Scripting Revolution

A Historical Approach to the

Comparative Study of Revolutions

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and Dan Edelstein

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The Antislavery Script

_Haiti’s Place in the Narrative of Atlantic Revolution_

One of the great ironies of Haiti’s longtime absence from the comparative canon of revolutions is that the term “revolution” has long been associated with the ideal of liberation from slavery. The theme of emancipation from human bondage is as old as Exodus and as recent as the Arab Spring. As Michael Walzer demonstrated in _Exodus and Revolution_ (1986), the biblical story of the deliverance of the Jews from Egypt has often served as a symbol and rallying cry (if not always as an actual template or script) for modern campaigns against social injustice and oppression.¹ And at the height of the tensions in Tahrir Square, Cairo, that preceded the deposition of Hosni Mubarak in early 2011, a protester intoned that “[w]e prefer to be run over by tanks a hundred times than to live as slaves to Mubarak.”² In Marxist theory, the progression from slaveholding to feudal to capitalist society describes a universally applicable and (as Martin Malia puts it) “logically phased line of social development.”³ We need not embrace even a diffuse version of this classic theory of revolution in order to see that freedom from slavery is a nearly ubiquitous refrain of revolutionary discourse, the quintessential expression of the hopes and dreams of those who purport to transform their societies.⁴

Indeed, the mantra is so ubiquitous that it raises as many questions as it purports to answer—including whether the “antislavery script” is doing any real conceptual work in these competing visions of revolution, only some of which involve actual chattel bondage. It is one thing to express revolutionary hopes in terms of antislavery; it is quite another to make abolition the very standard bearer of revolution. Saint-Domingue (Haiti as of 1804) has become the touchstone for unpacking the problematic nature of abolition in the revolutionary Atlantic world, for only there was the act of national founding expressly predicated on the negation of racialized Atlantic plantation slavery. But even there, ambiguities in the legal understanding of slavery translated into ambiguities in the process of abolition. What, indeed, does it mean, then or now, to be “free from slavery”? The answer requires that one first define the institution from which one wishes to be free. A nonexhaustive list of the conditions—some necessary, others merely sufficient—that went into the making of Atlantic chattel slavery might include: racial subordination; a claim to own individuals as property; the ability to compel another’s labor; the inheritability of future generations of slaves; and a hierarchical relationship between metropole and colony.

Many of the ambiguities of the Haitian Revolution flow from the selective attention that its protagonists gave, at given points in time, to one or another of these elements. But those ambiguities were not peculiar to the revolutionary era, or to Haiti; instead, they stemmed from the complex nature of Atlantic slavery itself. Getting a handle on Haiti’s place within the antislavery tradition, accordingly, requires looking beyond the familiar chain reaction of events that commences with the Seven Years’ War (1754–1763) and crisscrosses the Atlantic between the 1770s and 1789.⁵ The American and French revolutions alike exerted great influence on the Haitian Revolution, but (to paraphrase Tocqueville) that revolution owed less to what was done in either America or France than to what people thought at the time in Saint-Domingue.⁶ And what people thought at the time in Saint-Domingue depended very much on their particular experiences of the particular kind of slave society that had been developing in this immensely profitable corner of the French empire for more than a century before the revolution began in 1789.

The eighteenth-century Atlantic world provided few if any models for the abolition of plantation slavery. Indeed, the very notion that free people of color and slaves in Saint-Domingue might have been acting out a drama first performed elsewhere has a long and troubling history. Medallions of the early French revolutionary period depicted persons of African descent above the words _moi libre aussi_, demonstrating that even sympathy for the cause of racial equality could come shrouded in condescension and a subtle form of racism.⁷ The then prevalent belief that free people of color (not to mention slaves) were incapable of thinking and acting out of their own sense of political and social interests and goals has cast a long shadow over the historiography of the Haitian Revolution.
Insofar as Haiti's revolution involved a script, it derived not from prior or contemporaneous denunciations of political slavery on either side of the North Atlantic, but from experiences and understandings of slavery and racial subordination that were inscribed in the French colonial law of slavery and that preceded the outbreak of revolution in either British North America or France. To say that the law of slavery provided a script for the Haitian Revolution might itself seem to deny the extent of improvisation and innovation that took place during this period. In a colonial context that identified "innovation" in the rules pertaining to racial hierarchy and plantation labor as the worst possible form of treachery, however, tactical appeals to the authority of colonial law served an important purpose for both free people of color and slaves.

Moreover, improvisation was itself a long-standing feature of the administration of slavery in Saint-Domingue, never more so than during the revolutionary period. The dramatic metaphor takes on greater relevance when historicized. In the heart of an early modern French dramatic performance, "audience members and players might come up with interpretations that would subvert the intentions of the image makers." The spectators in the várterre (the pit just in front of the stage) regularly intervened in, and so became part of, the performance unfolding before them, and play scripts did not yet command literal adherence to a preordained text, as they would come to do in the nineteenth century. In this sense, the Code Noir—a script that included some surprising plot lines for the enactment of slavery and racial hierarchy—was often liberally construed, even stretched to the breaking point, by revolutionary actors in Saint-Domingue.

The process culminated in Jean-Jacques Dessalines's 1804 Declaration of Independence, which equated liberation from slavery with total rupture with France. That conflation permitted the first of these imperatives to be obscured in the name of securing the other. And it pointed forward to the ambiguities that would come to characterize emancipation in the very nations that sought to contain Haiti's explosive precedent, above all France and the United States.

