notes, relates, among other things, to the subject matter of the Joint Resolution, which agreement apparently has not been published or submitted to the Senate.”^{lxxxvii}

These two agreements eventually helped improve relations between Panama and the United States. Through WWII, the United States was able to seize an opportunity to finally place more of its military in Panama. Moreover, from these two agreements the United States was ultimately able to make a stronger general foothold than it already had in Panama.

Robert Arthur Humphreys was once the Assistant Lecturer of American History at University College London. In 2016, Humphreys wrote the book *Latin America and the Second World War: Volume 2: 1942-1945*. One of the things Humphreys argued in it was that Latin American countries during WWII continued to hold a high level of importance. Humphreys can

be seen as a less imperialist through his exclusion of many prior acts of imperialism by the United States. Through exclusion of many prior acts of imperialism by the United States, it can be perceived that Humphreys essentially supported United States imperialism because he did not provide a complete background of what ultimately led to the two agreements of 1942. Furthermore, it can be inferred that Humphreys did this to bypass any potential additional adverse feelings from his readers towards the United States.

As previously mentioned and observed, there have been many tensions over time between Panama and the United States as a result of the United States imperialism in regard to the Panama Canal. The two agreements of 1942 between Panama and the United States strengthened the connection between the both of them. “President de la Guardia described these agreements as ‘a high point’ on the road towards the ‘material and political consolidation’ of Panamá and the United States.”^{lxxxvii} As President de la Guardia reflected, these two agreements were a high point of relations between Panama and the United States. However, this did not mean United States imperialism in concern to the Panama Canal was coming to an end any time soon. If Humphreys supplied many prior acts of imperialism by the United States, then his readers would understand why a skeptical future was ahead.

At one point, Daniel John Flood was a member of the United States House of Representatives. In 1958, Flood wrote *Panama Canal Zone: Constitutional Domain of the United States*. In it, Flood argued that the Panama Canal could not prosper without United States sovereignty and control of it. From this argument, Flood can be viewed as imperialist in that he maintained that the imperialist United States must have sovereignty and control of the Panama Canal because he assumed that Panama would not be able to make it prosper. Furthermore, Flood can be seen as an imperialist because he was supportive of the current position the United States had attained through imperialism in regard to the Panama Canal.

In the 1950’s, there was a continued connection between Panama and the United States in concern to the Panama Canal through various treaties. One of the treaties observed by Flood was the Remon-Eisenhower Treaty of 1955, which was meant to strengthen relations between Panama and the United States. “The great lesson to be derived from a critical study of more than a century of experience in matters affecting security of transit, and the protection of the Canal itself, is the imperative necessity for political stability on the Isthmus, with no dilution or diminution of United States sovereignty and control over the Panama Canal enterprise.”^{lxxxvii} After reviewing treaties such as the Remon-Eisenhower Treaty of 1955, it can be seen that people such as Flood did not have faith in a Panamanian run Panama Canal. Although Panama did not have the same amount of power as the United States did, it did not necessarily mean that Panama would fail in operating the Panama Canal, or at least without some assistance by the United States.

Walter Darnell Jacobs was once Professor of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland. In 1968, Jacobs wrote *New Treaties for the Panama Canal?* In it, Jacobs displayed the importance of the Remon-Eisenhower Treaty. Moreover, Jacobs argued that a further

deterioration of the American sovereignty in the Canal Zone would only end up hurting Panama. From this argument, Jacobs can be perceived as an imperialist because he did not believe Panama would be healthy without the imperialist United States.

In the 1950's, there really was a continued connection between Panama and the United States in concern to the Panama Canal. As aforementioned, the Remon-Eisenhower Treaty of 1955 was meant to tighten the relations between Panama and the United States. "The canal annuity was increased from \$430,000 to \$1,930,000. The U.S. gave up several improvements and several parcels of land. It turned over to the Republic railroad terminals in the cities of Panama and Colon. Panamanians working in the Zone lost commissary and other purchasing privileges and their pay was made subject to Panamanian taxation."^{lxxxvii} Through the Remon-Eisenhower Treaty, a number of things became changed. Essentially, the Remon-Eisenhower Treaty was an enhancement of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty.

Historically, the United States has left an unforgettable impact on the Panama. "A further deterioration of American sovereignty in the Canal Zone would not benefit the Republic of Panama but would serve to encourage communist guerrilla and terrorists in Latin America."^{lxxxvii} Contrary to Jacobs's argument of American sovereignty, Panama could benefit from a decline of American sovereignty in the sense that Panamanians could be more prideful in the fact they control a major part of their country instead of another country. Furthermore, it can be inferred that Panamanians could experience a rise in nationalism from a decline of American sovereignty.

Hugh Fox was formerly Professor of American Literature at Loyola University. In 1968, Fox wrote the *Latin American Report: Panama: The Places between Places*. Upon examining events such as the Martyrs' Day riots of 1964, Fox argued that the United States was not the cause of Panama's ailments, but instead the cause of any of its modernity and or prosperity. From this argument, Fox can be seen as an imperialist because he basically supports all of the United States imperialism inflicted upon Panama in the past.

In the 1960's, Panama still did not like the fact that there was American sovereignty in the Canal Zone. Moreover, the Martyrs' Day riots of 1964 were an integral event in Panama's history. "To consider the U.S. as the cause of Panama's ills, on the other hand, is completely unrealistic – Whatever modernity or prosperity Panama may have today can be attributed more or less directly to the U.S."^{lxxxvii} Contrary to Fox's argument of Panama's ailments, the United States can clearly be viewed as a cause of Panama's ailments. For example, the Martyrs' Day riots were ultimately a response to American sovereignty in the Canal Zone, which had been obtained through imperialism by the United States.

Julie Greene is Professor of History at University of Maryland at College Park. In 2009, Greene wrote the book *The Canal Builders: Making America's Empire at the Panama Canal*. In it, Greene argued that the United States acted with means of imperialism in numerous aspects concerning the Panama Canal. Moreover, Greene displayed much background on the Martyrs' Day riots in her book. Furthermore, Greene can be known as a less imperialist through one of the things she said in her interpretation of the Martyrs' Day riots.

The United States control of the Canal Zone had not been widely met with a warm reception from those who lived there, Panamanians, and others. On January 9, 1964, the Martyrs' Day riots started and brought an increased awareness to the issue of American sovereignty in the Canal Zone. Additionally, much of the tension between the Canal Zone, Panama, and the United States is depicted through this quote:

“By 1964 the governor of the Canal Zone had ordered that U.S. and Panamanian flags both be flown at specific sites. They were not to be raised at schools, but American students at Balboa High School rebelled against their own government and flew the U.S. flag outside their building. To counter this perceived insult, Panamanian students attempted to add their flag to the school. The Panamanian students' demonstration generated widespread riots throughout Panama City and Colón.”^{lxxxvii}

Contrary to what Greene stated, the United States flag raising by American students was a clear insult to Panamanian students and to Panama itself. United States imperialism is noticeably seen through the fact that it maintained a powerful influence upon the Canal Zone and Panama itself. Moreover, as an unintentional consequence, United States imperialism ultimately led American students to rebel against their own government.

Richard Anderson Falk was once Professor Emeritus of International Law at Princeton University. In 1978, Falk wrote *Panama Treaty Trap*. In it, Falk depicted how the Torrijos-Carter Treaties were not favorable for Panama. Moreover, Falk argued that problems first arose from Panamanian negotiators. Through this argument, Falk can be viewed as a less imperialist because he ignored the acts of United States imperialism in the past.

