Frank C. Zagare is UB Distinguished Professor of Political Science. A former Vice President of the International Studies Association, Dr. Zagare has served on the Advisory Panel of the National Science Foundation, on the editorial boards of International Studies Quarterly,  International Interactions, and Oxford Bibliographies Online in International Relations, as a panelist for the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, as a member of the Presidential Nominating Committee and the Professional Rights and Responsibilities Committee of the International Studies Association, as a Councilor for the Peace Science Society (International), as a Council Member of the Conflict Processes Section of the American Political Science Association, and on the Academic Advisory Board of the United Arab Emirates University. His research has been supported by grants from the National Science Foundation, the International Studies Association, and the United States Institute of Peace. In  2005 he received the Susan Strange Award from the International Studies Association. Professor Zagare is the author, co-author, or editor of seven books including Perfect Deterrence (with D. Marc Kilgour), The Dynamics of Deterrence, Game Theory: Concepts and Applications, and The Games of July: Explaining the Great War. His most recent book is Game Theory, Diplomatic History, and Security Studies. He is also curator of The Deterrence Project.

• PhD, New York University
• MA, New York University
• BA, Fordham University

Explaining escalation and limited conflicts; modeling extended deterrence; explaining the First World War.

• PSC 346 – Individuals and World Politics
• PSC 393 – Game Theory and Politics
• PSC 504 – Approaches to the Study of International Relations
• PSC 533 – Formal Political Theory

• “Two Against One: Deterrence in the Triad,” Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, (2024): 1 – 25
• “Explaining the Long-Peace: Why von Neumann (and Schelling) Got it Wrong,” International Studies Review, (2018), pp. 422–37.
• “A Game-Theoretic History of the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Economies, 2, number 1 (2014), pp. 20 – 44.
• The Games of July: Explaining the Great War. (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2011).
• “Explaining the 1914 War in Europe,” Journal of Theoretical Politics, 21, number 1 (January 2009), pp. 63 – 95.
• “Reconciling Rationality with Deterrence: A Re-examination of the Logical Foundations of Deterrence Theory,” Journal of Theoretical Politics, 16, number 2 (April 2004) pp. 107 – 141.