When it was not altogether absent, Haiti was often submerged in the French revolutionary story, and therefore also in the comparative sociological study of revolutions that invariably adopted the French Revolution as one of two or three primary points of comparison. From Karl Marx to Thomas Piketty, the leading social scientific accounts of global economic inequality have internalized this historiographical lapse. Piketty's recent treatise argues that the French Revolution, and only the French Revolution, abolished all legal privileges and thereby established the principle of "legal equality in relation to the market." The American Revolution, says Piketty, fails this standard because it left slavery and racial discrimination intact. Such facile comparisons illustrate a continuing proclivity to write Haiti out of the Western revolutionary tradition that is all the more striking when its (good) intention is precisely to draw attention to the significance of slavery. Even more difficult to accept is a recent definition of the revolutionary tradition as a strictly European phenomenon encompassing only the American Revolution among New World developments.

If the irony of this perspective has sometimes been lost on students of the Atlantic revolutionary period, it could hardly have failed to impress classical republicans of the late eighteenth century who lived to see the Haitian Revolution unfold. On both sides of the Atlantic, in the years during and after the Seven Years' War, polemics identified the overcoming of a state of political slavery as the chief object of their exertions. The note was struck first by Whig pamphleteers in British North America. Slavery, Bernard Bailyn has observed, "was a central concept in eighteenth-century political discourse. As the absolute political evil, it appears in every statement of political principle, in every discussion of constitutionalism or legal rights, in every exhortation to resistance." Thus the Pennsylvanian John Dickinson wrote in 1768 that "[t]hose who are taxed without their own consent expressed by themselves or their representatives are slaves." And in 1774 John Adams, to take one other example, opined that under British rule the Americans were "the most abject sort of slaves." As Bailyn underlines, this was slavery in a very specific, eighteenth-century political sense: it denoted a state of servitude induced by corruption in the body politic that destroyed the capacity of the people for independence. The larger movement of classical republican thought in which this understanding of slavery participated is by now well charted in both the Anglo-American and French contexts (though Mary Nyquist's recent study of antityrannicism in early modern literature brings a new depth of scholarly understanding to political slavery's place in the seventeenth-century English Revolution). Slavery in the sense evoked by Dickinson, Adams, and many others in British North America had a close, if not an exact, counterpart in the French pre-revolutionary pamphlet literature. The most famous example is perhaps also the most revealing of this comparison, for it was itself born of the nexus between English and French political thought of
the period. Jean-Paul Marat’s *Chains of Slavery* was published in London in 1774; its full title captures both the republican gist of the work and the close connection to British politics:

a work wherein the clandestine and villainous attempts of princes to ruin liberty are pointed out, and the dreadful scenes of despotism disclosed, to which is prefixed, an address to the electors of Great Britain, in order to draw their timely attention to the choice of proper representatives in the next Parliament.

Marat was, at this time, nearing the end of a decade-long stay in Britain during the 1760s and 1770s. Occasioned by the approaching parliamentary elections of 1774, *Chains of Slavery* was an unabashed appeal to the British public to embrace the cause of the “Commonwealthmen,” whom Marat saw as the inheritors of the seventeenth-century English Revolution. And like other works in the commonwealth tradition, Marat emphasized throughout the potential for the crown, through its control of places and pensions, to reduce the legislature to a state of dependence and corruption.14

Slavery was not exactly a state of nature, in Marat’s view, since it depended on the institutions of organized society, and above all the executive power, for its existence. But it was, Marat argued, the natural fate of humanity. “It appears the common lot of mankind not to be allowed the enjoyment of liberty,” he wrote in the book’s opening sentence. Everywhere princes aspired to despotism, and everywhere they seemed to be prevailing, notwithstanding “the vain efforts of an unfortunate multitude to shake off oppression, and the numberless evils constantly attendant on slavery.”15

*Chains of Slavery* was republished in French in 1793, at the high-water mark of classical republican influence on French revolutionary politics, and just months before Marat’s death. In that context, the work’s provincial (British) origins quickly dropped out and it assumed the role of universal manifesto for the Jacobin cause.

This confluence of antislavery and Jacobinism in 1793–94 imported into classical republicanism a fateful element that was not itself a prominent theme of either *Chains of Slavery* or the Anglo-American Whig writers: the link between political revolution and violence. A *Republican Catechism* published in year II of the French revolutionary calendar concisely captures this shift. A revolution, the *Catechism* held, could be defined as none other than “a violent passage from a state of slavery to a state of liberty.”16 One clear context for such a definition of revolution ca. 1793–94 was the quest to justify the Terror as a natural and necessary response to foreign and domestic counter-revolution. The long-standing historiographical maelstrom that swirls around this problem is beyond the scope of this essay. Suffice it to say that Haiti’s place in that controversy, despite long-standing and widespread associations of the Saint-Domingue Revolution with retributive racial violence, has been a very minor one. That may be in part because the political ethics of the debate over the French revolutionary terror can be mapped onto the social context of the Haitian slave revolt only with considerable awkwardness.

The exceptional case in point on both counts is Germaine de Staël, writing in 1817, near the very outset of the French revolutionary historiographical tradition. Contrasting the relative tranquility of the seventeenth-century English Revolution with the fourteen months of the Reign of Terror in France, de Staël concluded from this comparison that “no people had ever been as fortunate for a hundred years as the French people. If the Negroes of Saint-Domingue have committed even more atrocities, it is because they had been all the more oppressed.” De Staël was careful to add, however, that “[i]t does not flow from these reflections that the crimes [of the Terror] merit less hatred.”17

De Staël’s interpellation of Haiti into her reading of the Terror is highly suggestive. But for most of the nineteenth century, and well into the twentieth, interpretations of the French Revolution in this period elided the Haitian Revolution where they did not overlook it altogether.18 And while benign neglect no longer characterizes the study of Saint-Domingue, the long-standing marginalization of the colonial revolution effectively confirmed that the difference between metaphorical and Atlantic chattel slavery (and hence the difference between metropolitan and colonial antislavery) was too large to contain within the same political and analytical framework.