As observed, the Panama Canal has been a controversial subject between Latin America and the United States for many years. The Torrijos-Carter Treaties of September 7, 1977, certainly intensified their relations. “The new arrangements for the Panama Canal are regressive and unwise, if not utterly imperial. They make no genuine adjustment to changing international realities, and thus they are unlikely to remain acceptable to the Panamanian people for very long, nor should they.”^{lxxxvii} Once again, through United States imperialism towards Panama there is more of a strenuous relationship between them. “Problems emerged when the Panamanian negotiators gave their own version of the U.S. role in Panama.”^{lxxxvii} Contrary to what Falk argued of problems, problems did not arise from Panamanian negotiators, but instead they came from United States imperialism as far back as when Panama first became an independent nation.

Andrew S. Zimbalist is Professor of Economics at Smith College. John Weeks had been Professor of Economics at Middlebury College. In 1991, they wrote the book *Panama at the Crossroads: Economic Development and Political Change in the Twentieth Century*. In it, they accurately displayed what the Torrijos-Carter Treaties were. Moreover, they argued that the United States should not need to continue paying the whole cost of the upkeep of the Panama Canal. In doing so, they are essentially supportive of some of the acts of United States imperialism of the past by stating that they did not constitute for the United States to pay the whole cost of the upkeep of the Panama Canal. From what they argued in concern to payment of the upkeep of the Panama Canal, they can both be regarded as less imperialists.

As examined, there were still many issues concerning the Panama Canal between Panama and the United States in the 1970's. The Torrijos-Carter Treaties were a response to some of these issues. Moreover, the Torrijos-Carter Treaties ultimately had an unforgettable impact on the Panama Canal, and on the relations between Panama and the United States. The Torrijos-Carter Treaties are accurately described seen through this quote:

“One treaty concerned the transitional comanagement of the Canal until the year 2000 when the Canal would be fully controlled by Panama; the other treaty concerned the operation of the Canal and its neutrality after December 31, 1999. The treaties contained several elements that many Panamanians saw as unacceptable: the majority control granted to the five U.S. commissioners on the nine-member board of commissioners for the new Canal Commission; the twenty-year-plus length of the transition period before Panama became the sole operator of the Canal; the provision giving the United States the right in perpetuity to safeguard the neutrality of the Canal; and the terms of the economic settlement that inter alia provided for far less revenue for Panama than Torrijos had been calling for.”^{lxxxvii}

Ultimately, through imperialism the United States ensured control over the Panama Canal for years to come. Additionally, imperialism had also granted the United States with an unfair advantage in what it attained from the Torrijos-Carter Treaties. “As long as the United States is just one of the many users of these facilities, there is no reason the U.S. service payment should cover the entire costs of upkeep.”^{lxxxvii} Contrary to what Zimbalist and Weeks argued concerning payment, the United States should continue to pay the entirety of the Panama Canal because the United States constructed it, and is hanging on to it in every imperialistic way that it can.

John Quigley was once Professor of Law at the Moritz College of Law at the Ohio State University. In 1990, Quigley wrote the book *The Invasion of Panama and International Law*. In it, Quigley depicted how the United States acted unjustifiably in its ultimate decision to invade Panama. Quigley can be perceived as a less imperialist in the he never displayed Panamanian perspectives concerning the United States ultimate decision to invade Panama. Furthermore, it can be inferred that Quigley did this to prohibit any potential additional unfavorable feelings from his readers towards the United States.

Like in the 1970's, the United States played a role in Panama during the 1980's as well. In particular, the United States invasion of Panama on December 20, 1989 was one of the various roles the United States played in Panama during the 1980's. Some of the realities the United States ignored in its decision making to invade Panama are seen through this quote:

“However, there had been no interference with the Canal, which had operated normally. Panama had not breached its treaty obligation to permit the unimpeded transit of ships. Moreover, under the Panama Canal Treaty and the Neutrality Treaty, the United States has no unilateral right to intervene militarily. In the Neutrality Treaty, the United States and Panama agreed to maintain “the regime of neutrality”, but did not agree on a right for the United States to send troops against the government of Panama, even if that might be necessary to defend the Canal.”^{lxxxvii}

In terms of Panama, the United States generally used imperialism as a means to attain what it desired. The things that were occurring with the Panama Canal and Panama itself at the time did not call for a United States invasion. Essentially, the Torrijos-Carter Treaties were ignored by the United States in order for it to gain a greater influence upon the future of the Panama Canal and Panama itself.

Peter Michael Sanchez was Associate Professor of Political Science at Loyola University in Chicago. In 2002, Sanchez wrote *THE END OF HEGEMONY? PANAMA AND THE UNITED STATES*. In it, Sanchez argued that the United States was focused on maintaining hegemony in the United States. Furthermore, Sanchez can be seen as a less imperialist through one of the things he said in his interpretation of the side effects of the United States invasion of Panama. From Sanchez's interpretation, the motives behind the imperialist United States role in Panama were downplayed.

After the United States invasion of Panama, Panama was left in shambles. “Whether intended or not, this seemed to be a recipe to generate support for a continued US military presence, since many analysts and Panamanians in general assumed that such a presence was a *sine qua non* for Panama's economic and political stability, and since without a military Panama would be hard-pressed to meet its treaty obligations to defend the canal.”^{lxxxvii} Ultimately, Panama had an insufficient economy and no military after the United States invasion of Panama.

Moreover, contrary to what Sanchez stated concerning intentions, the United States did intend for those results for Panama so it could maintain its strong presence there.

At one point, Michael Lee Conniff had been Professor of History at San Jose State University. In 2001, Conniff wrote the book *Panama and the United States: The Forced Alliance*. In it, Conniff argued that the relationship between Panama and the United States was a forced an unequal alliance through imperialism by the United States. Moreover, it is through Conniff's interpretation of ownership of the Panama Canal that he can be viewed as a less imperialist.

Although not many if any treaties were being made in the 1990's between Panama and the United States, there were still various treaties that were in effect. Such as the Torrijos-Carter Treaties, which among other things allowed Panama to finally have possession of one of its main desires. "The danger of potentially explosive areas in the lands returned by the United States left a bitter taste in Panamanians' mouths. Furthermore, Panama complained that canal and military records did not provide adequate maps of utility grids, many of which were very old. Yet for better or worse, the canal and bases were now fully Panamanian."^{lxxxvii} Panama officially became in control over the Panama Canal after going through years of controversy. United States imperialism was so substantial that it actually prevented Panama from becoming whole until after numerous years. Furthermore, contrary to what Conniff interpreted, it was for the better that Panama controlled the Panama Canal simply because they were able to retain a great sense of national pride that was missing during the ownership of the imperialist United States.

Michael E. Donoghue was once Assistant Professor at the University of Connecticut at Storrs. In 2014, Donoghue wrote the book *Borderland on the Isthmus*. In it, Donoghue displayed the tense relation between Panama and the United States. Moreover, Donoghue argued that the Canal Zone was initially designed for only certain aspects pertaining to the Panama Canal. From this argument, Donoghue can be regarded as a less imperialist in that he acknowledge other specific aspects such as the United States desire to implement the American way of life. Furthermore, it can be inferred that Donoghue did this to ward off any potential additional unfavorable sentiments from his readers towards the United States.