To be sure, this gap was not nearly as wide as a literal interpretation would have it. British imperial critics of the American revolutionaries were among the most outspoken antislavery voices of their day. Their critique avoided discussion of British imperial participation in the slave trade while exposing the hypocrisy of American invocations of political servitude against the backdrop of southern plantation slavery.19 But the utterly instrumental nature of this critique obviated its political impact in the American colonies and elsewhere, even if it did go on to become (in Christopher Brown’s view) a “foundation” of British abolitionism, notwithstanding its avoidance of the slave trade. Mary Nyquist’s study of early
modern antityrannicism draws some tantalizing connections between seventeenth-century English discussions of political liberty (particularly Locke and Hobbes) and England's role in the emerging Atlantic slave economy, suggesting that the former helped to legitimate the latter. But, in contrast to Dan Edelstein's exploration in this volume of the striking parallels between the events of 1649 in Britain and 1793 in France, Nyquist makes little effort to link her discussion of the English civil war to the problem of chattel slavery in the late eighteenth century.\(^{20}\)

The notion that the American revolutionary understanding of antislavery could have served as a script for Saint-Domingue is problematic as an account of both the American and Haitian revolutions. Recall the essence of that understanding: the classical republican emphasis on enslavement as a process whereby the crown's control of places and pensions reduced the populace to a state of dependence on despotic power. Bailyn rightly notes that "slavery" so defined was more than "mere exclamation and hyperbole" and instead captured "a specific political condition" that Americans believed they shared with the people of France, Turkey, Russia, Denmark, and other "despotic" nations. But it is less clear that this definition of slavery "applied equally" to the enslavement of the African diaspora on New World plantations. Black plantation slavery was not simply "a more dramatic, more bizarre variation on the condition of all who had lost the power of self-determination."\(^{21}\)

This is not to deny that the revolutionary movement reinforced the position of preexisting antislavery communities in British North America and generated new pressures toward the abolition of slavery in the northern colonies/states. There were indeed voices who recognized, as early as 1774, that it was difficult to "reconcile the exercise of slavery with our professions of freedom," as the Philadelphian Richard Wells exclaimed in 1774.\(^{22}\) On the other hand, as George William Van Cleve notes, "there was—and could be—no uniform understanding across Revolutionary-era America of the relation between slavery and 'Revolution principles.'"\(^{23}\) Revolutionary-era denunciations of political and African American slavery, as in the Wells statement just quoted, masked "a political reality [that] was far more modest."\(^{24}\) And Van Cleve demonstrates, persuasively to my mind, that the impetus toward emancipation in the North was a deeply ambivalent and qualified one that made significant concessions to the interests of southern states, most notably in the way of fugitive slave policing mechanisms. The result was the "slaveholders' union" enshrined in the 1787 Constitution.\(^{25}\)

The long-standing debate over whether the Founders could have taken greater steps to limit or even abolish slavery in 1787 continues to simmer.\(^{26}\) We may agree with Gordon Wood that emphasizing the revolutionary generation's failure to end slavery obscures the ultimate significance of the "revolution principles" that the Founders did articulate. But there is perhaps less to this "eventualist" defense—the notion that the American Revolution's attack on political slavery made possible the later abolition of chattel slavery—that meets the eye, at least as a way of bridging the gap between political and plantation slavery. As Alfred Young, Gary Nash, and Ray Raphael have argued, "[b]y treating liberty and equality as 'promises' to future generations, we simultaneously acquit the founders of culpability and affirm our national commitment to these high goals."\(^{26}\) More problematically for the historian, we do so without then interrogating very deeply the forces that actually gave rise to abolition in the nineteenth century, whether in the United States or in Haiti.

A useful way of getting a handle on this debate is to ask why the American revolutionary emphasis on political enslavement appears to have had little or no impact on those parts of the Atlantic world that would have been especially vulnerable or receptive to such rhetoric. Jack Rakove's chapter in this volume explains part of the answer: the American revolutionaries very quickly came to subordinate revolutionary processes to the imperatives of constitutional authority. But the almost complete absence of American "revolution principles" from the prerevolutionary political scene in Saint-Domingue involved an additional and no less critical factor. The American Revolution was, in fact, a major concern of the French colonial pamphlet literature of the 1770s and 1780s, but those writers interpreted the American precedent in commercial more than political terms. Like the British colonies, the French colonies were subject to an Exchange that permitted them to trade only with the mother country. The military conflicts of the Seven Years' War and the American Revolution interrupted normal trading patterns and led to a marked expansion of the long-standing illegal trade of timber and salted cod for rum and molasses between British North America and the French Caribbean colonies. The threat of famine and slave unrest encouraged French colonial administrators to turn a blind eye to the reality of this commerce, and in 1784 the monarchy followed suit by relaxing the Exchange so as to essentially legalize the "Yankee-Creole" trade.\(^{27}\)

In the 1784–85 pamphlet debates that swirled around this controversy, the prospect of a French colonial war of liberation modeled on the American one was not entirely absent. But it was distinctly subordinated to discussions about how best to assimilate the American example through the
manipulation of trade policy. What separated commentators such as Michel-René Hilliard-d’Auberteuil, a radical thorn in the side of colonial administrators, from his opponent, Paul-Ulric Dubuisson, the former Saint-Domingue postal inspector turned pamphleteer, was a matter of emphasis within the world of colonial political economy. Hilliard-d’Auberteuil argued, in effect, that the “invisible hand” of the colonial marketplace was the best guarantee against imperial dismemberment: concede to the colonists their need to trade with the Americans, rather than rely on unenforceable prohibitions that would simply foster “a contraband so widespread that it would be seditious.” Dubuisson, for his part, argued that the French Caribbean colonies were as many “provinces of the kingdom of France, in the manner of Brittany, Normandy, and Guienne.” By this he meant not that the colonial provinces ought to forgo their commercial interests in the name of loyalty to France, but rather that the metropolitan provinces ought to receive no greater priority in the national scheme of things than Saint-Domingue. Mercantilism had no place, in other words, in a world of interprovincial equality.28