Historically, the negative effects of United States imperialism towards Latin America were seen. Ultimately, United States imperialism caused the United States to be more cautious concerning its relations with Panama in at least some aspects in the 1990's. "Authorities actually arranged a hasty handover ceremony more than two weeks before the official transfer, on December 14. Part of the reason for this rested with the troubled legacy of the old borderland, site of so many anti-American riots and protests."^{lxxxvii} Aware of how the negative effects of United States imperialism had affected the relations between Panama and the United States, the United States moved up the handover ceremony before the official handover of the Panama Canal to Panama to fend off any potential protests and riots.

Prior to and ever since the Panama Canal was opened, the Canal Zone, the Panama Canal itself, and Panama itself have been impacted by United States imperialism. "The Panama Canal

Zone began as a territorial entity designed “for the construction, maintenance, and protection” of a transoceanic canal.^{»lxxxvii} Contrary to what Donoghue argued of the Canal Zone’s design, it was not solely designed for the construction, maintenance, and protection of the Panama Canal, but also as an area to implement the American way of life. Moreover, this can be observed by when the Panama Canal first opened, the Canal Zone began to differ from local society in various ways such as country club prosperity.

The time period an author wrote in assists in shaping whether he or she was an imperialist or a less imperialist. Generally, an author’s writing is more detailed and more balanced when it is wrote at least five years after the event it discussed. Consequently, there are primarily mostly authors that can be seen as less imperialists when writing about an event after at least five years of when it occurred. Therefore, there are principally authors that can be seen as imperialist when writing about an event within at most five years of when it happened. Moreover, what an author wrote about in concern to a specific event of that time period assists in shaping whether he or she is an imperialist or a less imperialist.

In regard to the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903, Bigelow can be seen as an imperialist, where as Alstyne can be seen as a less imperialist. In reference to the opening of the Panama Canal in 1914, Thatcher can be seen as an imperialist, which was unlike Smith who can be perceived as a less imperialist. In concern to the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty of 1922, Hill can be viewed as an imperialist, and in contrast Hogan can be seen as a less imperialist. In relation to the General Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1936, Padelford can interestingly be seen as a less imperialist, and Wheeler can be observed as a less imperialist as well. Pertaining to the two agreements of 1942, Woolsey can be viewed as an imperialist, where as Humphreys can be considered as a less imperialist.

In reference to the Remon-Eisenhower Treaty of 1955, Flood can be seen as an imperialist, and Jacobs can surprisingly be perceived as imperialist as well. In concern to the Martyrs’ Day riots of 1964, Fox can be seen as an imperialist, which was unlike Greene who can be viewed as a less imperialist. In relation to the Torrijos-Carter Treaties of 1977, Falk can be observed as a less imperialist, and both Zimbalist and Weeks can be seen as less imperialists as well. In reference to the United States decision to invade Panama in 1989, Quigley can be perceived as a less imperialist, while Sanchez can be seen as a less imperialist too. In regard to Panama officially controlling the Panama Canal in 1999, Conniff can be observed as a less imperialist, which was like Donoghue who can be viewed as a less imperialist as well.

As time goes on, there are more actions and events that take place. Consequently, when reviewing history we can compare these actions and events to other actions and events that took place in the past. Through doing this, we can learn what has went wrong in history among other things. In regard to the Panama Canal, we can see where the United States went wrong with its imperialist ways. Moreover, by the late 1960’s, most authors shifted their views from imperialist to less imperialist. This was due to a higher awareness and knowledge of the United States imperialism done towards various aspects regarding the Panama Canal.

Ultimately, it is quite indisputable that the Panama Canal is one of the most significant connections between Latin America and the United States. Without the Panama Canal, it can potentially be inferred that relations between Latin America and the United States would be different today. As long as authors using United States historical perspectives continue to maintain at most a less imperialist view, then nearly complete views of the relations between Latin America and the United States will be provided in the future.

The Nicaraguan Civil War: A Cold War Conflict and an Anti-Imperial Struggle

Anthony Franco

The Cold War is often seen simplistically as an ideological struggle between the world's two greatest powers in the second half of the 20th century. Such a framework can overemphasize the significance of capitalism and communism and underestimate the importance of international histories that long predate "the bipolar world." A complex history between the United States and Nicaragua manifested itself with U.S. intervention in a bitter Central American civil war with unexpected alliances that made Central America "the most important place in the world for the United States" by the early 1980's, according to then- U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick.^{lxxxvii} Remembered more in the U.S. for its effect on the legacy of Ronald Reagan's presidential administration, the Nicaraguan War of 1979-1990 is instead more significant as an example of the ways in which one's understanding of history can shape their view of the present. Nicaragua's unique place in Cold War history went far beyond simplistic notions of capitalism versus communism for the members of the Frente Sandinista Liberación Nacional, the left-wing ruling party whom the U.S. had helped to remove from power by 1990. It was rather, for many of those involved, a legacy of U.S. imperialism and a continuation of a tradition of U.S. challenges to Nicaraguan sovereignty in pursuit of political and geographic goals.

The uniqueness of the Nicaraguan situation was unappreciated, however, by many U.S. leaders and intellectuals, most notably the Reagan administration, who instead framed the war in the context of recent U.S. history. They instead reemphasized the "domino theory" of the 1950's, which held that all forms of worldwide communism were of the same strand and naturally self-expanding, so that immediate efforts needed to be taken to contain it, and eventually roll it back. The differing understandings of the conflict's roots, and of its potential future consequences, between the FSLN and the Reagan administration and its supporters served only to exacerbate tensions. The disconnect between the FSLN and the U.S. Republican Party was jointly a reflection of ideological tension and conflicting self-interests. The amicable relationship between the U.S. and the Nicaraguan governments in the decades immediately preceding the 1980's is worth reflecting on briefly before analyzing the Nicaraguan Civil War itself.

The Somoza family, which seized power in Nicaragua after a prior civil war in 1936, had made Nicaragua a strategically useful ally for the United States during the early portion of the Cold War. In 1960, President Eisenhower even declared that the United States and Central America, of which the Somozas' Nicaragua was a critical piece, were "new partners" in confronting an uncertain future.^{lxxxvii} Internally, however, conditions were less than stellar, with wealth distribution, educational policy and inadequate health services presenting major challenges, with the corrupt Somozas exploiting, rather than alleviating, national problems. Despite the shortcomings of the Somoza regime, the Eisenhower administration remained supportive of a perceived vital ally.^{lxxxvii} Ambiguity between Nicaragua's strategic value as an

ally and its internal difficulties was not unique to the 1950's; rather, it was a recurring theme until the end of the Cold War, most notably espoused with the Nicaraguan Civil War from 1979-1990. Located in the U.S.'s "backyard," Nicaragua would transform from a crucial ally during the Eisenhower regime, one which could be referred to as, even if not treated as, an equal partner in a chaotic and bipolar world, into a perceived threat to U.S. security with the rise in popularity of the FSLN in the mid-1970's.

The Reagan administration portrayed the left-wing government as terroristic, while proclaiming the sympathetic insurgent forces as moral defenders of freedom, virtue and democracy. Despite Reagan's assertions, American interference in the Nicaraguan Civil War was *not* a result of ideological discord, but instead a reflection of the intertwined political histories of the two nations. Closing the gap between rhetoric and reality with regards to the U.S.'s role in the Nicaraguan Civil War requires both an understanding of the domestic political climate in the U.S., of the membership and self-perception of the FSLN, and of the ways in which these two factors were interrelated. Domestic situations in each of the two nations and the history of repeated U.S. interventions in Nicaragua clarify the discrepancy between the Reagan administration's and the FSLN's perceptions of the conflict.