The 1784 decree legalizing the American-Dominguan interloper trade made it unnecessary to resolve the exact legal status of the colonies in the French empire—namely, what difference it made whether Saint-Domingue was to be treated as a “colony” or a “province.” This economic assimilation of the American Revolution’s impact on the French Caribbean colonies, moreover, served to dampen the political implications of 1776, an effect demonstrated nowhere more clearly than in Hilliard-d’Auberteuil’s somewhat mischievous treatment of the North American rebels. As a result, the American Revolution seems, overall, to have had little discernible effect on the political culture of prerevolutionary Saint-Domingue. Not surprisingly, when the time came to promulgate Haiti’s own declaration of independence in 1804, Dessalines rejected an early draft that seems to have appealed to the style and language of the American declaration.29

If the American Revolution did not provide an actual model for the unraveling of Saint-Domingue, what of the next most obvious candidate: the French Revolution? Historians have considered many different angles on this question, including the hypothetical dead end of debating whether a Haitian slave uprising would have occurred in the absence of a metropolitan revolution. The inquiry has proven to entail the classic question mal posée. The French Revolution was not a “prior” event relative to the transform of Saint-Domingue (just as the Haitian Revolution was not an “autonomous” force whose reciprocal impact on the French Revolution we can somehow isolate). The abolition of slavery in the French colonies in February 1794—arguably the most radical act of the entire revolutionary period30—was an act of the French Revolution, and also of the Haitian Revolution, but above all it was the product of the interaction between these two parallel sets of events.31

If we break down this unwieldy question into a set of smaller inquiries, by contrast, it is possible to assess certain discrete “impacts” of the early French Revolution on Saint-Domingue and the rest of the Atlantic world. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, for example, was undoubtedly a force in the debates over the rights of free people of color on both sides of the Atlantic between late 1789 and early 1792. And elsewhere in the Afro-Atlantic diaspora, the example of the taking of the Bastille created a memory of popular agitation that shaped critical moments in the anti-slavery drama. The famous 1822 revolt of Denmark Vesey in Charleston, South Carolina, is illustrative. Himself once a slave in Saint-Domingue before his French owner returned him to his seller—a ship captain named Joseph Vesey—Denmark timed his uprising to take place on the night of Sunday, 14 July 1822. The alleged purpose and nature of the plot—to set fire to Charleston and kill off the city’s white population—has become a matter of some dispute, but the links to the French and Haitian revolutionary experience seem clear enough.32

These and other examples notwithstanding, the framework for the revolution that eventually unfolded in Saint-Domingue is better identified not in geographic, linguistic, or national terms but rather in relation to a set of imperial political and legal dynamics, prerevolutionary in origin, that crisscrossed the Atlantic and spilled over colonial boundaries.33 The Declaration of the Rights of Man was not the only source of egalitarian claims-making in the early revolutionary period. Free colored leaders such as Julien Raimond turned also to the 1685 Code Noir and its guarantees of equal “rights, privileges, and immunities” to those manumitted from slavery.34 These individuals brushed the dust off of a promise that had been, by turns, long neglected or frustrated under French colonial rule, and used it to shame the National Assembly into living up to the standards enunciated more than a century earlier by Louis XIV.

As Raimond put it in his 1791 pamphlet tracing the history of racially discriminatory laws directed at free people of color—many of them enacted in the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War—the Code Noir had “granted to
freed persons, properly understood, the right of citizens.” Strictly speaking, this statement was false, for the Code Noir said nothing about “citizenship” per se, identifying the “rights, privileges, and immunities” of freed persons with those of native-born subjects of the king. Raimond was, in other words, doing more than merely parroting the language of the Code Noir; he was updating it to fit the demands of the new revolutionary situation. For this purpose, however, it mattered little that Louis XIV’s understanding of subjecthood was the product of an absolutist rather than republican culture. To the contrary, the more antiquated an appeal to the Sun King’s authority would have seemed to Raimond’s contemporaries, the more effective it would have been. Raimond’s coup de grâce followed: “Will the National Assembly be less just than a despot?”

The Code Noir’s promise of civil and political rights for freed persons gave the law of slavery a logical place in the revolutionary campaign for racial equality. Somewhat less intuitive is the role that the Code Noir seems to have played in the aftermath of the 1791 slave revolt in the northern plains of Saint-Domingue. The evidence on this point is sparse, contested in its authenticity, and subject to more than one reading. Nonetheless, it appears that Jean-François and Biassou, upon whom devolved leadership of the revolt following the death of Boukan Dutty shortly after it began on Friday, 22–23 August, appealed to the Code Noir’s prohibitions on the torture, brutalization, and neglect of slaves in their negotiations with the representatives of the metropolitan assembly. In one letter, Jean-François and Biassou seem to have referenced these provisions as a way of articulating the grievances of insurgents fighting in their camps. They did so not as part of a demand for the abolition of slavery but rather on the assumption that something like slavery would continue, particularly given that a limited grant of freedom for Jean-François and Biassou and their inner circle was on the table. A later letter to the civil commissioners reflects a more affirmative and empathic reading of the protections accorded slaves under royal law, along with an element of natural rights reasoning about the injustice of slavery that hearkened back to the Declaration of the Rights of Man.

Strategic appeals to selected provisions of the Code Noir did not operate in a vacuum. They were part and parcel of a larger colonial concern about the prospect of slave revolt that went back to the early eighteenth century and received canonical expression in Raynal’s *Histoire philosophique et politique des deux Indes* (first published in 1770). Indeed, as Keith Baker’s essay in this volume demonstrates, Raynal’s text was one of the first works of the Enlightenment to popularize the word “revolution” itself, and it did so in the context of describing the “black Spartacus” whom Raynal warned (hoped?) would one day arise to avenge the blood of the innocent lives taken by European colonization of the New World.

In Saint-Domingue, this prospect took on a more concrete form, linked as it was to the everyday tensions and anxieties that plantation society, in all of its violence and brutality, inevitably generated at both the administrative and domestic levels. These tensions and anxieties centered on the concern that planter abuse and slave vengeance were linked in a vicious circle of violence that would one day put an end to the colonial project. The strategic ethics that animated such an administrative culture, driven as it was by the need to contain over-reaching on the part of both masters and slaves, was itself a kind of script for the Haitian Revolution, and would prove to have a profound impact on metropolitan responses to the insurgency. Ultimately, in the hands of Sontbonax, Polverel, and the French National Convention, these tactical anxieties, against the backdrop of the sequential insurrections led by gens de couleur and slaves, would give rise to what we know today as the abolition of slavery in Saint-Domingue in 1793–94.

Let us briefly consider some of the principal characteristics of that process, as seen through the prism of Sontbonax’s August 1791 decree of general liberty in Saint-Domingue. “The regime is going to be changed,” and productive work would henceforth be compensated, Sontbonax informed the insurgents, but “do not think that the liberty that you will enjoy means laziness and inactivity.” All peoples “currently in slavery” were declared “free to enjoy all the rights of French citizens,” even as they were made subject to a series of restrictions that implemented Sontbonax’s injunction against “laziness and inactivity.” In particular, “all men who do not own property and are neither in the military, nor working in agriculture, nor employed in someone’s home... or are found to be vagrants, will be arrested and put in prison.” In the new order to come, the ideal types of the warrior and the cultivator more or less exhausted the range of legitimate lifestyles. The formal terms of the Code Noir were “provisionally repealed,” but whether the substance of coerced labor was repealed along with it remained very much an open question.

Much of this history was subsequently effaced in the all-out violence that accompanied Haiti’s war for independence in 1802–3, which saw the forced exile of Toussaint Louverture to France and his replacement by
Jean-Jacques Dessalines. The proclamation of Haitian independence on 1 January 1804 announced a new revolutionary script far more radical than the one that had animated the contests of the 1790s. In the new order to come, "independence" consisted of two separate but putatively overlapping imperatives. The first was the elimination of all ties to France. The second was the end of racial domination and chattel slavery. Each of these goals was presented in the most uncompromising of terms: "In the end we must live independent or die," said Dessalines in his New Year's Day address to the people of Haiti at the public square in Gonaïves. The shadows of slavery continued to haunt the Dominguan landscape, he explained.

Everything revives the memories of the cruelties of this barbarous people: our laws, our habits, our towns, everything still carries the stamp of the French. Indeed! There are still French in our island, and you believe yourself free and independent of that republic, which, it is true, has fought all the nations, but which has never defeated those who wanted to be free.

The clear implication of this passage was that Haiti could only be free from "the cruelties of this barbarous people" when no more identifiable "French" individuals remained on the territory of the new nation.

It was indeed a fiercely resolute warning, and one that Dessalines followed through on a few months later, between February and April 1804, when he ordered and personally oversaw the ruthless massacre of most whites then remaining in the colony. The first Haitian national constitution, enacted in 1805, provided that "[n]o white man, regardless of his nationality, may set foot in this territory as a master or landowner, nor will he ever be able to acquire any property." All color distinctions were otherwise abolished, as Haitians would henceforth "only be known generically as blacks." The notion of rupture in both ideological and material or physical terms seemed absolute, and should be understood in part against the backdrop of an ongoing and very real threat of renewed invasion by France, not to mention the unrelenting hostility of nearly every other power in the Atlantic world, including Jefferson's Republican administration.

And yet, in certain respects, Dessalines's regime was less radical than it seemed, for it followed in the footsteps of Louverture's own compromised and ambiguous embrace of the need to end coercive plantation labor. Louverture's October 1800 and November 1801 labor regulations aimed to ensure the "general liberty" of the Haitian people by guaranteeing continued exports of sugar and coffee, which could happen only (in Louverture's mind) if the formerly enslaved were attached to their planta-

tions and mandated to take up the labor they had once performed as chattel property.

Dessalines's address on the occasion of Haitian independence alluded vaguely and awkwardly to his own variation on this revolutionary theme: "If ever you refused or grumbled while receiving those laws that the spirit guarding your fate dictates to me for your own good, you would deserve the fate of an ungrateful people." Notwithstanding such necessary compromises of the past (and those that would likely become necessary in the future), Dessalines urged his listeners to "prefer death to anything that will try to place you back in chains." Overall, the 1804 Declaration of Independence suggests that, by equating renunciation of France with actual liberation from slavery and its vestiges, Dessalines permitted himself to compromise with the second of these two goals in order to guarantee the first. By defining the meaning of "freedom from slavery" in terms of "independence or death," the Declaration privileged two critical elements of the institution of chattel slavery in Saint-Domingue over others: the ideology of racial supremacy, and French sovereign rule over the plantations as embodied in the Code Noir, one of those "laws" that "revives the memories of the cruelties of this barbarous people." Left intact, or at least unaddressed, were other components of slavery-like systems: the practice of coerced labor, and the ability of some to claim property rights in others. The first Haitian Constitution, promulgated in 1805, declared that "[s]lavery is abolished forever" while holding that "[p]roperty rights are sacred" and stating that "[a]griculture, the first, most noble, and most useful of the arts, will be honored and protected."

There are reasonable and important debates to be had about what was lost, and what gained, with the coming of Haitian independence. Perhaps the most famous account of the fate of Haiti's abolitionist script after 1804 is that of C. L. R. James: James's The Black Jacobins, first published in 1938. In an appendix to the 1963 American second edition, James posted a straight line leading "from Toussaint L'Ouverture to Fidel Castro," as the title put it, such that "[w]hat took place in French San Domingo in 1792–1804 reappeared in Cuba in 1958." A half-century later, that comparison appears less flattering to Haiti than James no doubt intended.