U.S. relations to Nicaragua were shaped profoundly by geography. One Republican U.S. Senator aptly summarized the geographical rationale for U.S. intervention in Nicaragua by noting that "those Sandinistas, those Communists, are closer to me in Louisiana than I am to New York City."^{lxxxvii} In doing so, the Senator duly managed to emphasize the potential immediacy of an attack and, by generalizing the FSLN under the blanket term "communists," frame the Nicaraguan Civil War as simply a microcosm of a bipolar Cold War, rather than acknowledging the complicated transnational histories of the two countries.

While nominally a Nicaraguan "civil" war, the domestic political landscape in the United States had a significant effect on the sequence of events. One's opinion on intervention became a deeply partisan one, with a largely Republican coalition proposing intervention to serve objectives foreign and domestic. Although those who pushed for intervention were mostly staunch anti-Communists who were no doubt threatened by what they perceived to be a Soviet puppet government on their doorstep, the onset of the Nicaraguan conflict in 1979 was also useful to Republicans seeking to achieve domestic political objectives. The most significant of these, of course, was control of the White House, with then-nominee Reagan repeatedly challenging President Carter's Central American policies as too relaxed and too tolerant of communism.^{lxxxvii} Reagan's proposed hardline stance was supported by a New Right coalition of neo-Conservatives, war hawks, and evangelicals, each of whom had their own reasons for supporting more aggressive action than Carter had been willing to authorize.

Neo-Conservatives, a broad group of U.S. nationalists and anti-Communists increasingly frustrated by the détente policy of the 1970's, saw Central America (El Salvador and Nicaragua in particular) both as a legitimate threat to national security and as an opportunity to replace an unpopular presidential administration.^{lxxxvii} To see the FSLN as an immediate national security threat, despite a lack of evidence that the FSLN was particularly closely tied to the Soviet Union or planning to take action against the United States, required a belief in the "domino theory" that had impacted U.S. foreign policy since the 1950's, which meant framing the Nicaraguan Civil War in a strict Cold War context, rather than in acknowledging the situation as a unique,

complex event. Most neoconservative U.S. Americans viewed the rise of the FSLN less as a legacy of decades of U.S. interference in Nicaragua than as a threatening communist satellite presenting a clear, immediate threat, one which needed to be dealt with strongly and swiftly. After the U.S.'s humiliation in Vietnam, some even saw Central America as presenting an opportunity to reaffirm U.S. world power and regional hegemony.^{lxxxvii} With national security at stake, or so they intimated, a regime change was necessary. A president open to "negotiate with anyone anywhere," as Jeane Kirkpatrick scornfully characterized Carter after he had lost the election, was willingly weakening U.S. power in favor of non-confrontation and acquiescence.^{lxxxvii} Carter's encouragement of democratization in Nicaragua to quell the anti-Somoza unrest was antithetical to Kirkpatrick's ideas. She instead staunchly advocated for an early intervention to support the Somoza dictatorship for pragmatic reasons; she argued that an increasing idealism, manifested in a left-wing socialist government in Nicaragua, would lead to an unstable and uncontrollable government that threatened U.S. security and domestic Nicaraguan society.^{lxxxvii} No matter how unsavory the Somoza regime, the Sandinistas were even more so, she claimed, acknowledging that "the choices" on which regimes to support "are frequently unattractive." Kirkpatrick's neoconservative realism relied entirely on an understanding of the Nicaraguan Civil War as a Cold War phenomenon, rather than as an isolated incident.

Although likely the most influential backers of intervention in Nicaragua, neoconservatives were not alone in doing so. Religious evangelicals adopted moralistic rhetoric, rather than the cold foreign policy pragmatism offered by Kirkpatrick, for supporting a hardline policy in response to the Sandinistas. While it is easy to understand why Christian zealots opposed the spread of the atheistic Moscow bolshevism, their situation in Nicaragua was much more complicated, with the many high-ranking FSLN members devout Catholics.^{lxxxvii} Instead, their support of the insurgent forces was nationalistic in nature; similarly to the neoconservatives, they saw Vietnam as a potential precursor to a U.S. decline, which would inevitably bring a decline in worldwide religiosity and morality.^{lxxxvii} In supporting the sympathetic contras on nationalist grounds, the religious right believed themselves to be fighting to preserve a worldwide morality that only a strong U.S. influence could provide. Manifested as humanitarian aid, cash was funneled from U.S.-based Christian organizations to the insurgents with moral justifications. While some of these funds were purely humanitarian in nature and invaluable resources (schools and medical clinics, vital to a nation in poverty with the highest infant mortality rates and lowest life expectancies in the region, were established), others served as military aid for a collection of rebel groups with oftentimes detestable actions. High-ranking contra officials were often quite open in discussing murders, rapes and tortures of civilian Sandinista sympathizers, while one U.S. official noted that contra forces had a "tendency to kidnap young girls."^{lxxxvii} With a history of such horrific actions, the contra forces were likely to make for a difficult case for the promotion of the betterment associated with American intervention.

Demonization of the FSLN, and subsequent veneration of the insurgents, became a necessity for those willing to support intervention on moral grounds, a practice that was adopted wholeheartedly by the Reagan administration itself. A striking 1985 pamphlet described the FSLN in such terms as "evil," "puppets," and "repressive."^{lxxxvii} The insurgents, on the other hand, were portrayed as "underdogs" and "freedom fighters," a sympathetic force in need of

assistance. However, the most inflammatory characterization came when Reagan included the Sandinistas alongside Qaddafi and Khomeini in a speech on the threat of terrorism to U.S. national security; he also likened them to Nazis, and the CIA worked with contra leaders to spread rumors of FSLN antisemitism that they felt would appeal to the “Jew-controlled American media.”^{lxxxvii} Efforts to promote moralism spread beyond the politicians and insurgent leaders, however. Grassroots conservative organizations sponsored television and newspaper advertising to promote the sympathetic contras as well as offering private money for arms build-up.^{lxxxvii} Situating the Nicaraguan Civil War in a Cold War mindset, the Reagan coalition acted decisively and successively to delegitimize the FSLN regime. Dr. Alejandro Bendaña, a former FSLN party member and an historian of Nicaraguan diplomacy, notes that “the relentless U.S. destabilization campaign and the crippling economic embargo embittered much of the population against the Sandinista government.”^{lxxxvii} While Bendaña’s past sympathy for the FSLN may predispose him to attribute outside factors, rather than internal leadership failures, to its collapse, he reserves criticism for the Sandinista leadership’s shortsightedness and exploitation of political positions.^{lxxxvii} Rather than overemphasizing U.S. involvement to scapegoat Reagan and to absolve the FSLN of blame for its eventual downfall, Bendaña contextualizes U.S. intervention as a significant factor in the Nicaraguan Civil War, but not as the sole actor. In order to understand why the Sandinistas so deeply threatened so many U.S. Americans, it is necessary to understand how they thought of themselves and what made their original rise possible.

Originally formed in opposition to the Somoza regime in 1961, the FSLN considered itself to be a nationalist vanguard movement.^{lxxxvii} Its founder, Carlos Fonseca, noted that its constituency was motivated, in the words of historian Dennis Gilbert, “more by shame than by conscience.” That nationalistic shame was rooted largely in the ineptitude of the Somoza government, which Fonseca attributed to the lasting history of U.S. imperialism. The social conditions in the country in the early 1970’s spurred the rise of anti-Somoza sentiment, with the average life expectancy in Nicaragua nearly 20 years shorter than in neighboring countries, illiteracy rates near 50 percent and the highest infant mortality rate in Central America.^{lxxxvii} Despite an agro-export boom that spurred extraordinary economic growth at the close of the 1960’s and the beginning of the next decade, wealth maldistribution left just 15 percent of the income for the bottom half of the country’s population.