The fact remains that, well before the United States succeeded in doing so, Haiti's 1801 and 1805 constitutions abolished slavery and racial discrimination and enacted something like equal protection of the laws: achievements that were not incorporated into the American constitution until 1865.
and 1868, only to be undermined shortly thereafter by the southern backlash against Reconstruction. And the ending of slavery in the rest of the French empire itself would await 1848 and the arrival of the Second Republic. In what remains of this essay, I want briefly to consider what these subsequent abolitionist processes can tell us about the catechistic definition of revolution relative to the Haitian experience.

The antislavery script that first came to fruition in revolutionary Haiti continued to unfold in the United States of the antebellum and Civil War years. The American reaction to 1804 initially took the form of denying Haiti's very existence, as Congress (with President Jefferson's support) moved to impose an embargo on trade and the movement of persons between the former French colony and the United States. In other forms, however, the message of Haitian independence deeply penetrated the politics and society of antebellum America, in the North and South alike, as recent studies by Ashli White, Edward Rugemer, and Matthew Clavin have confirmed. Southern strategic anxiety about a revolutionary contagion of "French negroes" joined northern prognostications of a bloody race war unfolding in the absence of gradual emancipation.

No figure better captures the tensions in these competing visions of the Haitian "threat" than Lincoln. Lincoln's path to the Emancipation Proclamation was, as James McPherson has written, a second American Revolution. But it traveled by way of a complex vacillation between racism and equality, a coded commitment to "constitutional limits" on the antislavery agenda and a willingness to endure rupture for the sake of union. It also traveled through the former Saint-Domingue. While Jefferson's decision to renounce state-level ties with Haiti carried forward until 1862, the coming of war motivated Charles Sumner to open up a campaign in support of recognizing Haiti. Later that year, Lincoln re-established diplomatic relations with the former French colony for the first time since the administration of the first John Adams. (In an especially fitting act of poetic justice, the post of minister resident/consul general to Haiti would eventually be held by Frederick Douglass from 1889 to 1891.) Even as he embraced the cause of recognition and moved toward the wartime emancipation act, however, Lincoln was still entertaining his lifetime illusion that colonization could solve the race question in the United States. On 31 December 1864, the day before the Emancipation Proclamation was issued, he signed a contract with a Charleston businessman named Bernard Kock that entailed the settlement of some five thousand African Americans to Île à Vache, off of Haiti's southern coast. The venture proved (unsurprisingly) to be a fiasco, one that only the following morning's "act of justice"—a phrase that Treasury Secretary Salmon Chase persuaded Lincoln to incorporate into the Emancipation Proclamation at the last minute, so as to soften the document's otherwise emphatically strategic tone—could redeem.

The close proximity, in both time and spirit, of these Haitian-American stories to the Emancipation Proclamation suggests that the Civil War witnessed a merger of Atlantic revolutionary scripts: an updating and revision of the revolutionary tradition in light of both the (first) American and Haitian insurrections. In Lincoln's America, "revolution" had indeed proven to be a "violent passage from a state of slavery to a state of liberty." But is this process accurately described as an enactment of the Founders' revolutionary-era commitment to metaphorical antislavery? The affirmative case is not so much wrong as incomplete. Alexander Tsesis has shown that the language of equality in the 1776 Declaration inspired a rhetoric of equal protection in the antebellum period that ultimately became the formal equal protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. And Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson have argued that the term "slavery" in the Thirteenth Amendment (declaring slavery abolished throughout the United States as of 1865) was taken from the Framers' use of the same word in the 1787 Northwest Ordinance. As of 1787, these scholars say, the term "slavery" evoked the metaphorical vision of revolutionary-era classical republicanism, which associated slavery broadly with illegitimate domination and political subordination.

But if the slavery that was outlawed in 1865 and 1868 was not African American chattel slavery, as Balkin and Levinson insist, what was it? From this question flows a century and a half of still contested judicial doctrine interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment to refer only to chattel slavery—thereby excluding from that amendment's purview other coercive labor practices, such as the southern peonage regime that the Department of Justice sought to challenge in the 1940s on both constitutional and statutory grounds. Balkin and Levinson write, understandably, in protest of this marginalization, which derives from the conservative ideology that a suddenly "free" society was created in 1865. But the contrarian premise that the Thirteenth Amendment evokes a metaphorical vision of slavery (and hence of antislavery) proves too much. It seeks to draw a line between the late eighteenth century and the contemporary era that effectively bypasses the second American Revolution that was the Civil War. And though debate over the character of that war persists, the notion that the Civil War was not in some central sense a war to end slavery no longer persuades.
The persistence of slavery's legacies in modern American history is real, not metaphorical, even if there are many other forms of contemporary subordination that do not partake of racial inequalities.

Somewhat ironically, a variation of the Balkin/Levinson thesis might actually make better sense of the final French abolition of slavery. The 1848 emancipation was only an indirect beneficiary of the forces that resulted in the creation of the Second French Republic: the latest chapter in a still unfolding French revolutionary narrative dating back to 1789. The year 1848 witnessed the convergence of this newly radicalized republican script with Victor Schoelcher's specifically anticolonial brand of abolitionism, a cause that the moderate Alexis de Tocqueville framed as a matter of French national honor and economic self-interest.

In fact, it required the threat of a preemptive slave uprising in the French West Indies to prompt the April 1848 decree by which all slaves in the French colonies were finally liberated and granted the right to vote. In bringing the curtain down on the Second French Republic a few short years later, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte retroactively limited the effect of the 1848 emancipation decree by denying the colonies representation in the metropolitan legislature. The creation of this new “empire without slaves” thus recalls both the strategic pragmatism of French revolutionary abolitionism vis-à-vis Saint-Domingue and the visions of British antislavery activists of the post–Seven Years’ War era.

Yet for many years after 1848, the question “What is abolition?” remained a salient one in France. The revival of the Atlantic slave trade under Bonaparte after 1851 fueled a new system of indentured servitude in Martinique, Guadeloupe, and elsewhere. And the masters of the former slaves were compensated for the loss of their property. Even today, the ambiguities of French abolitionism linger in public debate and legal contestation. In 2013, a descendant of Guadeloupean slaves named Rosita Destival brought suit on behalf of her grandparents, seeking reparations from the French government (as the successor to the regimes of the Code Noir) under a 2001 statute known as the Taubira law, which declared slavery a crime against humanity. Destival’s claims included a retroactive demand to declare the compensation of former slave masters after 1848 unconstitutional, pursuant to a newly enacted procedure that permits French courts to review acts of the National Assembly for conformity with the French Constitution. And the fourteen members of the Caribbean Community (including Haiti) are preparing to sue for reparations against France, Britain, the Netherlands, and other European governments, though it remains unclear just how the International Court of Justice would calculate damages to compensate for the many injuries inflicted by slavery. What price to be paid for forced labor, for example, or for the indignities associated with racial subordination? The antislavery script lives on, quintessentially but not solely in legal form, continually soliciting original performances of an endless revolutionary plot line.
52. On the “natural republicanism” of the Jacobins, see my _Terror of Natural Right_, chap. 5. On the utopian socialists, see notably Frank Manuel, _The New World of Henri Saint-Simon_ (Cambridge, MA, 1956); and Billington, _Fire in the Minds of Men_.

53. See _The Class Struggles in France_ (1830), in _The Class Struggles in France: From the February Revolution to the Paris Commune_ (Chippendale, AU, 2001), 106.


55. I explore the afterlife of the Jacobin script in “Revolution in Permanence and the Fall of Popular Sovereignty,” forthcoming.

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4. For the body of works, see Brochures sur les fêtes en l’honneur de Marat et Le Pèlerin, French Revolution Research Collection, Gallica.


8. Alain Chevalier, préface to ibid.


11. Coqaud, _Jean-Paul Marat_.

12. _Spectateur Universel_, CLXXCV (14 juillet 1793).


17. Peter McPhee, _Rolespierre, A Revolutionary Life_ (New Haven, 2012).


19. _Journal de Marseille_, 20 juin 1793; J. De Cock, “La santé de l’Ami du peuple,” in De Cock and Goetz, eds., _Jean-Paul Marat_.

20. Stanis Perez, _La santé de Louis XIV. Une biohistoire du Roi-Soleil_ (Seysel, 2007).


23. Adresse de la Société républicaine de Chaumont à la Convention nationale, 18 juillet 1793, AN C 266, d. 182.


27. Mazeau, _Le Bain de l’histoire_, chap. 2.


32. Mazeau, _Le Bain de l’histoire_, chap. 3.


36. Jourdan, _La Révolution française_.

**Ghachem: The Antislavery Script**

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4. Compare Orlando Patterson, Freedom, vol. 1, Freedom in the Making of Western Culture (New York, 1991), ix (noting that freedom is "the catchword of every politician").
7. For an example of these caricatures, see the 1790 medallion by Simon-Louis Boizot available at http://jcb.lunai imaging.com/luna/servlet/detail/ JCB:1~1~1291~4660066: Moi-Libre-aussi.
9. Palmer's The Age of the Democratic Revolution is frequently cited in this context. As Lynn Hunt has observed, Palmer's work should be understood and appreciated as an important intervention into the debates of its own scholarly time. Lynn Hunt, preface to "Robert Roswell Palmer: A Transatlantic Journey of American Liberalism," Historical Reflections/Reflexions historiques 37, no. 3 (Winter 2011): v–vii. For a reading of the revolutionary era that absorbs the recent rise of Haiti as an historical actor, see, e.g., Wim Klooster, Revolutions in the Atlantic World: A Comparative History (New York, 2009).
22. Quoted in Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, 239. See also Peter A. Dorsey, Common Bondage: Slavery as Metaphor in Revolutionary America (Knoxville, TN, 2009).
24. Ibid., chaps. 2–4.
27. For the details of this history, see Malick W. Ghachem, "Sovereignty and Slavery: Haitian Variations on a Metropolitan Theme," Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 2002, chap. 3.
29. David Armitage, The Declaration of Independence: A Global History (Cambridge, MA, 2007), 115. No actual manuscript reflecting this initial draft has survived the passage of time, but a portion seems to have been preserved and appears in Gaétan Mentor, Les fils noirs de la veuve: Histoire de la franc-maçonnerie en Haïti (Port-au-Prince, 2001), 168–69. See David Geggus, "La déclaration de independen-
cia de Haiti," in Declarando Independencias: Textos fundamentales, ed. Alfredo Ávila et al. (Mexico City, 2013). Julia Gaffield's very recent discovery of an original print of the final declaration in the British National Archives gives one reason to hope that the earlier drafts, believed to have been composed by a free person of color named Jean-Jacques Charéron, may eventually be found. For Gaffield's discovery, see http://today.duke.edu/showcase/haitideclaration/juliasdiscovery.html.


31. Compare Potofsky's essay "The One and the Many," which describes the Haitian Revolution as a "future revolution" relative to that of France, and one whose "immediate origins must be found in the same sense of inequality or injustice as well as the promise of universal human rights" (at 32; internal quotations omitted). Stated at this level of generality the thesis proves too much, for the origins of nearly all revolutions must then be traced to the French Revolution, and then further back in time to the American Revolution, and so on.