The Somozas’ self-enrichment and flaunting of their wealth in the midst of these brutal social conditions left many Nicaraguans embittered against the regime. Perhaps the final blow to the Somozas was a natural disaster. A 1972 earthquake in Managua that reached 6.5 on the Richter scale and killed thousands^{lxxxvii} led to a swift response from the international community, which poured in aid for the relief efforts. Rather than orchestrate a massive rebuild of the city, however, the Somozas funneled a large portion of the aid money to themselves, with their exploitation of the situation even alienating many elites who had previously benefitted from the country’s unequal wealth distribution.^{lxxxvii} With their hold on power tenuous, the Somoza government began to actively repress opposition, culminating in the assassination of an influential elite critic, Pedro Chamorro Cardenal.^{lxxxvii} The combination of these events produced a relatively surprising outcome- elites increasingly shifted their allegiance toward the mounting FSLN resistance, despite its socialist tendencies. This can partially be explained by the Sandinistas’ ideological flexibility. Despite the neoconservatives’ fears, the FSLN was not, at its core, an ardent revolutionary communist force. Instead, it was a conglomerate of socialists and

left-wing capitalists motivated more by a disgust for the Somozas than by an ideological devotion to Joseph Stalin.^{lxxxvii} In fact, Fonseca, the party's founder and figurehead, constantly warned against ideological inflexibility, instead proposing a modified nationalist socialism more reflective of Nicaraguan history.^{lxxxvii} Rather than an irrational Marxist "puppet," as Reagan would later define his party's leadership, Fonseca was a calculated pragmatist and anti-imperialist. He proposed a two-stage, gradual revolution applicable only to Nicaragua: national liberation from, as he termed it, "white man's exploitation of man," followed by the adoption of a democratic Socialist government.^{lxxxviii} It is significant that anti-imperialism, rather than the establishment of socialism, was Fonseca's *primary* goal, a reflection more of the largely negative legacy of Nicaragua-U.S. relations than of a simplistic adherence to Moscow. Because of this history, exacerbated by the corruption of the Somoza government and the perceived connections between the Somozas and the United States, the FSLN adopted an inherently anti-U.S. policy, even adopting the name of Augusto Sandino, the famous Nicaraguan anti-imperialist who led a guerilla war in opposition to U.S. forces in the 1920's. Despite this inherent anti-Americanism, it is unclear that the FSLN, either in its formative stages or after it had seized power, ever presented the dire threat to U.S. security that the Reagan administration, or many of its hawkish supporters, perceived it to be. Instead, the rise of the FSLN and the party's message can better be explained in the context of Nicaraguan history than through Cold War dynamics.

The FSLN demonstrated, as they came into power, a willingness to prioritize political and diplomatic practicality above ideological devotion. As the party was in its nascent stages during the 1960's, Fonseca's rhetoric was overtly conflictual. Studying what she calls the "evolution of a strategy," Matilde Zimmermann notes that early FSLN propaganda "expressed a confidence that bore no relationship to its size, political influence, or military accomplishments" and "showed no inclination to compromise with other opposition forces."^{lxxxvii} Fonseca attacked intellectuals, elites and members of other left-wing, nominally Socialist parties (or sometimes his own) as being indifferent to societal ills, while maintaining that, as he titled one speech, "The Guerrilla Movement is Invincible." Synthesizing generic Marxist theory on the inevitability of the rich's exploitation of the poor with a specifically national problem concerning the exclusivity of higher education in Nicaragua, Fonseca implored sympathetic students to promote an "unequivocally radical revolutionary ideology" that offered an alternative to the status quo for the poor in 1968.^{lxxxvii} By the 1970's, however, the FSLN had begun to walk back their overt rhetoric in favor of gaining more mainstream support. Upon the Somozas' butchering of the Managua earthquake relief effort in 1972 and fearing the potential instability of the corrupt regime, many elites began to shift support in favor of the FSLN as an alternative to the ruling dynasty. This seemingly contradictory shift (elites supporting an overtly socialist regime) can be explained through self-interest and hubris on the part of the elites. One businessman noted to historian Rose Spalding in hindsight that many elites failed to recognize the FSLN as a legitimate political force, instead viewing the Sandinistas as a means to their own political end. "They thought they could put (the Sandinistas) in the field to care of the guard. Then they would step in and take over when Somoza fell. If there was a problem, the United States would stop the Sandinistas from taking power," the businessman recounted to Spalding.^{lxxxvii} The FSLN's initial efforts upon receiving elite support, however, were just as influential in consolidating their power and demonstrated a shift in the party from fervent ideologues to pragmatic national leaders. Spalding notes that, partially driven by the results of the 1980 U.S. presidential election,

in which the avowedly anti-Sandinista candidate won handily, the newly-installed regime in Nicaragua elected to retain much of the elite apparatus in a more gradual transition than had previously been espoused. Nor was this a result of an ideological change; internal party documents indicate that the FSLN continued to regard the bourgeoisie contemptuously.^{lxxxvii} Instead, this demonstrates the party's willingness to modify ideology to meet more pragmatic goals. Also significant and implicit, both in the businessman's recounting of the elites' thinking and in the FSLN's nervous response to the U.S. election, is that most Nicaraguans viewed the United States as continually willing to intervene in their country if the internal status of the nation failed to meet the U.S.'s liking. Even prior to U.S. intervention in the war, Nicaraguans across political and economic strata situated their contemporary political climate in the nation's long history of U.S. imperialism, not within the Cold War international climate that the Reagan administration visualized. If truly a Moscow puppet installed in Managua, the FSLN would likely have been unwilling to moderate their platform to gather broader support. The party's propaganda, along with Fonseca's early rhetoric, also emphasizes the primacy of nationalism and anti-imperialism, rather than communism, as its focus.

Even in the FSLN's formative stages, the Sandinista "vanguard" was primarily anti-imperial in nature, although closely interlocked with Marxism. Fonseca's "Message to Revolutionary Students" in 1968 not only extolled the students as potential bringers of rapid social change, it also linked the social revolution directly to nationalism. Fonseca opined that a simple transfer of power in government (at that time, the expulsion of Anastasio Somoza as President) was insufficient in effecting holistic national changes: "For this reason, we have the obligation to make sure that the Nicaraguan insurrection has a profound revolutionary content, that it involves radical social change. In the modern history of national liberation struggles, there have been cases when popular insurrections have actually won but haven't resulted in revolutionary governments taking power, cases in which the proletarian revolution has not been victorious."^{lxxxviii} In this speech, he duly draws on a history of revolutions in other nations and simultaneously on the uniqueness of Nicaragua, which he hopes will result in a revolution for "national liberation." While the "proletarian revolution" is undoubtedly a key goal, Fonseca's rhetoric, even as far back as 1968, was more in the spirit of Nicaraguan nationalism than in any sort of strong allegiance to the Soviet Union.

The nationalist spirit of the FSLN is also apparent in much of the imagery that they used to promote their party. One FSLN poster, for example, featured a black-and-white drawing of the party's namesake with his slogan, "Patria libre o morir," with the name "Nicaragua" running over the top, implying a sense of national unity and self-determination brought on by the party. Of course, the use of Sandino's name and likeness was a strong symbolic nationalist gesture as well, evoking the FSLN as the natural successors to Sandino, the famous anti-imperialist. Another party poster featured Sandino again posing confidently and defiantly with his rifle by his side with the party's name and initials surrounding the central figure. The bottom reads simply, "Pro liberación de Nicaragua." Again, the poster symbolically links Sandino with the FSLN as Nicaraguan nationalists, promoting "liberation" and a "free homeland." Interestingly, this poster also features Marxist overtones, with Sandino posing in front of a bright red background. Yet another reads simply "Sandino vive, FSLN." All of these images imply a strong connection to the face of the anti-imperialist movement and promote the idea that the FSLN was extraordinarily nationalist in nature. The absence of references to political opponents is striking;

it is clear that the party hoped to emphasize its unifying ability rather than any semblance of discord or dissent.

The combination of Fonseca's rhetoric on the role of the FSLN, the party's emphasis in its propaganda and its willingness to moderate devout ideology in favor of pragmatic domestic political objectives cast doubt upon the Sandinistas' actual threat to the United States during the 1980's. Rather than as a Cold War microcosm, the left-wing coalition of democratic socialists, religious leaders and radical revolutionaries viewed the international climate through the lens of imperialism, evoking Augusto Sandino as a means of articulating that they saw U.S. imperialism as ongoing and threatening to the nation's sovereignty. Nor was this simply paranoia; even their ideological adversaries, the elite class who had hoped to exploit the FSLN to gain their own stake in the government, saw U.S. intervention as a simple fact of life, one which informed their decision to ally with the Sandinistas in the first place.

On the contrary, the Reagan administration continued to adhere to a decades-old domino theory in viewing Nicaragua. Staunchly anti-communist, the administration situated the rise of the FSLN as the continued spread of a Communist threat that immediately threatened the very existence of the U.S. As expressed by the Louisiana senator, Nicaragua was, for these U.S. Americans, too close geographically to not warrant an immediate response delegitimizing the Sandinista government. The Nicaraguan Civil War is a prime example of the importance of history- differences in historical interpretations profoundly shaped its course of events, with the Sandinistas viewing U.S. operations to support the counterinsurgents as a continuation of decades of imperialism and the U.S. understanding the FSLN's rise as a direct threat to national security.

America and Venezuela: A Tale of Two Freedoms

Nicholas Ottati

In 1998, Hugo Chavez was elected the president of Venezuela. This is often referred to as Venezuela's Bolivarian Revolution; it was also a revolution of Venezuelan-American relations. The effect of their revolution on international relations is evident through the worsening relations between the United States and Venezuela. What is less clear is what made their revolution "Bolivarian" and what it meant to be "Bolivarian". The purpose of my paper is to examine the concept of Bolivarian thought, analyze the implementation of it and determine its impact on the relations between Venezuela and the United States.

The term "Bolivarian" is symbolic of the ideals presented by Simon Bolivar in the Age of Latin American Revolutions. Simon Bolivar was a military and political leader in Latin America who led independence movements in Gran Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. His role in each of these revolutions earned him the name *The Liberator*. The name *Liberator* does seem to have more significance than simply leading independence movements in Latin America. *Liberator* is symbolic of the principles enshrined in the Latin American revolutions, the principles that have come to be known as "Bolivarian".

The principles of Latin American independence were similar to those of American independence, not without its differences, but so much in fact that many Americans referred to Bolivar as the "Washington of South America".^{lxxxvii} Americans looked highly upon the work of Bolivar since his revolution was representative of the same values. Constitutional government, preservation of individual rights and the desire for autonomy were all present in both Latin American and American revolutions. During the height of Latin American revolutions American citizens often found themselves covertly shipping arms to support revolutions in Latin America. In 1820, a Venezuelan admiral admitted that "our savior has been the arrival of a Boston brig full of provisions and sundry necessary articles for our navy, at a time when we were beginning to perish."^{lxxxviii} Although this was not the official policy of the U.S, due to their commitment to neutrality, the United States government indirectly supported the movements by directing arms seekers to private sellers. The support for Bolivar's revolutions were strongly praised and supported by both the United States government and its people. Despite the apparent solidarity of Americans towards Latin Americans, Bolivar found it necessary to warn against the United States since, in his view, the freedom it had conjured allowed it to accomplish any goal.

Bolivar's independence movement differed from the United States' because of his dedication to solve the issue of slavery in Latin America. In the case of the founding fathers, the issue was a balancing act between maintaining individual rights enshrined in the constitution and a deep passion for expanding the liberty promised in the constitution. This often led to ambivalence among the founding fathers, most notably in the case of Thomas Jefferson, who morally made arguments against slavery but recognized the destabilization that would occur in their young nation if they immediately abolished the institution. Simon Bolivar used the same principles of liberty and freedom during his freedom marches in order to free slaves from

bondage. Simon Bolivar insisted that freedom be granted to all members of Latin American society, and so in 1816 “in exchange for arms aid, Bolivar promised Haiti’s president Alexandre Petion that he would free all of the slaves in the lands that he liberated.”^{lxxxvii} This shows the desire of Bolivar to make these principles universal not only out of principle, but out of a desire to facilitate unity in society.

Simon Bolivar condemned social injustices, most obviously in his multiple efforts to free Latin Americans from European rule and unify the newly freed societies. The need to encourage unification rekindled in the mid- 1820’s, due to high levels of dissidents and a risk of Gran Colombia dissolving into separate nations. Under these circumstances, Simon Bolivar reiterated his desire for stable and just societies during constitutional conventions; particularly in the Ocaña Convention of 1828 in which the Constitution of Gran Colombia was meant to be revised. During this convention, Bolivar called for an increase in federal powers in order to decrease the risk of anarchy:

“Consider, legislators, that energetic use of public power is the safeguard against individual weakness, the threat that frightens the unjust, and the hope of society. Consider that the corruption of the people is inspired by the indulgence of the courts and impunity for crimes. Be aware that without force there is no virtue; and without virtue the republic perishes. Consider, finally, that anarchy destroys freedom, and that unity preserves order.”^{lxxxvii}

Many legislators strongly disagreed with Bolivar, blaming the rapid centralization of power for the unrest that was haunting Gran Colombia. Bolivar’s proposal was denied and countered with a more federal approach, which was denied by Bolivar supporters. Bolivar’s response to the lack of support was to sign the organic decree of August 27, 1828, in which Bolivar “gave himself the right to issue decrees with force of law on any subject, to repeal laws, to name and remove all state employees.”^{lxxxvii} With the signing of this decree, Simon Bolivar effectively became a dictator of Gran Colombia.