33. I have developed this argument elsewhere and will only briefly summarize the main lines of argument here. See Malick W. Ghachem, The Old Regime and the Haitian Revolution (New York, 2012).

34. Code Noir (1685), arts. 57 and 59.


36. The two letters in question—dated 22 December 1791 and July 1792, respectively—are discussed in Ghachem, The Old Regime and the Haitian Revolution, 276–85.

37. I am here summarizing the argument of Ghachem, ibid., chaps. 3–6.

38. Câtel, address to the assembled crowd in Creole. His secretary, Louis Boisrond-Tonnerre, then read, in French, the longer speech that is known today (somewhat misleadingly) as the Haitian Declaration of Independence. A separate act announced the independence of Haiti proper, and a third document made Dessalines governor-general of Haiti for life.

40. Address of Jean-Jacques Dessalines at Gonaïves, 1 January 1804, in Dubois and Garrigus, Slave Revolution in the Caribbean, 188–89.

41. Dessalines went on to express his threat to the assembled crowd, and in the French-speaking population, thereby "soil[ing] the land of liberty." Ibid., 189.

42. See Davis, Inhuman Bondage, 168.

43. The 1805 Haitian Constitution, arts. 12 and 14, in Dubois and Garrigus, Slave Revolution in the Caribbean, 192–93.

44. Claude Moïse, Le projet national de Toussaint Louverture et la Constitution de 1801 (Montreal, 2001). This fine volume reprints Louverture's October 1800 and November 1801 labor regulations at 131–57.

45. Address of Dessalines to the People of Haiti (1 January 1804), in Dubois and Garrigus, Slave Revolution in the Caribbean, 191.

46. The 1805 Haitian Constitution, in ibid., 192, 196.

47. See the essays in Julia Gaffield, ed., The Haitian Declaration of Independence: Creation, Context, and Legacy (Charlottesville, VA, 2011).


49. Davis, Inhuman Bondage, 167.

50. It is certainly possible to trace many other genealogies. See David Patrick Geggus and Norman Fiering, eds., The World of the Haitian Revolution (Bloomington, IN, 2009); David Barry Gaspar and David Patrick Geggus, eds., A Turbulent Time: The French Revolution and the Greater Caribbean (Bloomington, IN, 1997); David Patrick Geggus, ed., The Impact of the Haitian Revolution in the Atlantic World (Columbia, SC, 2002); and Ada Ferrer, Freedom's Mirror: Cuba and Haiti in the Age of Revolution (New York, 2014).

51. Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 303. As Julia Gaffield's work shows, this embroilment was not water-tight even as to American merchants, and in the Caribbean trade with Haiti continued as it had for decades under French colonial rule. See Julia Gaffield, "Haiti and Jamaica in the Remaking of the Early Nineteenth-Century Atlantic World," William and Mary Quarterly 69, no. 3 (2012): 583–613.


54. Dubois, Avengers of the New World, 303.


56. Foner, The Fiery Trial, 239–40. Only about four hundred African Americans were actually transported to the island at the end of the day, and most returned to the United States within a very short period.

57. Ibid., 241.

58. Câtel, address to the assembled crowd in Creole. His secretary, Louis Boisrond-Tonnerre, then read, in French, the longer speech that is known today (somewhat misleadingly) as the Haitian Declaration of Independence. A separate act announced the independence of Haiti proper, and a third document made Dessalines governor-general of Haiti for life.

66. Drescher, _Abolition_, 282.


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4. See Michael Rowe, _From Reich to State: The Rhineland in the Revolutionary Age 1780–1830_ (Cambridge, 2003).


10. Cited in Breckman, “Diagnosing the “German Misery.”” 39. Börne considered that the passivity of Shakespeare’s _Hamlet_ could be attributed to the time he spent studying German philosophy at the University of Wittenberg. Ibid., 39. Ludwig Börne, a democratic writer and a lapsed Jew, went into exile in Paris at the same time as Heine. He was one of the heroes of the young Friedrich Engels, especially be-

cause of his attack on the anti-French German nationalism of Wolfgang Menzel, in his 1837 _Menzel der Franzosenfreund_. Heine fell out with him and denounced him after his death in Ludwig Börne: eine Denkschrift (1840), which Engels regarded as “despicable.”


13. Ibid., 187.

14. The regime of Louis Philippe, in particular its chief spokesman, Guizot, claimed that it represented _la classe moyenne_, a class without privileges and open to the talented from all classes. See Adeline Daumard, _Les Bourgeois et la Bourgeoisie en France depuis 1815_ (Paris, 1987), 44–51; Pierre Rossanvallon, _Le Moment Guizot_ (Paris, 1985), passim. The Saint-Simonians played an important part in initially defining the 1830 Revolution as “bourgeois” and underlining its pejorative character. See Shirley Gruner, “The Revolution of July 1830 and the Expression ‘Bourgeoisie,’” _Historical Journal_ 11, no. 3 (1968): 462–71. From the Saint-Simonians, this terminology spread to the rest of the left. The journalistic work of Louis Blanc was particularly important. See, for example, Louis Blanc, _Révolution Française: Histoire de dix ans, 1830–1840_, 5 vols. (Paris, 1841–44). Blanc characterized “the social history of the bourgeoisie” as “the banking interest enthralling industry and commerce; individual credit profiting the strong, injuring the weak; in a word, the reign of competition tending inevitably to overthrow small fortunes, and to undermine those of middle standard and all this for the purpose of arriving at a real financial feudalty . . . an oligarchy of bankers.” From 1835 to 1839, Blanc continued, “the bourgeoisie busied itself only with completing its domination. To turn the elective system to its own advantage, to seize on the parliamentary power and render it supreme after having achieved its conquest, such was for fifteen years the work prosecuted by liberalism.” Louis Blanc, _The History of Ten Years 1830–1840_, 2 vols. (London, 1845), 1: 27, 33.