By this time, Simon Bolivar was also a totalitarian leader in Peru and was serving a life term presidency in Bolivia. His consolidation of power in the executive created doubt among many American onlookers, who questioned his commitment to freedom. Administrations in Washington were also skeptical of Bolivar’s intentions based on the opinions of various American representatives to Latin American countries. William Tudor in Peru went so far to claim Simon Bolivar was a “madman”, while William Henry Harrison, the future U.S president, openly sympathized and consorted with Bolivar’s opposition.^{lxxxvii} Bolivar recognized the staunch opposition to his leadership that was rising in Washington politics and it was under these circumstances that he penned his famous words to a British official in 1829 “The United States... seem[s] destined by Providence to plague America with torments in the name of freedom.”^{lxxxvii}

Simon Bolivar consistently condemned America in his writings, while simultaneously praising America, sometimes in the same writing. For example, Bolivar once said, “I think it would be better for South America to adopt the Koran rather than the United States’ form of government, although the latter is the best on earth.”^{lxxxvii} I believe this further shows the tendency of Bolivar to appreciate freedom while believing

that the people cannot be trusted to safeguard their own liberty. A belief further exemplified in his Angostura Address, when he claimed that American institutions would be ineffective in solidifying the freedom of Latin American peoples, due to the concern that they “had been given over to ‘the threefold yoke of ignorance, tyranny, and vice.’”^{lxxxvii}

On a fundamental level, Simon Bolivar’s cries for liberty and freedom resonate with a colonized populace. Simon Bolivar, through his role as life president in Bolivia, dictator of Peru and dictator of Gran Colombia, showed his willingness to become a totalitarian statesman as a means to an end. While this “end” was meant to be freedom, Bolivar adopted characteristics of the same European monarchs which he sought to expel from Latin America. I argue that Hugo Chavez shares this trait with Simon Bolivar. Hugo Chavez spoke highly of Latin American unity and the need for social equality and like Bolivar, relied on heavy handedness of law to enforce his idea of freedom. Therefore, what made Venezuela’s revolution “Bolivarian” was not only a desire to abolish social inequality, but the willingness to use a powerful executive to reach such a goal.

Growing up, Hugo Chavez felt very strongly about the social inequality that existed in Venezuela. He was one of six children in a working class family in a small farming village. This was not a recipe for positive mobility, in fact it often left his family in serious financial troubles. Simon Bolivar on the other hand was born into a wealthy family with endless opportunities. Bolivar was an inspiration to Hugo Chavez, as we discussed earlier, the term “Bolivarian” was adopted by Chavez as a description of his revolution. Chavez felt that by utilizing Bolivar’s status as a national hero he could further legitimize his own rule and in some ways he did his best to follow in the footsteps of his idol.

In early adulthood, both men had entered the military academy and upon graduation enlisted in the military. Simon Bolivar earned a reputation amongst his colleagues as a capable military officer, even after his defeat as a colonel at Puerto Caballo, an obstacle to his reputation that he would overcome. Chavez’s reputation was earned through his own military skills which eventually rewarded him with leadership over an elite Para trooping unit. Chavez capitalized on his strong reputation by garnering a following of over 12,000 men to lead a coup attempt against the sitting elites of Venezuela; similar to how Bolivar had led his armies against the Spanish, earning himself the nickname “The Liberator”. Chavez’s actions left him in a prison cell but not before he gained international fame as a Venezuelan hero. In some ways, Chavez’s time in prison only aided in his eventual rise to power, since many Venezuelans perceived it to be punishment for trying to stand up for the livelihoods of the majority of Venezuelans.

The system which gave rise to Hugo Chavez can be credited to the hegemony of the United States in the hemisphere. Its military prowess, willingness to intervene in Latin America, promotion of free markets and ability to enforce economic dependency on Latin American nations are all factors of the U.S hegemony.^{lxxxviii} Venezuela’s dependence on the United States began when oil was found in Venezuela under Dictator Juan Gomez. The United States immediately took interest and began investing in Venezuela, becoming a top trading partner; even convincing them to lower oil prices. The

World Bank had predicted that U.S investment in Venezuela would amount to \$855 million in 1948, rising from approximately \$500 million at the end of World War 2.^{lxxxvii} This investment was vital for Venezuela's economy. Information published by the World Bank shows that in 1948 all production and refining of oil in Venezuela was done at the hands of foreign companies; further, more than 50 percent of oil production and refining was done by American oil corporations.^{lxxxviii} The investment of foreign capital into Venezuela's economy disproportionately shifted the bargaining power of Venezuela in respect to other nations. Foreign companies and the Venezuelan government had decided to split profits fifty-fifty in order to limit the shift of power balance between the government and petroleum companies. However, by 1945, taxation on foreign profits of petroleum made up 55 percent of Venezuela's budget.^{lxxxvii}

In the 1960's, the price of oil per barrel began to rise sharply, reaching about \$35 by 1981 (Note: dollar amounts measured in value of the 1984 US Dollar); at which point oil prices began to fall drastically reaching a low of about \$6 a barrel in 1998, the year Chavez was elected.^{lxxxvii} Over this time period, Venezuela became increasingly reliant on oil profits in order to maintain a significant welfare state and to secure power for governing officials. Further, as Venezuela became more reliant on exporting oil the United States became more reliant on importing Venezuelan oil. The United States has received 60 percent of Venezuela's oil exports, making up about 11 percent of the United States' oil imports; these percentages have been relatively stable since the 1980's.^{lxxxvii} Further analyzing reveals that as the price of oil per barrel fell, so too did Venezuela's per Capita Oil Income and Capita Fiscal Income, which maintained steady lows of about \$400 and \$200 respectively from 1986 until 1998 when they began to increase.^{lxxxvii} The data shows that turbulence in Venezuelan politics, and the resulting rise of Chavez, largely coincides with fall of oil profits and therefore inability to maintain the welfare state and power security.

Hugo Chavez rose to the political scene as an anti-establishment figure, in the political climate previously discussed, promising radical reform to the ruling system in Venezuela. He was not a member of either political class which granted him social legitimacy, since the Venezuelan people felt betrayed by the ruling parties. Chavez's movement to pedestalize democracy turned into what Javier Corrales and Michael Penfold refer to as a "Hybrid Regime". This regime appears democratic but it possesses autocratic practices as well; it effectively allows for opposition but does not allow for an equal playing field between parties. After Chavez took office in 1999 he immediately ratified a new constitution which "eroded checks and balances within congress and between the legislative and executive branches."^{lxxxvii} In 2004, Hugo Chavez faced strict opposition that called for his recall from the presidency. Chavez survived this movement and used it as justification for greater executive powers, just as Simon Bolivar did in the Ocaña conference and with his Organic decree.

Chavez faced opposition from the United States, who wished to maintain the hemispheric status quo. Chavez also understood that he could not shift the status quo by facing down the United States military. Therefore, he began an effort to decrease reliance on the United States as a trading partner, aiming his crosshairs at their economy. Chavez

knew that Venezuela was nearly 100 percent reliant on oil exports and 60 percent of their oil exports went to the United States.^{lxxxvii} Effectively meaning, the United States economy had more control over the well-being of Venezuela than Venezuela's economy. The first step for Chavez to decrease reliance on American markets was to integrate Venezuela's economy with the economies of South America in order to shift the balance of bargaining power. Venezuela then undertook various ventures with other South American economies in order decrease reliance on American markets as a destination for oil exports. Lastly, Chavez made an attempt to diversify the Venezuelan economy. An effort that has evidently failed based on a recent statistic by OPEC stating that the oil and gas sector makes up approximately 25 percent of Venezuela's GDP.^{lxxxvii} These efforts to diminish reliance on the United States coincided with the nationalization of Venezuela's largest oil company, PDVSA, and a decree by Chavez in 2006 that nationalized foreign oil fields, raising government ownership of oil from 40 to 60 percent.^{lxxxvii} The United States was particularly unhappy with this gesture because, historically, they had been one of the highest investors in Venezuelan oil and they had been stripped of their investment. The nationalization of the PDVSA was also disturbing to the United States because they have a significant hand in U.S domestic refineries and own a U.S subsidiary, CITGO.

Two major American losers of Venezuela's nationalization of oil fields were ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips. These companies refused to cooperate with Chavez's nationalization and so Chavez simply stripped them of their investments. Both companies attempted to negotiate with the Venezuelan government to receive compensation for their investments but independently they failed. The United States, under George Bush, stepped into the situation to help move the process along in favor of the two American companies; this undoubtedly only added to the disdain that the two leaders held for one another. The companies ultimately filed international arbitration claims, which resulted in a \$1.6 billion payday for ExxonMobil while the ConocoPhillips case is ongoing.^{lxxxvii}

The battle over oil companies was much more complicated than just companies being compensated for their misfortunes. Chavez sought to raise oil prices, indirectly putting themselves at odds with their fellow OPEC members. This led to closer relations with both Russia and Iran, two anti-western countries.^{lxxxvii} This was a meaningful shift in international relations when considering that these 3 nations control more than 20 percent of the world's oil output. As a major consumer of oil, the United States could not afford to allow oil prices to rise and the weight of high oil prices were felt by most Americans in 2008 when a gallon of gas costed over \$4 per gallon. Meanwhile, in Venezuela, the populace was appeased by growing welfare spending and a seemingly vibrant economy. Chavez capitalized on high oil prices to solidify his Bolivarian Republic by nationalizing more industries and rewarding the population with welfare spending. It seemed as though he may have gained an upper hand on the U.S. However, in September of 2008 the market crashed, sending the global economy, including oil prices, into a rapid decline.

Much time has been spent on the economic problems that exist within the U.S-Venezuelan relationship. It has been concluded that Hugo Chavez used unfavorable economic relations as a way to gain power in a society that faced large gaps between the ruling elites and the normal citizen. He then changed Venezuelan policy accordingly in

order to promote economic independence from the United States, a shift that was unfavorable for the United States' balance of power in the hemisphere. However, economics was not the only reason that relations between the two nations had soured. The stark differences in ideology and what each country viewed to be freedom would also play a significant role in the termination of relations.

As I previously stated, being “Bolivarian” was a desire to abolish social inequality with the use of a heavy handed executive. President George W. Bush's, on the other hand, practiced the promotion of representative global democracy through U.S foreign policy. Hugo Chavez continuously tried to undermine Bush's legitimacy on this front and it was particularly costly to the Bush Administration. Many world leaders began accusing President Bush of attempting to spread U.S influence into more nations. In 2007, there was evidence that suggested that Authoritarian regimes were gaining influence over the public, while there was little expansion of global Democracy.^{lxxxvii} Speaking to the rise of Authoritarian regimes, Chavez's government was consolidating more and more power under the executive branch.

The accumulation of power by Chavez and the growth of his “Hybrid Regime” left many Americans skeptical of his commitment to democracy. During Chavez's reign there was a very public feud with George Bush over Bush's method of democratization. Bush directed funds towards Democratic institutions in Venezuela, while this did not directly endanger Chavez's rule, Chavez felt as though it was a threat to his power. One historian refers to this potential loss of power as “the complete deflation of what is often a megalomaniacal sense of pride and self-importance.”^{lxxxvii}

The legitimacy of Bush's effort was questioned since Chavez was democratically elected and, based on international organizations, the election was both free and fair. “The United States has talked about democracy promotion while funding efforts to undermine the elected Chavez presidency.”^{lxxxvii} However, Bush's support for Chavez's opposition and for Democratic organizations in Venezuela increased due to the apparent lack of commitment to democracy, a suspicion that had been growing since Chavez led a failed coup attempt in 1992. Bush even encouraged Venezuela's neighbors to isolate Venezuela, a diplomatic feat that was not achieved based on Venezuela's integration into the South American economy. The claim exists however, that Bush focused too narrowly on ousting Chavez that he had failed to actually promote the establishment of a sustainable Democracy in Venezuela.^{lxxxvii} Chavez did not take these “Democratization” efforts lightly, he declared the United States to be Venezuela's primary enemy and began to run military exercises with Cuba, in case the United States attacked one of the coalition members.

This was significant for the United States since it reinforced the idea that the United States foreign policy objectives ultimately revolved around imperialism and domination. The logical answer to such a threat was to build up military and form alliances to defend against the potential threat. A similar response is visible in the Middle East where dictators adopted similar ways of opposing U.S influence in their own region.^{lxxxvii} Arab leaders also acted similarly to Chavez in the face of democratic aid from the Bush administration, calling it “a code word for regime change.”^{lxxxvii} The effort

to force regime change is evident in Venezuela based on the recipients of U.S grants. The National Endowment for Democracy which received over \$1 million in grants from the U.S directed significant amount of its funds to a group called Sumate. The goal of this particular group was simply to remove Hugo Chavez from power, whether or not a more Democratic institution would replace him remained to be seen, though it was the ideal result. In other words, Democratic aid to Venezuela was largely aimed at relinquishing the power of the presidency from Chavez instead of fixing the institution itself.

For the final section of this paper we will examine the principles of each countries founding and the implementation of those principles during this tumultuous period. In order to do so we will assume that President Bush's intents in Venezuela were honest, in that he sincerely meant to spread democracy. We will also assume that the goal of President Chavez to eradicate social injustice by way of a powerful bureaucracy were sincere. In each founding, there was a clear contempt for the absolute power of kings. In the case of the United States, contempt for Great Britain; in the context of Venezuela, contempt for Spain.

In the United States' Declaration of Independence, the founding fathers recognize what they believe to be eternal truths. The Founding Fathers then arrive at the conclusion that the best way to protect the unalienable rights of mankind was to ensure that the new government would be subject to the will of the people, while simultaneously advising that "governments should not be changed for light and transient causes."^{lxxxvii} Preceding the founding and the failure of the Articles of Confederation, the Founding Fathers solidified the government by creating a limited government, the purpose of which was to ensure national stability through a federal government while also preventing the bloating of an executive power.

The Venezuelan Declaration of Independence was announced in 1811 and in many ways represented the same values that were present in the U.S Declaration. There are however subtle differences between the two declarations. The Venezuelan Declaration of Independence states that the new state has "full power to take that form of Government which may be conformable to the general will of the people..."^{lxxxviii} This spirit of conformity implies that the governing body be respondent to the populace, but permits that the governing principles can change as a form of response. A feature that it evident in the history of Venezuela, which has been governed by many different Constitutions.

Such a spirit of reform is a key factor in the ability of Chavez to pass the 1999 constitution, and is also a major difference in the principles that existed at each countries founding. The principles that now exist in Venezuela's constitution are opposite to the principles that exist in the American doctrine. This could be a point of contention between Venezuela and the United States when considering their historical struggles against tyranny and their solutions to perceived problems.

Understanding "Bolivarian" to be a heavy handed government to promote freedom, we can understand why an American government dedicated to freedom through limited government may oppose such principles. In the times of Simon Bolivar, the

United States worried about the lack of dedication to republican principles. In the time of Chavez, administrations worried about a growing anti-American sentiment and lack of commitment to Democracy. From the point of view of Bolivar and Chavez, they both worried about the might of the United States and its willingness to intervene for the sake of self-interest or Democracy. These are two contradicting ideas how to practice freedom, they are fundamentally at odds with one another and therefore collide when they meet in practice. While the political collisions have never erupted into full-scale war, there have been strong remarks made against one another. Relations between the two nations are at a low point due to a long history of contention. In order to fix the soured relation both countries will have to become completely accepting of one another or one would have to give up its principles, neither of which is foreseeable in the current state.

lxxxvii **Works Cited**

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